Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

795.00/6–2950: Telegram

The Chargé at Saigon (Gullion) to the Secretary of State

secret   priority

Saigon, June 29, 1950—1 p. m.

525. 1. No Vietminh or Chinese Commie action of unusual character yet observed following Korea development.¹ French forces hold initiative continuing Tonkin sweep-up and difficult operation into Plaine des Jones Vietminh stronghold in south destroying “enormous” quantities Red munition stocks at considerable cost to French troops.

2. Effect US intervention in Korea all the more electric because both local French and Viets had discounted the possibility. They thought our procedure in SC was mere effort to talk our consciences clear before American people and mass UN action. News of intervention had not arrived before press had begun to take pessimistic tone. It was said that munitions to be sent by MacArthur would arrive too late and would only supply Commies.

3. Yesterday morning delivered substance of President’s declaration to principal French and Associated States representatives now in Vietnam. Conferred at acting HC Torel’s request with him, political counselor Bonfils, acting commander-in-chief Alessandri, Col. Brebisson, chief of general staff. French highly gratified, particularly military who had lately shown some skepticism (Legtel 524, June 29)² and disenchantment about our intentions in IC and Far East. They asked to be informed about progress of operations and further diplomatic negotiations, French civil administration particularly concerned about effect on Viets who had traversed psychological crises in last two days. First crisis was when they thought US and UN would not intervene. French described effect as “catastrophic”. Yet when we reacted vigorously Viets showing tendency to panic, in fear of immediate extension of conflict here. Hoped in my remarks on reception of US aid aircraft I might help calm them. Replied would say that such aid was destined to make war less not more likely but I hoped Viets could be gradually brought to realize their stake in world-wide anti-Commie fight and their responsibility in it. Also they seemed completely to overlook that we had worked through and for UN”, pouring strength in its forms and making it the enforcer of world peace it was meant to be. Viets showing tendency to view this as power clash between Soviets and US in which they might get hurt.

4. Then saw acting Prime Minister (Minister of Justice) Nguyen Khac Ve and secretary of FonOff Do Hung. (All other key Viet officials in France for Pau conference.) Viets obviously scared but agreed Vietnam would have run greater danger had US not intervened. When I stated that the vigorous intervention of US and UN ought to discourage further aggression, Khac Ve agreed and observed that situation recalled re-occupation of Rhine by Nazis, except that we had accepted the challenge thus probably preserving the peace whereas French had failed in their responsibility.

5. The group of French officials believed a further statement by high US officials (i.e., President, Secretary of Defense) expressing US concern and interest in IC would be very desirable for Vietnam morale. Even in spite Korea intervention there was lingering belief that Vietnam was beyond pale of US strategic interest and some Viets sp interpreted declarations of US spokesmen, for example Secretary’s Press Club speech of last winter.³ I said that we had made many declarations of our interest in IC most recently following Foreign Ministers conference and there would very possibly be more, how categoric I did not know. I recalled that the recognition of Bao Dai, US decision to send aid all had taken place since declarations they cited.

Department pass Paris. Sent priority Department 525; repeated info Paris 264.

Gullion

1. On June 25, forces of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea invaded the Republic of Korea. On June 27, the U.N. Security Council approved a United States resolution recommending that members of the United Nations furnish assistance to the Republic of Korea to repel the armed attack. The same day President Truman issued a statement indicating that he had ordered United States air and sea forces to give support to the troops of the Republic of Korea. The President’s announcement also stated that he had ordered the United States Seventh Fleet to prevent attacks on or from Formosa, and had ordered the strengthening of United States forces in the Philippines. In addition, the statement included the following with respect to Indochina: “I have similarly directed acceleration in the furnishing of military assistance to the forces of France and the Associated States in Indochina and the dispatch of a military mission to provide close working relations with those forces.” For the full text of the President’s statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 492, or Department of State Bulletin, July 3, 1950, p. 5.

   For documentation on the Korean War, see volume vii .

2. Not printed.
3. Reference is to an address by Secretary Acheson on United States policy toward Asia delivered before the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., January 12, 1950. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, January 23, 1950, pp. 111–118.