PSA Files: Lot 54D190
Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State
for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant) to the
Secretary of State
secret
[Washington,] March 7, 1950.
The attached memorandum has been prepared to summarize the principle
policy considerations with which the United States Government is
concerned in Indochina.
You are of course familiar with what the Department has done in the
premises; the recognition of the three Indochinese states, the efforts
to secure Asian recognition of them, the dispatch of the Griffin mission
to Saigon,1 the dispatch of elements
of the Seventh Fleet to Saigon, and the processing of requests for
economic and military assistance from the French Government and from the
Government of Bao Dai.
Certain important decisions must yet be made in respect of:
- (a)
- The extent and character of our military commitment in
Indochina. This matter has been referred to the National
Security Council for action.
- (b)
- The French have proposed that conversations commence at once
between the governments of the United States, France and the
United Kingdom on the problem of general anti-Communist strategy
in Southeast Asia and that staff talks between representatives
of the three powers concerning the defense of Indochina be
initiated. As you know, it is our purpose to embody the subject
of Indochina in conversations now planned for the Foreign
Ministers of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom
on a wide range of subjects. FE
and EUR are favorably disposed
toward the initiation of staff conversations provided the
Government of the United Kingdom is agreeable.
If you agree, therefore EUR and FE will make appropriate approaches to the
British Government to determine its attitude toward
[Page 750]
the commencement of staff discussions; if
the British Government is agreeable the Department will notify the
French Foreign Office that we are prepared to begin staff discussions at
once on the defense of Indochina.
[Annex]
Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant) to
the Assistant Secretary (Butterworth)
secret
[Washington,] March 7,
1950.
Subject: French Indochina
I The Department’s policy with respect to Southeast Asia is to stop
Communism at the southern border of China (i.e., to prevent the
establishment by force in the countries south of China of Communist
or Communist-dominated regimes) by all feasible and appropriate
political, economic and military measures.
The importance of French Indochina is due to:
- A.
- The fact that it is the key to the rest of the area. It
can be assumed that Thailand would change sides promptly if
French Indochina goes Communist. Burma would be outflanked.
The position of the British in Malaya would be gravely
prejudiced and the opening up to the Communist coalition of
the raw materials of the Republic of the United States of
Indonesia would be accelerated.
- B.
- The probability that the inability of Mao Tze-tung to
expand southward would increase the friction between China
and Russia over Manchuria and the northern tier of Chinese
provinces.
- C.
- The certainty that the prestige of psychological results
of another Communist triumph in Asia, following on the heels
of China, would be felt beyond the immediate area and could
be expected adversely to affect our interests in India,
Pakistan and even the Philippines.
II The element of urgency in French Indochina is underlined by:
- A.
- The recognition of Ho Chi-minh by Peking and
Moscow.
- B.
- The certainty of increased support in the form of arms and
supplies for Ho Chi-minh’s forces from the Chinese
Communists now that the latter are established on
Indochina’s northern border.
- C.
- The formal French request of February 16, 1950 for massive
economic and military assistance.
III Actions taken by the U.S. in the political field include:
- A.
- Recognition of Bao Dai and the Kings of Laos and
Cambodia.
- B.
- Efforts to persuade friendly Asian countries similarly to
recognize.
- C.
- Maintenance of continuing pressure on the French to extend
the area of sovereignty granted to these three
rulers.
- D.
- Active cooperation with the British in the foregoing
activities.
[Page 751]
IV Actions taken by the U.S. in the economic field include:
- A.
- Under the ERP Program for metropolitan France the
necessary dollar imports of French Indochina have been and
continue to be financed.
- B.
- An unsuccessful effort was made to secure additional funds
in ECA fiscal 1950 budget
($15 million) for economic projects within French Indochina
over and above financing necessary imports.
- C.
- It is our intention to seek Congressional extension until
the end of fiscal 1951 authority to expend residual China
Aid funds and to include French Indochina in the area of
eligibility for the use of such funds.
- D.
- The Griffin Mission arrives in Saigon March 6 to survey
economic programs with political impact and promising early
results which might be financed under ECA China Aid, Point IV funds
or Section 303.
V Actions taken by the U.S. in the military field include:
- A.
- Transmission to the President, with the concurrence of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense, a
request that $15 million be earmarked from Section 303 funds
for military equipment to be supplied in Indochina.2
- B.
-
NSC 64 was submitted by the
Department on February 27, 1950 requesting the establishment
of a joint working group on French Indochina composed of
representatives of the Departments of State and
Defense.
- C.
- Arising from informal meetings of this working group, the
Department of State representatives have requested a
military assessment of the magnitude and availability of the
U.S. military effort which would be required of the U.S.
either in addition to or in partial substitution for the
French effort to render French Indochina militarily secure
against:
-
a)
- A full-scale invasion by Chinese Communist
organized forces, or
-
b)
- Increased insurrectionist activity by the forces
of Ho Chi-minh, supported by arms and material
support from China.
It is assumed that under a)
above such an act of aggression would be promptly taken to the
United Nations and that we would be committed to help enforce such
solution as the United Nations agreed to. Under b) it should be assumed that no U.S. combat forces would
participate in the internal police action conducted by the French
Army and the troops of Bao Dai. Fundamentally, our policy with
respect to Burma can be considered indentic with that applicable to
French Indochina. Burma is distinguished from French Indochina,
however, by the fact that as a member of the British Commonwealth
[sic] it is primarily the political,
economic and military responsibility of the Commonwealth and the
Commonwealth has not requested assistance of the U.S.
