Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

794A.00/8–2750

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Under Secretary of State (Webb)

top secret

[Washington,] August 27, 1950.

As I foresee developments, those who put out the release in Chicago may well let it stand, and then instead of formally presenting the message to the Convention may read the telegram from General Mac-Arthur and issue a blast at the same time.

In the resulting confusion, questions will be asked as to who ordered the withdrawal of the original message and why the original message is regarded as inconsistent with United States policy. The question arises whether the White House today should issue its order, the General’s reply and the General’s telegram, or whether it should brief the press for release when the news breaks. There may be still other alternatives of action.

Points which might be made either now in order to clarify the press or by me on Tuesday,¹ or both, are along these lines:

1. There can be only one voice in stating United States positions in foreign relations. This is of fundamental Constitutional importance. The President has spoken very clearly and very specifically on the subject of American policy toward Formosa. It is essential that the clarity, sincerity and good faith of our position on this matter—a matter which is now being used to divide the free world—should not be brought in doubt.

The President cannot debate with the General as to who states the United States position the better nor can he debate with the General whether the General’s statement supports or does not support the President’s position.

The President’s statement must stand before the world unconfused and uninterpreted as the official position of the United States.

In the light of this situation if the General’s statement is compared with the President’s statement, the difference is at once apparent. For instance, the President says in his statement of June 27 that, as a corollary of the action in directing the Seventh Fleet to prevent an attack on Formosa, he was calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. There is no suggestion of this idea in the General’s statement.

2. In the same statement, the President says that the determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan or consideration by the United Nations. There is no such idea in the General’s paper.

3. In the President’s message to Congress of July 19, he says that we have no territorial ambitions nor do we seek for ourselves any special position or privileges on Formosa. The General’s statement should be read in the light of this pronouncement by the President.

4. In his message the President says that the present military action is without prejudice to the political questions affecting that island and that our desire is that these political questions be settled by peaceful means.

5. The President says that with peace reestablished even the most complex political questions are susceptible of solution, but in the presence of brutal aggression some of these questions may have to be held in abeyance in the interests of the security of all.

Not only in these statements made most solemnly by the President as official statements of the Government but in the official communication which Ambassador Austin as the direct representative of the President made to Mr. Trygve Lie on August 25, Ambassador Austin quoted the President’s statements referred to above and said: “These statements and the facts to which they related make perfectly clear certain fundamental points which the people of the world will have clearly in mind.”

The fundamental point which Ambassador Austin then listed as the essence of American policy include those which I have referred to in the paragraphs above. It is essential that these fundamental points remain absolutely clear as United States policy amid the dust storm of propaganda which Mr. Malik is raising on this very subject.

The President’s action in directing the withdrawal of the General’s message was an effort to preserve the clarity of the position of the United States before the world.

It must not be forgotten that General MacArthur is the United Nations Commander in Korea, that the question of Formosa has now been brought before the Security Council of the United Nations, that members of the United Nations have differing points of view regarding Formosa, and that the American position which has been so clearly stated by the President and Ambassador Austin must not be beclouded in any way by any person.²

D[ean] A[cheson]

1. August 29.

2. On the following day, the Department of State sent the following message in a circular telegram, August 28, 10 a. m., to Canberra, London, New Delhi, Ottawa, Paris, Taipei, and to the United States Mission at the United Nations in New York.

   “Urinfo only statement (Depcirtel 3 a. m. Aug 26) was ordered withdrawn by Pres and Gen MacArthur so informed VFW. However text had been widely distributed press and radio and has been published altho VFW asked for its withdrawal also. US News already at press carries full text as does Wash Star, Aug 28.

   “White House issued brief statement to press Aug 28 confirming Pres action and made public full text Pres letter Aug 27 to Sen Austin (Depcirtel 1 a. m. Aug 27) reiterating Formosa policy not changed.” (794A.00/8–2850)

   The text of circular telegram of August 27, 1 a. m., is not printed, but for the text of President Truman’s letter of August 27 to Ambassador Austin, which reiterated the position set forth in Austin’s letter to Trygve Lie on August 25 (U.N. document S/1716), see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950, p. 599.