Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

790.5 MAP/3–1450

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Politico-Military Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Robertson)

secret

[Washington,] March 14, 1950.

Subject: Section 308 Projects.

Participants:	State
	WEA—Mr. Elbert G. Mathews1
	NEA—Mr. David A. Robertson
	SO A—Mr. Donald D. Kennedy2
	O—Mr. Nolting
	SOA—Mr. William S. B. Lacy
	S/MDA—Mr. John O. Bell
	S/MDA—Mr. Willard Galbraith
	Defense
	OSD—Capt. A. C. Murdaugh3
	OSD—Mr. K. T. Young4

Problem

To expedite action on military aid programs of Burma, Indochina, and Thailand under Section 303, Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949.

Action Required

a. Obtain concurrence of Defense and approval of the President for proposed Burma projects.

b. Obtain President’s approval of specific programs for Indochina and Thailand.

c. Broaden the terms of reference of NSC 64.⁵

Action Assigned to

O, SOA, PSA.

Discussion

Captain Murdaugh and Mr. Young of the Department of Defense called at the State Department on March 14 at their request to discuss 303 programs with the above mentioned parties.

Captain Murdaugh, who attended the Bangkok conference as representative of the Department of Defense, reported that he was very much impressed with the seriousness of the situations in Indochina and Burma and the urgent need for taking prompt action to save these countries. The cold war, in his opinion, was hot in both countries. Thailand was in a slightly better condition but its position would be seriously jeopardized if Indochina or Burma were lost to communism.

He mentioned that NSC 64, which had been prepared to cover Indochina, was being broadened on an area basis by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to also include Burma, Malaya and Thailand before being sent to the Joint Chiefs for consideration. Mr. Mathews expressed appreciation for receiving this information and suggested that Mr. Kennedy discuss with Mr. Lacy the possibility of taking parallel action in the State Department.

Mr. Lacy pointed out that in a very recent message, the French had attached first priority to obtaining five C–54’s and a supply of 37-mm ammunition for Indochina.⁶ He stated that the C–54’s were particularly important as they were badly needed for the movement of matériel and manpower to strategic points in Indochina.

Mr. Nolting stated that programs of $15 million for Indochina and $10 million for Thailand had been approved in principle by the President subject to specific programs being submitted for these countries. When it was indicated that the French were asking for a much larger program for Indochina, he pointed out that these sums could be considered as initial installments. When the question was raised as to what action would be taken if items sought under these programs were in conflict with those needed for Europe or elsewhere he replied that Mr. Rusk would decide for the State Department where specific equipment should go and the fact that countries of Western Europe may have a higher priority would not necessarily mean that their entire requirements would be satisfied before shipments could be made to countries in South and Southeast Asia. The Department’s position on such items short in supply would be coordinated with that of Defense and in the event of any difference of opinion the matter may have to be referred to the President.

Mr. Nolting raised the question as to whether conditions were sufficiently serious in South and Southeast Asia as to warrant token shipments. Captain Murdaugh and Mr. Young replied that it was a matter of urgency that token shipments of military equipment be sent to Indochina and Burma at the earliest possible date as the arrival of such equipment would be interpreted as concrete evidence of our support and interest in the existing governments of these countries. Messrs. Lacy, Mathews, Kennedy and Robertson concurred in this view and stressed the urgency time-wise in arranging for token shipments. Mr. Kennedy stated it may be more important to provide Burma with a $5 million program now than a $50 million program one year hence. However, he cautioned that our role should continue to be one of complementing British efforts who traditionally have supplied arms to Burma; we should not lose sight of the fact that the British have the primary responsibility for Burmese requirements/Mr. Lacy said that we must similarly keep the French in a position of responsibility in Indochina and not let them pass the buck to us.

Mr. Kennedy outlined the existing situation in Burma. He stated that while the present government has many weaknesses it is the best that can be found. The government is confronted by a number of rebellious factions in two of which the communists play a leading role. It is believed that with the ten small craft included in the proposed river boat project the government will be able to clean up insurgent pockets along the river, instill confidence in the people so that workers will return to the fields thereby enabling an increase in production from the present rate of 800,000 tons to some 1,500,000 tons by next year. The government’s efforts in this direction are limited both by the number of boats on hand and trained crews. The training of qualified personnel may be a limiting factor in furnishing the new equipment. The government is also actively dealing with other troubled areas. Its troops have taken the second best stronghold of the Karens and are within 25 miles of the Karen capital of Toungoo. Troops dispatched by air to Kengtung have given positive evidence of the desire of the government to control that area.⁷

Mr. Bell indicated that he was concerned over the piece-meal or ad hoc approach as evidenced by the proposed Section 303 projects submitted to date. He felt that it would be necessary to go into fairly detailed programming before it could be hoped to get funds allocated. Mr. Mathews replied that he understood the purpose of Section 303 was to make funds available for providing any form of aid considered necessary to meet rapidly developing emergency situations which could not be foreseen in sufficient time to permit programming in advance. Mr. Lacy most emphatically emphasized that his office had no alternative to pressing for the earliest possible approval of projects designed to strengthen the countries of Southeast Asia.

After the meeting Mr. Nolting gave Captain Murdaugh and Mr. Young a copy of the Burma program as prepared in SOA, indicating that the river patrol project had been presented before FMACC on Thursday, March 9, for clearance with Defense and that he would appreciate if they would clear in Defense the non-military items of the program. Mr. Young indicated that there may be some criticism in Defense and possibly in Congress of the rodent control program.

1. Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs.
2. Deputy Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs.
3. Assistant Director of the Office of Military Affairs, Department of Defense.
4. Adviser on the Far East, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Defense.
5. For the text of NSC 64, “The Position of the United States With Respect to Indochina,” a report to the National Security Council by the Department of State, February 27, 1950, see p. 744.
6. For documentation on French requests for military aid, see pp. 690 ff.
7. For documentation on United States policy toward Burma, see pp. 229 ff.