Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

661.00/8–1550

Minutes of a Meeting by Representatives of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States in Paris on August 4, 1950¹

Paris, August 4, 1950

top secret

[The first portion of the meeting dealt with Indochina, for documentation on which see pages 690 ff.]

M. Parodi then turned to the question of China and speculated whether Mao is following the Moscow line in a strict manner or is pursuing a somewhat independent course. He said that if Communist, China were admitted to the United Nations, its presence there would doubtless contribute to the difficulties of that organization and raise a number of questions. He felt that the admission of Communist China into the United Nations was not an appropriate subject for debate in the United Nations at this time but presumed that it would be brought up in the Security Council in September. He asked for comments on the general problems arising from this question.

Mr. Bohlen said that whether Communist China was strictly following the Moscow line was a matter for speculation concerning which the British, with representatives in China, might be in a better position than we to comment. In our view, there could be no question of the seating of Communist China in the United Nations until the Korean question was settled. He set forth our reasons why we can take no other position. He went on to say that if a Korean settlement were achieved, we could then consider the question of admission of Communist China on its merits. He emphasized the serious effects on public opinion in the United States that would result if we were thought to be paying a price for aggression. He then returned to the question of the place of Communist China in the Soviet world, expressing the view that whereas in certain cases there might be a conflict of national interests with Soviet interests, in all questions of general foreign policy Communist China had followed the Soviet line. At all events, we could not afford to predicate our policy on the expectation of Communist China splitting away from the Soviet world. The future alone will tell to what extent Soviet views will prevail, but we believe that while rifts may appear between the Soviet views and China, this is not likely to be brought about by Western attempts to wean Communist China away from Kremlin control. In short, kindness from the West will not tempt them to break away from the Soviet world. If a break should come, it may be expected to come from within. We would repeat that no policy can be predicated on the likelihood of Mao taking a line in opposition to that of Moscow.

Mr. Dening concurred that on all important points of foreign policy the Peking Government had taken the Moscow line wherever there was no peculiarly Chinese interest involved. On the other hand, where China’s own interests are involved, the United Kingdom did not expect to see the Peking Government always act for the “beaux yeux” of Russia. He expressed the view that Peking wants a seat at the United Nations and that the Soviet Union has promised to deliver it. However, Malik’s policy at the United Nations had not served to help but has merely resulted in removing the question of admission from the agenda. Mr. Dening said that he shares the United States view that the question of the admission of Communist China should not be linked to that of Korea, and that it should not be used as a bargaining counter. At the same time the United Kingdom position is that, taken by itself, the admission of the Peking Government into the United Nations should be decided on its merits. He cited in this connection Mr. Bevin’s statement of May 24,² that in the British view Communist China should be represented in the United Nations and that no Government should be excluded therefrom because of its politics. In taking this view, he added, the United Kingdom has been influenced by Indian opinion. Although on the merits of the case alone, the United Kingdom would favor admission, it is obvious that in the light of the present international situation, the case could, not be considered on its merits alone.

M. Parodi commented that, objectively speaking, the French largely share Mr. Dening’s interpretation. They agree that the question of admission cannot be linked to that of Korea and that there can be no bargaining on this score. The negative French vote yesterday in the Security Council against placing the question of admission on the agenda was largely in response to the violence of Mr. Malik’s address.³ The French have always reserved freedom of action on this question, and although they have as yet formulated no definite position, they are, in view of the present international situation, opposed to admission for the time being.

Mr. Dening spoke to Mr. Bohlen’s statement about the unlikelihood of weaning Communist China away from the Soviet Union. Clarifying the United Kingdom position in this regard, he said that the British believe that the door should be left open to Communist China by the West because unless Mao were assured of some possibility of contact, he might reach the conclusion that there was no other course than to turn himself exclusively to the Soviet Union.

M. Parodi said that France is inclined to share Mr. Dening’s view in this regard.

Mr. Bohlen asked if it was the consensus that nobody wished to link the question of admission with that of Korea, or to see Communist China seated at the United Nations prior to a settlement of the Korea question.

Mr. Dening said that this did not quite express the view of the United Kingdom. Whereas the United Kingdom was agreed not to link the question of admission to that of Korea, it was in principle for admission on the merits of the case. While conceding that in the light of the present international situation the time seemed inappropriate, he could not honestly assert that in the view of the United Kingdom settlement of the Korean question must necessarily precede the admission of Communist China to the United Nations.

Turning to the question of Formosa, Mr. Dening expressed the view that Formosa, juridically speaking, belongs neither to Chiang nor to the Peking Government, and that the question of its juridical disposition can only be resolved by a peace treaty with Japan.

Mr. Bohlen expressed general agreement with this point of view and cited the President’s statement that “the determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan or consideration by the United Nations.”

M. Parodi said that his Government is somewhat hazy on the juridical status of Formosa, and would appreciate it if our delegate to the United Nations would give the French delegate a fuller statement of our views on the question. He then tasked whether, in the event of a Chinese Communist attack on Formosa, the United States would appeal to the Security Council.

Mr. Bohlen replied that such an attack would be immediately resisted by the United States Fleet and that there was a good chance that we would bring the matter before the Security Council. He added that this would depend of course on the scope and duration of the attack and that, so far as he was aware, no position had been taken by our Government before his departure with regard to such an eventuality. Referring to the possibility of further Chinese Communist attacks in Asia (and leaving aside Tibet, about which we knew virtually nothing), there appeared to be three possibilities:

1) As regards Formosa, we are not sure whether Communist China will launch an attack. We know, however, that its armies have been in a position to do so for some time. Furthermore, we have reports of Chinese Communist ship concentrations, although these have not been confirmed by our aerial reconnaissance. We know also that the monsoon season is on and that the typhoon season is in the offing. In short, such an attack could be launched but there are no immediate indications as to its imminence.

2) As regards Korea, the Chinese Communists have no special interest in Korea and if left to their own free will, would probably hesitate to take any aggressive action.

3) As regards Indochina, M. Pignon has already given us his estimate of the probabilities for an attack. In sum, we feel that the Chinese Communists will hesitate long before launching any attack which would involve them in a general war with the United States, and this consideration should prove to be the greatest deterrent against any Chinese Communist local action in Asia.

M. Parodi asked if there is any risk of an internal uprising in Formosa.

Mr. Bohlen replied that this is difficult to estimate. Based on past experience, there is no guarantee that there will not be defections among the Nationalist forces on the Island, and although there are some good Chinese Generals there, we are not sure if they are being well used. The assurance that the United States Fleet will respond to any attack is perhaps the greatest deterrent to an uprising, and for this reason the probabilities are against any such eventuality. In any event, there seem to be no grounds for fearing a successful internal insurrection by itself.

Mr. Dening supported Mr. Bohlen’s view, and said that according to reports from the British Consul in Formosa, there is no likelihood of an internal revolt unless a Chinese Communist attack should occur.

[The remainder of the meeting dealt with a wide variety of countries and areas but mainly with problems relating to Germany. Documentation is scheduled for publication in volume IV.]

1. See footnote 1 to the minutes of the meeting held on August 3, p. 407.
2. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 475, col. 2083.
3. See U.N. document S/PV.482; see also editorial note, vol. vii, p. 525.