771.00/1–2351
The Consul at Rabat (McBride) to the Secretary of State 1
No. 269
Ref: Consulate’s Desp. No. 169, November 6, 19502
Subject: Transmitting Memoranda Submitted by Sultan to French Government on Status of Morocco
There are transmitted herewith copies in French and translations into English of the two memoranda3 which were presented to the French Government by the Sultan of Morocco during his recent visit in Paris as the official guest of the French Government. They are dated October 3, 1950, and November 1, 1950, roughly the dates of the Sultan’s arrival in and departure from Paris. This office received the French copies through unofficial Palace channels and the texts should be considered confidential as they have never been made public by the Residency.
In the light of the vigorous discussion of these documents which took place in the French and French Moroccan press, the texts are of considerable usefulness and importance. It will be recalled that the French press accused the Sultan of bad faith in raising with the Quai d’Orsay the question of the abrogation of the Treaty of Fez in his second memorandum while his original demands contained in the earlier one were more moderate and much less far-reaching. Moroccan [Page 1771] opinion took the stand that the first presentation in the October 3 paper was in itself a request for the substitution of a system of mutual cooperation for the present stricter arrangement under the Protectorate.
The texts of the notes are of course self-explanatory but a brief synopsis thereof is given here for convenience. The first document was delivered by the Sultan during his conference with President Auriol immediately after his arrival in France. We have been told that, while Socialists Auriol and Moch, Minister of Defense, who was present, were generally unsympathetic to the Moroccan cause, Foreign Minister Schuman was favorable to the Moroccan thesis throughout. The Sultan’s memorandum points out that Morocco remains legally an independent country which has had a legal basis for its relations with France over a period of several centuries and not just since 1911. It is stressed that the first Resident General of France in Morocco, Marshall Lyautey, felt that an arrangement should be worked out for the administration of the country by its own authorities under a simple overall control of the Protecting Power. Under this system, the Maghzen would itself administer the Sherifian Empire. Subsequently, the Sultan’s note of October 3 alleges, the French changed this concept and installed direct administration of Morocco ostensibly to prepare the country for self-government. The authority of the Maghzen has been steadily nibbled away, the note continues, to the point where now even the right of the Sultan to nominate pashas and caids is questioned, and Sherifian functionaries are appointed without prior consultation with Moroccan authorities.
Insofar as the system of direct administration which has been installed by the French is concerned, the Sultan stressed that these foreign bureaucrats which have been put into Morocco have no understanding of local problems, and, by their ignorance and especially by their neglect of social and educational matters, have tended to drive the Moroccan people towards the support of extremist causes. It is unclear whether the Moroccan sovereign is referring to the nationalists or the Communists in this instance. It is added that profound differences of opinion have risen because of varying interpretations as to what Moroccan reforms are essential. Furthermore during the period since the establishment of the Protectorate, the Moroccan people have evolved rapidly because of increased contacts with the West and also because of the revitalization of Islam, with which such intimate contact of course occurs. In this connection note is taken of the development of purely Moroccan political parties which are anti-French in orientation.
In continuation, the Sultan’s note states that open quarreling in Morocco, which is thought inevitable by some elements, cannot have [Page 1772] favorable results for anyone. Therefore, profound reforms are necessary. The heart of this appeal to the French Government calls for changes, not merely in administrative structure, but for a basic and thorough revamping as called for by changed conditions in Morocco. The Sultan of Morocco states that, as the leader of his people, who is well aware of their demands and requirements, he feels himself a good interpreter especially since he has always sought to cooperate with France. As reason for France to give in to Moroccan wishes at this time, His Majesty cites the forthcoming war against the Soviet Union in which Moroccan blood will flow freely on the behalf of the western powers. He notes that liberties such as those requested have already been granted to less evolved peoples such as the Libyans, and that they should be given to the Moroccan people in order to establish a situation whereby the two nations concerned could progress tranquilly together. It is stated, in this section, that the existing difficulties should not be concealed, but rather that they should be examined together so that a solution can be worked out to satisfy the just demands of Morocco. It is concluded that Morocco has attained maturity and deserves and expects a happy solution to the political problems now existing with France, first of which is of course the re-establishment of her full independence.
The second note is much briefer and is, in a sense, an interpretation of the first, which it explains as a document to demonstrate the profound changes which occurred in Franco-Moroccan relations as a result of the Treaty of Fez. In view of the unsatisfactory nature of this new relationship from the Moroccan viewpoint, a search for a new basis for reciprocity has been sought, it is said, and regret is expressed that no conferences have been scheduled in Paris in that sense. It is noted that the French reply to the first note merely stated that the French aim was to lead the Moroccan people towards self-government within the framework of the Fez Treaty. It is asserted, finally, that this proposal would not be likely to be satisfactory since what is required is some new treaty based on a genuine spirit of cooperation between the two countries, which would permit the fulfillment of Moroccan aspirations. Therefore, the hope is expressed that the French reply is not a final definition of national policy but that some more understanding spirit will be found.
Despite the fact that the two notes are somewhat vague in terms, it is clear that the Sultan has intended to bring up the vital question of revamping the Treaty of Fez in his first note. Since he did not mention this unpopular matter of revision by name, possibly to appease the French and hope for a better reception of the document in question, however, there is some justification to French claims that the revision of the Protectorate was mentioned only in the second note, [Page 1773] delivered just before His Majesty’s departure from Paris. Nevertheless, it can hardly be said, as Le Monde claimed, that the first note represented a series of generalities, and that it was not until the second that the extent of the Sultan’s wishes were known. Rather, it would seem that he definitely had a revision of the Treaty of Fez in mind from the beginning. Since, however, he did not so state, the story that he adopted an intransigent position only at the end, after apparently originally taking a reasonable stand, will continue.
These documents are of importance in that they are the first written evidence of the efforts of the Sultan of Morocco to obtain a new basis for his relations with France in some years. It is repeated that the French reply indicating a willingness to establish a joint committee in Rabat has not been satisfactory to the sovereign because the commission would be an unilaterally appointed affair, and he does not believe that any result would be achieved thereby. On the contrary, he has suggested a truly joint Franco-Moroccan body to sit in Paris, but the French have not accepted this proposal either. In view of later developments which have further widened the breach, it does not appear that any further conciliatory developments can be expected at this time, and the Sultan’s memoranda may take on added significance as the last peaceful effort in some time on the part of the Moroccan Government to settle its principal outstanding differences with France.4
- Copies sent to Paris, Tangier, Casablanca, Tunis, Algiers, and Cairo.↩
- Ante, p. 1760.↩
- The four attachments under reference are not printed.↩
- On February 21, 1951, the Embassy in France transmitted to the Department of State the text of the October 3 memoranda by the Sultan including seven annexes which were not a part of the source text and an English translation of the memoranda. (771.00/2–2151)↩