Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V

775.00/3–1550

Aide-Mémoire Prepared by the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Aide-Mémoire of the Audience Held on 15th March, 1950 at the Imperial Palace, Addis Ababa, Granted by His Imperial Majesty to the Honourable George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs

Present: His Excellency Ato Aklilou Abte Wold, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, and the Honourable George S. Merrell, American Ambassador, Addis Ababa.

His Majesty wished, first of all, to express His deep appreciation for the assistance which the American Government has continuously accorded Ethiopia as regards the Eritrean question.¹ This assistance, in so far as Eritrea is concerned, has been total and all that His Majesty could have desired. His Majesty repeated His most sincere expression of appreciation.

2) As regards the question of Eritrea, since the problem had been studied in 1947 by the Commission of Investigation of the Four Great Powers which visited that territory, the conditions have changed even more clearly in favour of Ethiopia. In the first place, the new Commission of the United Nations has already been able to determine that the followers of union with Ethiopia, with the exception, perhaps, of the Western Province, have a clear majority everywhere, even at Massawa, where recently it has been demonstrated and noted by the Commission itself that a very clear and in fact, an overwhelming majority exists in favour of Ethiopia. On the other hand, the opponents of union, under Italian pressure, had united in the so-called “Independence Front”. However, scarcely had that Front been established than the Eritreans themselves came to realize that they had been made the dupes of the Italian Government, and, in consequence, they did not fail thereupon to withdraw from this so-called Front as is evidenced by the establishment of the new Moslem League in the Western Province, the independent Moslem League in Massawa and by the recent defection of the liberal progressists. These defections had been promoted by the fact that the Italian system of bribery had become a matter of public notoriety. All the members of the Commission, the British Government, the Unionists, and His Imperial Majesty possess such undeniable and striking proofs of that bribery that no one attempts now to deny it. It has become an open secret. These activities on the part of Italy have disgusted the majority of the Eritreans, and have had as a result the practical break-up of the Independence Front. On the other hand, they have likewise been largely responsible for the disturbances of the peace in Eritrea. Not only has Italy sought to purchase the votes of the population, but also through her adherents to the so-called Independence Front she has provoked acts of violence in Eritrea, which in their turn have led to reactions of indignation on the part of a population, outraged by these actions of violence and of bribery.

3) His Imperial Majesty criticized sharply the attitude of Guatemala and Pakistan who refuse, as always, to recognize the realities of the situation. However, the other members of the United Nations Commission seem to be convinced of the strength of the demand for union in Eritrea. His Imperial Majesty recognized that Pakistan and Guatemala are simply playing the Italian game as they had done at the United Nations and that they would do everything in their power by fair means or foul to oppose union with Ethiopia.

4) His Majesty pointed out that three factors therefore contributed to the tense situation existing in Eritrea as well as on the southern frontiers of Ethiopia. There was in the first place the very marked increase in force of the unionist movement in Eritrea. On the other hand, there was the anxiety created throughout East Africa by the presence of Italy in Somaliland. Finally, there is the almost fanatic opposition of the Eritrean population to the Italian activities being carried on there under the formula of independence. These factors have produced such a state of tension in Eritrea that if the Commission of Investigation or the Interim Committee of the General Assembly itself under pressure from Pakistan or Guatemala or from the Secretariat of the United Nations which for some time has been seeking to influence the Assembly in favour of a United Nations Trusteeship, should fail in June to recognize the realities of the situation in Eritrea, the situation, now already critical, will become intolerable. In such a situation, without Ethiopia’s having the least degree of responsibility or initiative in the matter, there would certainly be a general uprising of the population now fanatic in its demand for union as a result of long delays and frustrations. His Imperial Majesty remarked that certainty the Honourable Assistant Secretary of State was in possession of reports on conditions in Eritrea and would certainly interpret the situation in the same way.

5) For all of these reasons, His Majesty has constantly been prepared to listen to all advice which the American Government—a government which His Majesty considers as animated by the most sincere feelings of friendship—may desire to furnish. Notwithstanding His Majesty’s pessimism stemming from Italian activities in Eritrea, he had never refused to examine the situation together with the Americans. However, one cannot ignore the fact that the Italian Government rejected the American formula for agreement presented at the end of January. It is time that the latter finally commence to recognize that, unless she immediately makes a volte face, she alone will be responsible for the uprising of the population and for a total impasse in the efforts to establish peace in East Africa. For these reasons and notwithstanding these instances of bad faith on the part of Italy, His Majesty feels that it would be highly desirable that the American Government should attempt now to settle the situation in favour of Ethiopia, a solution the necessity of which has already been recognized by the majority of the United Nations Commission, that is to say, by Norway, Burma, and South Africa.

6) Another question which His Majesty wished to raise with the Honourable Assistant Secretary of State was the granting of loans by the Export Import Bank and assistance under Point Four of the Truman Programme.² It was pointed out that the Assistant Secretary certainly did not ignore the fact that notwithstanding war devastations in the country, Ethiopia has been able to maintain a sound currency. Ethiopia, for example, has been the only country in the Middle East not to devaluate its currency with reference to the American dollar. Moreover, it is a rather striking fact that since the war, exports from Ethiopia to the United States have taken the first place in the foreign trade of Ethiopia far exceeding exports to other countries of the Middle East and to Europe. It is believed that this development is a healthy trend in international trade, and has been a cause of great satisfaction to His Imperial Majesty, the more so in that it strengthens the ties existing between the two countries. Ethiopia, however, stands in need of greatly increasing her means of production and of transportation and, certainly in this respect, the United States is in the best position for aiding in this development, by experts and capital. Already the Sinclair Petroleum Company is pursuing its activities in Ethiopia in complete freedom and tranquility. Also the Ethiopian Air Lines which is under American administration has already acquired an enviable reputation abroad. His Imperial Majesty is, therefore, confident that, with the co-operation of the United States through the investment of capital by the Export Import Bank and through Point Four of the Truman Programme, Ethiopia will enter upon a period of great economic development. In this connection, the problem has been carefully and fully studied during the past five years by American experts and detailed reports and plans have already been submitted to the American Government. The time has now come to place them into operation in the industrial and especially in the transport fields. This need is the more urgent in that His Majesty desires that Ethiopia endeavour without delay to bring about a simultaneous development of the two ports of Massawa and Assab as well as of the roads linking these two ports with the interior. Massawa is certainly the port which entails the greatest importance for Ethiopia, but Assab should not be ignored inasmuch as it should serve as the outlet for the pipeline which the Sinclair Petroleum Company would eventually wish to construct in Ethiopia.

7) It is for these reasons that His Imperial Majesty desires to see the earliest possible consummation of the loan by the Export Import Bank of a sum sufficient to constitute a serious and important contribution to the development of the country in the industrial and transport fields. As regards Point Four of the Truman Programme, His Majesty welcomed with great satisfaction the news that the Department of State had recommended to Congress the allocation of an important sum for a detailed programme of assistance in Ethiopia. His Majesty, therefore, wishes that the Assistant Secretary of State might bring his influence to bear for the prompt execution of this programme. It is the view of His Majesty that the assistance involved under Point Four might best be effected by arrangements concluded directly between the two countries in question rather than by the intermediary of third parties or of international organisations such as the United Nations.

8) His Majesty then raised the question of the request addressed to the American Government for permission to purchase certain arms and war materials as well as a small quantity of fighter planes.³ It was recalled that the Ethiopian Government had sought permission to purchase approximately thirty fighter planes called Hell-Divers fully equipped and armed. It would appear, however, that the American Navy has been unable to grant the requested permission. In view of this difficulty, the Ethiopian Government has been obliged to seek for other types of fighter planes, likewise equipped with their armaments as, for example, the fighter plane called the “Corsair”, which would appear to be particularly well adapted to Ethiopia’s needs and to the programme of instruction being followed at the aviation school at Bishoftu. The Ethiopian army is now well trained and the military aviation is a cause of great satisfaction. With the increase in national and international responsibilities resulting from the eventual return of Eritrea, it is necessary that these purchase orders in the various fields of armament and aviation be completed with the least possible delay. His Majesty would, therefore, be grateful for such steps as might be taken to expedite these purchases.

9) In closing, His Majesty again reiterated his profound and sincere appreciation for the continued assistance and support which Ethiopia has received from the American Government dating from the dark period of the Italian occupation, when the United States was one of the few countries to refuse to recognize the Italian regime.⁴ Since then, through Lend-Lease⁵ and other means of economic as well as social and cultural assistance, the American Government has never failed to demonstrate its friendly attitude towards Ethiopia. The recent months during which the Department of State has so loyally supported the Ethiopian Delegation at the United Nations is therefore a period which His Majesty contemplates with the greatest satisfaction and which calls from Him the renewed expression of His sincere appreciation.

[Addis Ababa,] March 16, 1950.

1. For documentation on Eritrea, see pp. 1640 ff.
2. For documentation on the Point Four Program, see vol. i, pp. 846 ff.
3. The Embassy in Addis Ababa was approached on March 6 by Ato Zaude Gabre Hetwot, Director General of the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with a request for assistance in procuring surplus military aircraft from the United States. (Telegram 46, from Addis Ababa, March 6, 775.5622/3–650).
4. For documentation relating to the nonrecognition by the United States of the Italian annexation of Ethiopia, see Foreign Relations, 1936, vol. iii, pp. 330–341; ibid., 1937, vol. ii, pp. 679–717; and ibid., 1938, vol. ii, pp. 723–726.
5. For documentation relating to the Ethiopian request for Lend-Lease assistance, see ibid., 1943, vol. iv, pp. 82–123.