Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V

690D.91/3–2350: Telegram

The Chargé in Pakistan (Wolf) to the Secretary of State

secret
priority

Karachi, March 23, 1950—3 p. m.

209. Foreign Secretary has requested me transmit immediately following from GOP:

“GOP regret have to inform Government US of following troop movements which have recently taken place in India towards frontier west Pakistan. Forward movement is continuing:

1. Move of one infantry division to area Hissar Rajastan.

2. Move of one armored brigade to area Ferozepore-Nabha.

3. Move of one armored division to area Meerut.

4. Formation of a corps headquarters at Ambala as operational headquarters.

5. Fourth Indian division and Pepsu division which are already in East Punjab have come under Ambala command.

6. Heavy concentration warlike stores and supplies in forward areas like Ferozepore Jullundur and Ludhiana.

Appreciation of Pakistan HICOM is that these concentrations are more offensive than defensive view of their locations specially that of the dumps of ammunition et cetera. GOP are anxious avoid any action which may aggravate situation but Government US will appreciate that GOP cannot but take necessary defensive measures.

Pakistan stands for peace and has absolutely no aggressive designs on India. Pakistan also believes that on continuance of peace between India and Pakistan depends world peace.

In order therefore maintain peace not only between India Pakistan but also world peace, GOP earnestly hope Government US would exert their influence with GOI and do their best persuade them move back their forward formations.”

Embassy advised similar communications have been sent UK, Canada, Australia through HICOM.¹

Absence from Karachi Ambassador Warren and ARMAT have discussed this only with Canadian HICOM who called this morning to ask if I had other confirmation or further information. He stated action taken by GOP without prior consultation any Commonwealth HICOM and he had no idea what reply his government would make.²

Sent Department 209, repeated New Delhi 32 for Ambassador Warren.³

Wolf

1. On March 23, after receipt of a copy of the Pakistan message, U.K. High Commissioner Nye telegraphed London stating he had already discussed the matter with Bajpai and felt that nothing more should be done until he learned what Nehru’s reaction might be (690D.91/3–2450). The Canadian and Australian High Commissioners to India also recommended that their governments delay formal action with India (690D.91/3–2450).
2. Henderson, speaking for both Warren and himself, stated in his telegram 390 of March 24, not printed, that they felt it would be preferable before taking action with India, or replying to Pakistan, for Warren to talk with Liaquat Ali Khan on his return to Karachi that evening to learn if the Prime Minister had taken up the matter directly with Nehru (690D.91/3–2450).
3. Avra M. Warren, U.S. Ambassador in Pakistan, was on diplomatic business in New Delhi after a brief tour of East and West Bengal with some of his own and Henderson’s military and political advisers (690D.91/3–2450).