782.5/12–1850
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mrs. Lucille Snyder of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs
Subject: Proposed Project to Mine Turkish Straits.
| Participants: | Admiral Ginder,1 formerly head of Naval Group of JAMMAT |
| Commander Davis, International Affairs Branch, Navy Department | |
| Mr. Raymund Yingling—L | |
| Mr. Richard Davis—EE | |
| Mr. John Howard—NEA | |
| Mr. William Rountree—GTI | |
| Mr. C. Robert Moore, GTI | |
| Mrs. Lucille Snyder, GTI |
Admiral Ginder outlined the proposed Turkish plan for controlled mining of the Straits, as part of an over-all project for defense of the Bosporus, and stressed the importance attached to it by JAMMAT, [Page 1342] both as a Turkish peace-time defensive measure and as an aid to the Allies. He stated that the proposed minefield project is strongly supported by the Turkish military. However, the Turkish Foreign Office has not authorized implementation of the plan, presumably because the British, although admitting the legal right of the Turks under the Montreux Convention to lay the mines, had, in their aide-mémoire of June 19, 1950,2 expressed reservations as to the advisability of proceeding with the project at that time. He thought the British may have viewed the plan as one involving moored mines suspended from cables, rather than moored mines on the bottom of the Bosporus which could be discharged only by shore control mechanism.
Both Mr. Yingling and Mr. Davis expressed the view that British reservations with respect to implementation of the project were doubtless based on something more fundamental than the reasons given to the Turks. Mr. Yingling added that the British, bearing in mind their military alliance with Turkey, were probably fearful of Soviet reaction in the event that the Turks proceed to lay the minefield.
It was Admiral Ginder’s view that knowledge of the mining project, which could not be kept secret after installation got under way, would deter the Soviets from any attempts to send submerged submarines through the Straits surreptitiously. He stated that the Turks are now installing a system in that waterway to detect submerged subs and that mines would serve as an aid in such detection. Any information gained thereby would, of course, be of great value to Allied intelligence.
The Admiral added that the cables for the mines could be run in during the installation of the detection system, which will probably be completed next spring, and that it would subsequently take from six to eight weeks for the actual laying of the mines. He said that the mining project would be financed by MDAP funds and that $400,000 had been set aside for the purpose. The mines under consideration would not, he pointed out, be expected to replace other types in the event of hostilities. They are intended primarily for submerged submarines and would be placed so deep that they would have little, if any, effect on surface vessels, if discharged.
Mr. Rountree pointed out that although it was the Department’s view from a legal standpoint that the mining project would not constitute a violation of the Montreux Convention, the Department had not yet formulated its position on whether it should urge the Turks to proceed with the laying of the mines. There were various factors to be considered, such as Soviet reaction to the project and the likelihood that the Turks might seize upon the issue to renew their request [Page 1343] for a US security commitment. He expressed the view that the Department should, therefore, before deciding whether to request the British to reconsider the views expressed in their aide-mémoire and/or to urge the Turks to proceed with installation of the minefield, endeavor to obtain Embassy Ankara’s opinion of the Turkish Foreign Office estimate of probable Soviet reaction if the project is implemented as well as the views of the Embassy at Moscow with respect to possible Soviet reaction thereto.
It was agreed that queries along the above lines should be sent to Ankara and Moscow. Upon the receipt of replies the Department will consider (1) whether to instruct the Embassy at London, in collaboration with Admiral Carney (CINCNELM),3 to discuss the question with the British Foreign Office and the British Admiralty with a view to obtaining British agreement to a modification of the reservations set forth in their June 19th aide-mémoire to the Turks, or (2) whether the question of US support of the mining project would, in view of political and military considerations, have to be referred for decision to the NSC. It was the consensus that every endeavor should be made to settle the issue at a lower level.
- Rear Adm. Samuel P. Ginder, Senior Member, Board of Decorations and Medals, Navy Department.↩
- Enclosure to despatch 113, August 29, from Ankara, 681.8229/8–2950, not printed.↩
- Adm. Robert B. Carney had succeeded Adm. Richard L. Conolly as Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, on November 1.↩