795.00/12–1450: Telegram
The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State
priority
367. 1. In call on ForMin Köprülü yesterday I reviewed carefully subject matter Depcirtel 256, December 9.1 He was keenly interested. Turkey too he said, believes that appeasement would be fatal to cause world peace and that aggression must be resisted; it is proud of contribution its brigade has made towards such resistance in Korea.
2. He expressed highest satisfaction that US and UK have close identity major objectives and warned against “Asiatic bargaining at which Russians are past masters”. He sees calculated Soviet policy of détente in west (e.g. Persia, Finland and Turkey) with view to all out effort achieve domination Far East. He cited, as examples this policy in Turkey, Bulgarian acceptance Turkish conditions for admission Bulgar-Turk refugees and fact that ten days ago Soviet Ambassador had called on him (purportedly to present new military attaché) for first time since he had taken office last spring.
[Page 1338]3. He then urged earliest possible implementation NATO invitation to associate Turkey and Greece in Mediterranean defense planning. Recent Greek-Turk staff talks, he said, had been cordial and productive. Staffs would henceforth exchange military intelligence re situation in Bulgaria and other SE Europe satellites. They agreed however that Greece could not be successfully defended against full scale Bulgarian aggression with covert Soviet backing unless Yugoslavs were brought in and would attack from flank. (Note: Turk Chief General Staff has promised General Arnold, only recently returned from consultation with Admiral Carney2 in London, full information these talks.)
4. Köprülü continued substantially as follows: he wished say this connection that Turk Government and people view mutual planning with NATO for Mediterranean defense as essential intermediate step towards eventual juridical association with NATO itself, perhaps through subsidiary Mediterranean pact between UK, US, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey and with which, because of strategic importance Suez Canal area and increasingly strained British-Egypt relations, it would be well endeavor associate with Egypt. He believed that if such pact be proposed, Turkish influence in Cairo could be materially useful.
5. In re “action in UN” envisaged in reftel, he said he personally shared our views and would present them to PriMin. If however, Cabinet decision were deemed necessary he would appreciate brief aide-mémoire stating them succinctly, i.e., first, support of six-power resolution unless cease-fire be arranged, in which latter event resolution would not be pressed and, second, support of stronger resolution naming Communist China as aggressor if cease-fire not arranged and Communist advance continue south of 38th Parallel. (Note: If this not be oversimplification Department’s thinking I should welcome early authorization send him personal note in that sense.)3
Department in its discretion pass to Athens, Belgrade and Moscow.
- Vol. vii, p. 1486. This telegram presented the Department of State’s thinking on the Korean situation in the light of the communiqué issued on December 8 following the meetings in Washington of President Harry S. Truman and Prime Minister Clement R. Attlee of the United Kingdom (Department of State Bulletin, December 18, 1950, p. 959; also Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950, p. 738). For documentation on the December meetings between President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee, see vol. iii, pp. 1698 ff.↩
- Adm. Robert B. Carney, Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean.↩
- Department’s telegram 320, December 19, to Ankara, not printed, read in part as follows: “Dept suggests you might postpone personal note setting forth US position future UN action on Korea until Dept’s views more firm, and time for proposed action is near” (795.00/12–1450).↩