Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V

782.00/9–2550

Memorandum by the Officer in Chargé of Turkish Affairs (Moore)¹

top secret

[Washington,] September 25, 1950.

Subject: General McBride’s Comments on Turkey of September 25.

In the FMACC meeting today,² Major General H. L. McBride, [former] Chief of JAMMAT, discussed the operations of the Aid Program in Turkey and answered a number of questions relating thereto and to other problems concerning Turkey. The following were some of the more important points brought up.

1. General McBride emphasized very strongly that, if it is the policy of the United States to make the Turkish Army effective in case of war, three things must be done:

a) More Americans must be assigned to TUSAG in order to help the Turkish field units make effective use of the equipment being supplied under the Aid Program and maintain it properly. To date training has been concentrated at centers of instruction, and it was not until this summer that the Mission appreciated how badly the field units needed help. General McBride estimated that an additional 350 Americans were required for TUSAG and stated that the Turks would welcome such an increase in the Mission’s training staff. He felt that TUSAFG and TUSNG were adequately staffed.

b) A war reserve supply program should be undertaken. At the present time, given existing stocks, the Turkish Army has the capability of fighting for only three weeks. General McBride urged that a war reserve be built-up to enable the Army to fight for at least six months. The war reserve would be concerned only with supplies for Army forces in being and not for forces that might be mobilized in case of war. He did not know what such a program would cost, but estimated that it would be not less than $100 million.

c) The number of NCO’s must be increased. At the present time the number of NCO’s is about 20% of requirements and an additional 30,000 are needed. Some formula must be found for helping the Turks meet the cost of this program which in the first year will amount to about $5 million, increasing to $30 million in the third year, at which point it will level off. General McBride suggested that the Aid Program supply the POL requirements of the Turkish ground forces for which approximately TL 15 million is now being provided in the budget of the Ministry of National Defense, thus enabling the Ministry to apply the funds to the NCO program. Another item normally covered in the MND budget, which might be financed by the Aid Program to provide such funds, is clothing for the forces. It is somewhat difficult to find direct military items in the budget which might appropriately be supplied under the Aid Program as the Turks are purchasing virtually no military equipment abroad and only small amounts locally, the production of the Turkish military factories. General McBride indicated that it did not matter to him what items we chose to finance so long as funds would be released thereby in the MND budget for the NCO program. In reply to questioning he admitted that the Turks might be able to finance the first year’s program of $5 million, but felt that the military budget already constituted a very heavy burden on the Turkish economy and that it would be most difficult for the Turks to meet the cost of the program, particularly after the first year. He mentioned that the Prime Minister had told him that, should the present international tension continue, he hoped to request TL 500 million for the Ministry of National Defense in FY 1951 as contrasted to TL 458 million in FY 1950. This would be an increase of only $15 million, out of which many other requirements of the Ministry, in addition to the NCO program, would have to be met.

(Colonel Enemark³ told me this morning that there was a fourth point which was implied in General McBride’s discussion, but which the General felt he may not have emphasized adequately in his efforts to get across the first three points, that is, the necessity of completing the modernization of the Turkish armed forces. He added that Defense was working on proposals covering the above points which would be presented to the FMACC in due course.)

2. General McBride seemed to find himself in dilemma with respect to Air Force requirements. We are rapidly approaching the time when the military planes which we purchased out of surplus and other stocks at only a fraction of their original cost will have to be replaced and at a very substantial cost. The General was disturbed at the portion of military aid which would have to go to the Turkish Air Foreign relation to the contribution which it could be expected to make in the event of a war. However, he seemed to feel that there was no alternative but to continue helping the Turks make their Air Force more effective.

3. General McBride felt very encouraged over the effects of the change in Government, resulting from the elections of May 14, 1950. He has a high regard for the new Chief of Staff and considered that a very good job had been done in replacing the “Balkan war mentality” generals with more progressive ones. In his opinion both the Government and the military leaders are seriously trying to assure the most effective use of American aid, and he was optimistic over the results that could be obtained if we are in a position to carry out the proposals made in paragraph one above.

4. When questioned about the likelihood of staff talks between. Turks, Iranians and Greeks, General McBride stated that, as a result; of the new personnel changes in the Government and the Genera! Staff, he was more optimistic that the Turks would be willing to enter into staff talks. They do not have much confidence in the Iranians as individuals or as soldiers but have a far greater respect for the Greeks. He stated that he had repeatedly tried to impress on them the desirability of such talks and felt that they were beginning to recognize that some good might come out of them. He mentioned several problems that could be profitably taken up, such as whether Turkish, forces would be permitted to enter Iran in the event of an attack on Iran and the status of Iranian troops in the event that they should be driven back into Turkey by an invading force.

5. General McBride pointed out that Turkey’s real desire to be included in the NAT was based on its desire to obtain a formal security commitment from the United States, which it felt could be obtained only in this way. This issue had become a very important one from the point of view of local party politics. He felt that the Turks would be keenly disappointed at not being included in the Pact. He did not consider, however, but that this would adversely affect their desire to cooperate with the Mission.

1. Addressed to Burton Y. Berry, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs; William M. Rountree, Director, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs; and John B. Howard, Regional Planning Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.
2. For the Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating Committee minutes, September 25, see FMACC doc. M–34, October 9, in Interdepartmental Committee files, lot 54D5, FMACC minutes.
3. Lt. Col. William A. Enemark, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, Operations, General Staff, U.S. Army.