Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V

740.5/9–1150

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson)¹

secret

Washington, 9 September 1950.

Subfect: Admission of Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty.

1. This memorandum is in response to the request contained in your memorandum dated 5 September 1950² in which the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were requested on an attached letter from the Secretary of State to you, dated 31 August 1950,³ outlining the pertinent political considerations involved in the admission of Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This memorandum also replies to your memorandum on the same subject dated 1 September 1950.²

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the subject letter contains an excellent analysis of the specific problem of the admission of Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. They feel, however, that full membership of Turkey and Greece in that organization is but one facet of the larger problem as to whether the North Atlantic Treaty should be revised in order to enlarge the region from the North Atlantic area to the entire anti-Kremlin peripheral area of Eurasia or possibly to a union of all peoples who are willing and able to contribute military resources to the defeat of communist aggression. In theory this union should be achieved in the United Nations, to which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is now subordinate. Such a union in that body is impossible, however, while the USSR and its satellites continue as members. Thus, if the nations of the free world are to combine their resources effectively against the USSR, they must accomplish this outside of the United Nations through the media of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or by some other appropriate means.

3. If the United States should decide to press for an enlargement of the region now covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, a considerable revision of that Treaty would be necessary. Such a revision, however, might involve fewer difficulties than the establishment of an entirely new organization, particularly if United States preparations were made well in advance and the revision were undertaken at a propitious time.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are strongly of the opinion that support of the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area is a primary military commitment of the United States. The defense of Western Europe is of the greatest importance to the defense of the Treaty area in general and to each signator in particular. The Joint Chiefs of Staff now plan to augment materially, at the earliest practicable date, United States armed forces in being in Europe. They also plan to reinforce rapidly and substantially those forces at the outbreak of hostilities. This should indicate the intentions and capabilities of the United States with regard to the defense of Western Europe. A successful defense of Western Europe will call for increased effort on the part of all nations signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the inclusion of Turkey and Greece as full members in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization might adversely affect the progress which is now evident in North Atlantic Treaty arrangements. On the other hand, the admission of Turkey and Greece now would enable the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to concert military planning and actions in the Mediterranean and the Near and Middle East with those already in progress in Western Europe. The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that it might be possible to obtain the benefits of Turk and Greek participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and at the same time minimize the disadvantages thereof by according to these two nations an associate status in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Such a status would permit their representatives to participate in coordinated planning against Soviet aggression.

6. The following three paragraphs deal, respectively, with the other alternatives proposed in the letter by the Secretary of State, namely:

a. The granting to Greece and Turkey of a consultative status in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;

b. The establishment of a regional pact in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East area; and

c. A unilateral, non-reciprocal declaration by the United States, or possibly a multilateral declaration with the United Kingdom and France, to make it clear that armed aggression against Greece, Turkey, or Iran will not be tolerated.

7. The granting of a consultative status in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to Turkey and Greece would only be a temporary expedient, the effectiveness of which would depend largely upon the extent and nature of the consultations which would be held. The nature and extent of these consultations could be definitely fixed by according Turkey and Greece continuous limited participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization through their admission as associate members therein. The terms of such membership should provide for their collaboration in the military bodies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization so that a coordinated defense of Western Europe, the Mediterranean, and, at least to some extent, the Middle East may be effected. This collaboration should also extend to concerting military plans.

8. A new pact, generally along the lines of the Atlantic Treaty, with Greece and Turkey as members and with the United States, the United Kingdom, and France guaranteeing the integrity of these two nations on a reciprocal or on a non-reciprocal basis would in fact provide an arrangement by which the military plans of the new area and of the North Atlantic Treaty area might be coordinated. A superior authority for the concert of the plans of the two regions, however, would be lacking. Since the nations of the Near and Middle East, with the possible exception of Turkey, are too weak militarily to defend their own lands, and since even by common defense they could not alone insure the integrity of their region, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the formation of a Near and Middle East regional arrangement to be militarily unsound.

9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not favor a formal unilateral nonreciprocal declaration by the United States or a multilateral declaration of this nature to include the United Kingdom and France for the purpose of making it clear to the USSR that armed aggression against Greece, Turkey, or Iran will not be tolerated and with assurances to these three nations that United States aid in the maximum amount possible, consistent with other United States commitments, will be provided. In view of prior United States military commitments elsewhere, the Joint Chiefs of Staff doubt that this nation could, at any time in the near future, provide substantially more military aid to these three nations than is now already planned. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff perceive no objection, from the military point of view, to the United States joining with the United Kingdom and France in informally assuring Turkey that a Soviet attack against it would probably mean the beginning of global war and that the United States, United Kingdom, and France would act accordingly. Such assurances might do much to dispel the Turkish feeling of insecurity and to compensate now for the possible disappointment in Turkey’s failing to achieve full membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

10. It is recognized that the status of Turkey, particularly, should be clarified. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that Turkey be informed that the development of the necessary defensive strength in the North Atlantic Treaty area has not progressed sufficiently to permit full North Atlantic Treaty Organization membership of Turkey at this time; that as soon as the defense of the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is reasonably assured, the matter of the inclusion of Turkey will be reconsidered; and that, meanwhile, the United States will suport the granting to Turkey of an associate status in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in order that its representatives may participate without delay in coordinated planning.

11. It would appear that no particular organizational and administrative difficulties would be involved in this associative arrangement. Probably the most important problem in connection with planning would be that of security. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that adequate safeguards can be established.

12. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:⁴

a. The United States now support the granting of associate status to Turkey and Greece in order that their representatives may participate without delay in coordinating planning;

b. As soon as the defense of the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is reasonably assured, the United States consider raising the question of full membership for Turkey and Greece in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and

c. Serious consideration not be given at this time to granting Iran either consultative or associate member status in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, would interpose no objection to the United States, the United Kingdom, and France joining to give informal assurances to Turkey that a Soviet attack against it would probably mean the beginning of global war and that the United States, the United Kingdom, and France would act accordingly.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

A. C. Davis
Rear Admiral, USN
Director, The Joint Staff

1. Copy transmitted to the Department of State by Secretary of Defense Louis September 11, prepared in the Department of State, on the security of Greece and Turkey (text ibid., p. 279), which was cleared in the Department of Defense for use in the Tripartite Meeting, Foreign Ministers of France, United Kingdom, and United States at New York, September 1950. For documentation on the discussion of the subject at this meeting, see ibid. , pp. 1188 ff.
2. Not printed.
3. vol. iii, p. 257.
2. Not printed.
4. In his letter of September 11 to the Secretary of State, cited in footnote 1 above, Secretary of Defense Johnson made the three recommendations stated here.