Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V

782.022/8–2250: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

top secret
niact

Ankara, August 22, 1950—11 a. m.

124. 1. Turkish PriMin and FonMin returned Ankara evening August 18. Earlier same day when presenting Counselor Keith, I had informed SecGen Akdur of receipt message from Department that Turkish request adhere NAT was under consideration (Deptel 92 August 17).¹ Akdur was “frankly disappointed message not more encouraging.” He argued vital importance to Turkish morale to morale and stability Near East, to security Mediterranean and Europe itself, and to world peace “now under critical Soviet threat.” I felt it politic to reply that in my opinion Department’s message, in view its very brevity, should be considered only as acknowledgement of receipt and assurance that Turkish application was receiving prompt serious study.

2. Following day August 19 Turkish PriMin and I reviewed at his request major problems US military aid program in four-hour conference with Generals McBride and Arnold and Turkish FonMin and Chief-of-Staff (remytel 44 July 31 from Istanbul). General Arnold will submit report.² I wish emphasize here realistic attitude Turks in recognizing deficiencies and seeking solutions through short-term program designed put existing armed forces in best possible condition preparedness to meet emergency. At conclusion this meeting FonMin asked me call August 21 to discuss Turkish request adhere NAT in light his conversations at Strasbourg and my conversation with Akdur.

3. Meeting was held as scheduled; to point its importance PriMin joined us. FonMin first told me of his meeting with Schuman and Bevin separately on August 5; Schuman promised wholehearted support, Bevin was noncommittal. Latter conversation was pursued “in more encouraging atmosphere” August 7 by Dalton³ who, while in no wise committing British Government, gave assurance Washington was being consulted. Hence, FonMin said, my message of hardly more than simple acknowledgment almost a fortnight later gave him some concern; matter was of such prime importance he and PriMin wished recapitulate Turkish position. Following five paragraphs give highlights their exposition.

(a) Turkey, a natural partner and militarily strong element in overall European defense, had long felt it should be formally included in and permitted contribute to such defense. Until recent intensification world crisis, precipitated by Korean developments, Turkey had accepted US view that, pending completion organizational stage NAT, moment for positive action was not propitious. Now there was pressing new urgency.

(b) Turkish approach was essentially realistic; it recognized much still remained to be done to integrate European defense; it appreciated present limitations on possible European aid were Turkey to be attacked by Russia. Turkey realized too that it would be assuming new obligations and that it would bring to the common pool more and more readily readiable military strength than it could expect to draw there-from, but this it wished earnestly to do in the vital immediate common interest.

(c) Towards protection that interest Turkey wished and felt it could materially contribute in morale-political fields as well. Would not Europe itself feel strengthened? In Near East effect would buttress wavering morale; Turkish Government had already expressed desire play positive role in Arab countries; if admitted to pact it could more effectively support Allied position in Libya, facilitate Anglo-Egyptian settlement, pursue private staff talks with Iran as well as Greece.

(d) In Turkey, itself, moral effect of admission would be spur to greater preparedness effort; whereas effect on public morale of further deferment would be “not only painful but at best, a moral deception.”

(e) Turkish policy today (PriMin emphasized) is “clear, unequivocal, honest and realistic”; it does not ask admission so it may relax its vigilance, but rather to end it may contribute more effectively to international peace. It relies first on its own armed forces and wishes strengthen them through more effective cooperation with JAMMAT. If attacked, it will resist with or without Western assistance; but Turkish Government and people believe such assistance will be forthcoming. Consequently, Turkish admission to pact, with its prescribed mechanism for positive common action, seems eminently logical to all Turks.

4. In light foregoing exposition, which I believe effectively portrays basic Turkish position, I do not find first question asked in Deptel 92 August 17 “perplexing.”⁴ The sound realism of that position, recognizing as it does present inability NAT powers commit substantial forces in event Soviet aggression against Turkey, would seem clearly indicate beneficial rather than harmful net effect Turkish inclusion.

5. If, on other hand, Turkish request be rejected, harm would surely be done to presently high Turkish morale and to élan of present Turkish-US cooperative relations, if only because, as stated to me by FonMin, Turkish Government is persuaded other signatories NAT would welcome Turkish participation unless opposed by US. Canada, Italy and Norway, he said, as well as France, have indicated their support in principle.

6. Only suggestion I can offer to counter resulting disappointment (disillusionment is not too strong a word in light Turkish conviction inevitability eventual showdown with Russia) is to increase military aid (e.g. by bearing cost NCO program and other new projects mutually deemed practicable and essential to emergency preparedness) and at same time to assure Turks that our negative answer is in no sense definitive rejection but rather deferment dictated by vital present but not fundamental policy considerations (e.g. essential desirability of perfecting logistics of Western Mediterranean defense before inviting Turks participate in planning overall Mediterranean and European mutual defense).

7. In re second question put in reference Deptel,⁵ I believe we may accept as sincere above Turkish comment that if Turkey adheres NAT it will be in better position undertake staff talks with Iran. PriMin added: previous Turkish Governments were hesitant on this point, whereas we seek assure ourselves position which will open way to effective positive action; Iran is not part of Europe, whereas Turkey is; consequently Iran should feel strengthened rather than abandoned as result Turkish adherence to NAT.

Wadsworth

1. Not printed.
2. Presumably a report, not found in Department of State files, based on the; draft memorandum of August 19 by Maj. Gen. W. H. Arnold, p. 1293.
3. Hugh Dalton, U.K. Delegate to the Consultative Assembly, Council of Europe, Strasbourg.
4. Department’s telegram 92, August 17, to Ankara, not printed, read in part as follows: “Two of several perplexing problems re admission GT are: 1. If, as members NAT, GT realize fact NAT powers, with present capabilities, cannot commit substantial forces to GT in event aggression, wld net effect incl GT be more harmful than not?” (782.5/7–3150).
5. Department’s telegram 92, August 17, to Ankara, not printed, read in part as follows: “Assuming GT included NAT, what measures can be taken indicate effectively to Iran and USSR continuing US interest in independence and integrity Iran?” (782.5/7–3150)