Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V

711.56386A/12–2450: Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Secretary of State

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Jidda, December 24, 1950—noon.

400. Arrived Riyadh December 14¹ with General O’Keefe. General Day² joined us December 17. Returned Jidda yesterday December 23 on understanding would return December 30 to continue drafting.

First item on agenda was presentation of President’s letter³ to King who greatly pleased and said appropriate reply would be prepared. Later advised him not intended publication now but would contemplate doing so at appropriate time later.

The King did not undertake to discuss either military assistance or DAF other than remark that latter was subject upon which he wished agreement reached without delay. He then appointed Yusuf Yassin and Khalid Bey Gargani to negotiate behalf SAG.

Next few days devoted to our presentation military assistance and DAF proposals and general discussion with Saudi representatives who indicated disposition reach agreement re both but emphasized immediate problem in both cases was how overcome King’s strong feelings that aid should have been on grant rather than cash basis, whereas, re DAF principle difficulty was King’s sensitiveness to both domestic and outside criticism for having acted to detriment Saudi sovereignty. Problem therefore was find counterbalancing factors and also present both matters in such way as to make appear that SA had made good bargain. Saudi negotiators repeatedly said in time war all SA would be at disposal US but in time peace political factors necessarily loomed large.

I believe presentation basic problem by Saudis reasonably accurate but, of course, it gave them good cover for hard bargaining which they did not fail exploit. Should be noted here that chief Saudi spokesman was Yusuf Yassin who reputed for his exasperating negotiation tactics and in this case he turned in star performance. Against background of practically no knowledge of subject he attempted rewrite practically entire draft and out-Shy locked Shy lock in endeavor exact more than pound of flesh on each point. Further complication lay in fact that group of similarly uninformed members of King’s entourage, including Prince Abdullah, were constantly injecting themselves into matter behind scenes and that Fuad Hamza, only man with knowledge of subject, was absent from Riyadh. As consequence for first week can be said Saudi tactics were on horse-trading rather than negotiation level.

Re military assistance discussion was relatively brief and devoted largely to trying to get greatest concessions on training; to get assurances of advantageous price; to seek some method for long-term credit, to obtain advance delivery of arms for storage pending purchase, and to obtain general assurance arms not specified in program would be available on request. After our initial presentation Saudi negotiators appeared convinced on cash-reimbursable character of aid but seemed find it difficult understand other aspects also had legal limitations.

On DAF agreement pressure was much greater and Yusuf Yassin was at his petty-fogging worst. Following are some of points which he merged:

1. King’s sensitiveness re giving civil air jurisdiction of DAF to US military commander and also giving rights to US Government as such (see following telegram).⁴

2. Attempt to transform any rights sought by us into mutual obligations in which we would be giving more than receiving.

4. [sic] Insistence that rights given to us would be fully exercised for full term of agreement.

5. Lack of appreciation our requirements and concentration on exactly maximum advantage for SAG.

6. Suspicion that agreement as drafted did not reveal our true intentions.

7. Desire restrict agreement to DAF within clearly defined limits of [garble] and to reserve off-field rights for separate handling.

8. Insistence on discussing details having no place in an over-all agreement.

As result these tactics Yusuf Yassin (Khalid Bey seemed quite friendly and reasonable throughout) we found ourselves in position where at end eighth day we had only discussed five articles despite repeated insistence American group that we first review American draft and tentative Saudi draft so as to determine area of agreement and points on which discussion required. At this point Prince Mansour, Minister Defense, suddenly appeared on scene to head Saudi delegation with result that remaining twenty articles were reviewed in single day and opportunity afforded assess problem as whole (we were later told that this development occurred as result of reports reaching King regarding Yusuf Yassin’s tactics and our dissatisfaction therewith).

As matter stands following [garble] of estimate situation re DAF agreement:

1. King wants agreement and his entourage are taking cue from him but nevertheless putting troublesome finger in pie.

2. Fact that agreement is for 25 years makes Saudis understandably cautious especially bearing in mind their own feeling of incompetence in matters this kind and example of unfortunate British experience in Egypt and Iraq.

3. So far tentative drafting only done on first five articles and if Saudis insist on discussion in such detail as heretofore work to be done will be exceedingly burdensome and time-consuming with result additional extension present agreement probably necessary.

4. Although list of problems long and items complex, chances for eventual agreement barring unforeseen developments are good. This estimate is based upon attitude of His Majesty, statement of Saudi representatives even in midst most difficult discussion and statement made to me by Prince Mansour while we were returning by plane together from Riyadh yesterday.

5. The one immediate hurdle which has to be surmounted is action by Department and Defense on suggestion regarding use of training mission (see Embtel 401 December 24)⁵ as means playing down for public relations reasons military character of DAF agreement. Prompt action on this point is essential, since without it we are unable to continue constructive discussions with SAG negotiators.

Prospects are also favorable on military assistance proposal. One of first things which Prince Mansour did on assuming charge of negotiations was specifically to say SAG approved JCS recommendations in principle but also on assumption that further requests would be cooperatively entertained, especially as regards (1) combat planes situation, (2) basic workshops and training therefor; and (3) increased supplies of ammunition and spare parts. He also expressed hope that first group of military experts would be able help in drawing up military budget. Present situation is that draft note including obligations of SAG as specified in Deptel 180, November 21⁶ and also some friendly phrases designed appeal SAG susceptibilities under discussion with Yusuf Yassin who characteristically has put forward not only unacceptable but practically unintelligible revision our draft but believes this situation can be met with mixture of firmness and patience.

We left Riyadh yesterday on understanding that we would return by December 30 to endeavor complete drafting on both DAF and military assistance agreement following reference of “mission concept” to Department for expression views (see Embtel 401, December 24).

Chronological account discussions to date together with pertinent drafts being forwarded by pouch.

I have suggested that if possible Major Napper return Washington immediately in order give first-hand account of problem as revealed during first phase negotiations. In so doing I desire express great appreciation for most helpful services he rendered in Riyadh.

Hare

1. Telegram 391, December 13, from Jidda, not printed, informed the Department of State that the Ambassador would proceed to Riyadh on December 14 to begin negotiations on the Dhahran Airfield Agreement and military assistance (711.56386A/12–1350).

   Despatch 202, December 23, from Jidda, not printed, contained a complete account of the negotiations. Enclosed with the despatch were a chronology of the meetings at Riyadh from December 14–23, an undated copy of a Saudi Arabian counterdraft of the Agreement, and a tentatively agreed draft of the first few articles of the Agreement. (786A.5/12–2350)

2. Brig. Gen. Edwin M. Day, USAF, who was to assume command of Dhahran Airfield in February 1951.
3. Dated October 31, p. 1190.
4. Telegram 401, December 24, from Jidda, not printed, reported that the King was sensitive to the reflection on his sovereignty implied in giving rights to a United States military unit “as had been previously done by specifically delegating SAG civil air jurisdiction to ‘commander Dhahran airfield.’” (711.56386A/12–2450)
5. It informed the Department of State the Saudi Arabians found the title “commander, DAF” objectionable, and the Ambassador wanted permission to substitute the title “chief, training mission” wherever reference was made to the base commander. Since the established Saudi Arabian training mission at Dhahran was a subordinate unit, he saw no reason why the title change could not be made, especially since “outcome present negotiations hinges on this issue.”
6. Ante, p. 1194.