Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V

786A.5/4–1950

Excerpt of Report by the Chief of Staff of the United States Army (Collins) to the Secretary of the Army (Gray)¹

top secret

[Washington, April 1950.]

Saudi Arabia

a. Unfortunately my visit to Dhahran was so short that it was not possible to make any detailed inspection of the Air Base which, of course, is under Air Force control.

b. In my several conferences with Ibn Saud and his principal advisors, which are detailed in appendices hereto, I was impressed with the fact that at no time did any Arab raise the question of the extension of our base rights at Dhahran. I do not believe this was an oversight but rather, to me, indicated that at least a subconscious acceptance of the fact that American Base Rights at Dhahran would be continued.

c. The thought uppermost in the minds of Ibn Saud and his advisor was the early implementation of the so-called O’Keefe report, however modified it might be. I believe that I convinced them that it would be far wiser to accept a more gradual and modest modernization of their Armed Forces than that envisaged in the O’Keefe report.

(1) I am certain that the Arabian officials were shocked at the cost of the proposed O’Keefe program. They immediately proposed a monetary grant-in-aid to provide sufficient funds for military equipment. I believe Ambassador Childs and I convinced them that this would not be possible.

(2) At the specific request of the King and his principal advisors and with the full assent of Ambassador Childs, I have made a record of our discussions with reference to the strength and organization of Arabian Forces. A copy of this discussion is attached hereto as Annex 6. I have agreed to furnish copies thereof to Ambassador Childs for transmittal to Ibn Saud.

d. I am convinced that Ibn Saud is more concerned over possible warfare resulting from some subsequent expansion of Israel than he is over any threat from Russia. However, he and his advisors are fully cognizant of how serious such a threat would be, not only to Saudi Arabia but to the Moslem World. The Arabs would fight to the limit of their ability if threatened by Russia.

e. With reference to a proposed token shipment of rifles to Saudi Arabia (see CM–IN 16971, 4 April 1950²), I believe that if Congress approves a MDAP program for Saudi Arabia clearance should be obtained from appropriate Congressional leaders for a shipment of 5,000 rifles and an appropriate amount of ammunition. Decision as to offering such a token shipment should rest with Ambassador Childs, who assures me that he will use the authority only if he finds it necessary in order to obtain an extension of our base rights in Dhahran.³

f. Action to be taken:

(1) G–3 take appropriate steps to expedite action leading to the initiation of a modest MDAP program, on a reimbursable basis, for Saudi Arabia, including a token shipment of arms, if such is deemed advisable by Ambassador Childs.

Annex 6

Saudi Arabia

1. Shortly after arriving at Riyadh on 2 April 1950, Ambassador Childs, General Collins, Colonels Johnson, Dodge and Howze called upon the King, Ibn Saud. The King greeted the party very graciously and extended a welcome to Saudi Arabia. The King’s good humor was indicated by the fact that he gave a detailed account of his capture of the Palace of Riyadh fifty years ago with a party of only 40 men.

2. At four o’clock in the afternoon, following customary procedure, the party paid its respects to the King.

3. Following this audience, the party then met with Crown Prince Saud; Prince Mansur, Minister of Defense; Fuad Bey Hamza, Minister of State and Counselor to the King.

4. At this conference General Collins outlined the current status of the O’Keefe report and stated that an abbreviated copy of this report had been forwarded by the JCS, without any final action on their part, to the U.S. Secretary of Defense for transmittal, through the Secretary of State, to Ibn Saud.⁴

5. General Collins pointed out that the whole matter of military aid to Saudi Arabia was still under study and emphasized the fact that no final action would be taken until Congress authorized appropriations. He further pointed out that if the usual MDAP procedures were followed, it would be necessary to consummate a bi-lateral treaty between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. He made clear that this treaty would not be a military or political alliance but would simply stipulate the extent of the program and the method of financing it. The next step would be the completion of negotiations between representatives of the Arabian government and U.S. officials to determine the exact nature and extent of the program.

6. General Collins then asked if the Crown Prince would care to have General Collins’ personal observations as to the type and organization of forces which he would recommend for the Arabian Army. The Crown Prince and his associates immediately expressed a desire to obtain General Collins’ views.

7. General Collins then told the party that he had read the O’Keefe report. While it represented a very fine study, he was convinced that the forces proposed would be much too large and costly to be maintained by the Arabian Government. He stated that the U.S. Army staff had made an analysis of the costs involved in such a program and determined that the cost would amount to at least 107 million dollars. This cost would cover the provision of equipment, necessary ammunition, packing, crating and transportation charges and the establishment of necessary shelter for a U.S. military mission which would be needed to train the Arabian Army. Even if this cost were spread over a period of 5 years, the annual cost would be approximately 22 million dollars. Since it would not be possible to create and train newly equipped forces immediately, it would be necessary for Saudi Arabia to continue to maintain its present forces for some time. The 22 million dollars for the new forces would be over and above the annual cost of maintaining the residual current forces.

8. When asked what the current military budget was, Fuad Bey replied it was about 9 million dollars. However, he admitted that this did not represent the entire military budget. It was then pointed out that for at least the first 2 years the annual cost would total at least 31 million dollars since the bulk of the present forces would have to be maintained. This would be nearly four times the present military budget. General Collins stated that he doubted very much that the country could afford to spend that much money on its armed forces at this time.

9. Ambassador Childs pointed out that when the O’Keefe report was drafted the financial situation of the government was different from that now existing. In 1949 oil production was rising with consequent increase in oil royalties; the O’Keefe report was developed using a Saudi income approaching 100 million dollars annually. In the meanwhile there has been a falling off in the demand for oil and a cutback in oil production, with the result that in 1950 government revenues were likely to be substantially below those of the high-water mark of 1949. The Ambassador added that there was a serious question as to whether Saudi economy could support the very heavy military charge.

10. Fuad Bey said the government was well aware of this problem and that consideration was being given already to the means of increasing oil royalties. (This short paragraph should be omitted from the copy of the report forwarded to the Arabian Government.)⁵

11. General Collins then suggested that rather than to embark on such an ambitious program, it would be far wiser to initiate a more feasible and modest one. He made the point that it was not simply a question of money but also the problem of the ability of the Arabians to absorb the new techniques and to establish and to train the essential non-commissioned officers and experts who would be required to handle this equipment. He pointed out that it would take some time to establish schools and to develop competent instructors in the Arabian forces. If this were not done, valuable equipment would stand idle and rapidly deteriorate. Should such equipment be seen by visiting Congressmen from America it would have a very bad effect. It might well result in the curtailment of the program. General Collins, therefore, suggested that it might be well to start with an Army force of three infantry regimental combat teams and a modified mechanized cavalry regiment.

12. General Collins outlined to the Arabians the American triangular system of organization under which each unit consists of three smaller homogeneous elements plus a fire support unit. This type of organization is designed primarily for an attack. For any attack there must be three elements; first, the force which finds the enemy and holds him in place. This is called the finding and fixing force. Next, there must be a maneuvering unit which is employed to outflank the enemy who has been fixed in position by the holding force. Third, it is necessary to have a reserve in order to carry home the attack and destroy the enemy. Each of these homogeneous units requires the movement of men and equipment over the ground. It is necessary for the commander to have a fourth element by which, without the movement of men or equipment, he can shift his supporting fires to assist any part of the attack. This fourth element is called the fire support unit.

13. All U.S. Army organizations are based on this theory of attack. For example, a platoon consists of three rifle squads and a fourth light machine gun squad, the latter being the fire support element. A company consists of three platoons and a light mortar and machine gun platoon. A battalion consists of three rifle companies and a heavy weapons company. A regiment has three battalions and a heavy mortar company and finally a division consists of three regiments and an artillery group.

14. There are two great advantages of this type of organization. First, young officers familiar with the method of handling a platoon have no new principle to learn when they become company commanders, a good company commander can readily handle a battalion, and so on throughout an officer’s career. The second great advantage and one which would have special application to Saudi Arabia, is that, if after the three regimental combat teams were well trained and equipped and the government should decide then that it could increase the size of its army, each of these regimental combat teams could be expanded to become a division. This could be done by adding men and material to each company so as to convert it into a battalion. Each battalion could be expanded into a regiment and then each regiment could then become a division. Thus, under the framework of the program suggested by General Collins, the Saudi Arabians might ultimately develop three infantry divisions and a light mechanized division, the latter being created from the original mechanized regiment.

15. Fuad Bey then interrupted to say that while this was very logical, the Arabs had felt that the forces recommended by the O’Keefe report represented the minimum forces with which Saudi Arabia could start. General Collins again pointed out the great costs involved and the lack of wisdom in embarking on such a large scale project until the proper groundwork had been laid by training the necessary specialists in schools.

16. Without divulging the contents of the O’Keefe report, General Collins pointed out that he could not agree with some of the units recommended in the report.⁶ For example, the report provided for a parachute battalion or its equivalent. General Collins told of his experience with two airborne divisions in the Normandy campaign and pointed out how complicated and difficult were airborne operations. He stated that with the relative short distances in Saudi Arabia it would be better to employ perhaps a mechanized regiment to seize a given area and then to move troops by air transport or overland by trucks rather than to parachute them from the air.

17. In answer to a query, General Collins began to outline the method now used of transferring equipment under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP). However, it was necessary to adjourn the meeting in order that the Arabians might have time for their evening prayers.

18. Following dinner, given by the King, the conference was resumed. In addition to the Americans and Arabs present during the afternoon discussions the King’s brother Abdula, headed the Arabian group.

19. General Collins resumed his discussion of the pricing methods employed under MDAP. He made clear that considerable equipment being furnished countries of Western Europe, Greece, Turkey and Iran was generally surplus to the maximum needs of the US forces. This equipment was divided, for pricing purposes, into three categories as follows:

a. The lowest category consists of such articles as older types of armored vehicles, small bazookas, and certain types of artillery of which the US Army has some surplus above its maximum needs. In the original program this equipment was priced at 10% of its original cost plus the cost of rehabilitation, handling, packing, crating and shipping. This system was changed so as to eliminate the 10% charge; however, the cost of rehabilitation and handling, packing, crating, and shipping has usually amounted to roughly 25% of the cost of new equipment.

b. The second category of equipment contains items which the U.S. needs but are not required for the minimum supply levels felt necessary for the U.S. Army. Some examples of equipment in this category are: certain radios, small arms and ammunition, mortars, and 105 mm Howitzers. This equipment has been furnished at its original acquisition cost which is roughly the 1945 purchase price. These costs represent approximately one-half of the current 1950 new procurement costs for similar items.

c. The last category of equipment contains those items which are needed to meet the minimum supply levels of the US Army. Examples of this category are: engineer equipment, artillery ammunition, almost all types of trucks, recoilless anti-tank weapons. Such items may be furnished at the current 1950 procurement cost if the item can be procured by the time the US Army needs it.

20. Abdula then remarked that the Arabian Army wished to have only new equipment as it had had some bad experience obtaining second hand equipment in the past. General Collins pointed out that the equipment that might be furnished them would be similar to that being used by the United States itself and being furnished to the Armies of France and Italy. He stated that it would be necessary to rehabilitate some of this equipment but that it would be all in excellent order. It would have a long life if properly maintained.

21. Abdula then raised the question as to whether Saudi Arabia could not be given this equipment as is being done for other countries. He stated that Saudi Arabia was of great strategic importance to the U.S. and that the oil from Saudi Arabia was essential to the U.S. Navy; therefore, the U.S. should be willing to furnish this equipment to Saudi Arabia by means of a grant-in-aid. Prince Abdula also pointed out that the O’Keefe report had been submitted some months ago and that before that there had been discussions by His Majesty Ibn Saud, concerning military aid for a period of 2 years and that nothing had come as yet from these discussions. The inference left was that we did not seem to be any nearer a meeting of minds than we had been before these long drawn out discussions.

22. Ambassador Childs stated that he would assume the responsibility for replying to certain of Prince Abdula’s remarks as he was intimately acquainted with the background of certain of the problems involved. The Ambassador stated that, as he had so frequently remarked to His Majesty, the United States Government was a very cumbersome machine. It was unlike the Government of Saudi Arabia where decisions could be implemented at the will of one man. Mr. Childs stated that in his opinion the O’Keefe report was receiving as prompt a consideration as was to be expected in light of the many authorities in Washington who had to pass judgment upon it and all the many other complicated problems with which the American Government is faced in all sections of the world. The O’Keefe report, after being studied by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of which General Collins was a member, would be referred to the Department of Defense and, thereafter, to the State Department. When the decision had been reached between these authorities and the President’s approval had been obtained, it would still be necessary to seek Congressional authorization for the implementation of the report.

23. The Ambassador recalled Prince Abdula’s statement that the Saudi Arabian Government considered the O’Keefe report recommendations an absolute minimum. Prince Abdula had stated the government desired even more than the O’Keefe report had recommended. This attitude might be said to be characteristic of all governments today in the world. In the United States, as rich as it is, there is great controversy of the amount of the military budget. No one was ever satisfied regardless of what the military budget might be. The great problem today is to fit the military budget to the financial means available to the country. If an intolerable burden were placed on a country’s economy it might be a means of hastening the forces of disintegration and preparing the way for Communism, against which all are seeking to guard themselves.

24. Mr. Childs observed that when Mr. McGhee had visited Riyadh, the week previous, he had taken great care to explain that military grants-in-aid could only be made by the United States to those countries not financially able to bear the cost of such aid. Saudi Arabia was financially solvent and had no external debt. It would be impossible to justify to Congress, under these circumstances, any request that the United States should bear the burden of military aid to Saudi Arabia. The United States was already faced with a budgetary deficiency of 5 billion dollars and every American was groaning under the burden of income taxes which he was forced to pay, not only to support the American military budget but for military aid to those countries not in a position to pay for it. It would be out of the question to expect the American taxpayer to assume the burden of military aid for Saudi Arabia which was in a thoroughly solvent financial position. The Ambassador stated he would ask General Collins to undertake any additional replies to Prince Abdula’s remarks.

25. General Collins stated that he fully supported the position of the Ambassador. He pointed out that it would be necessary in the United States to reduce the military budget one billion dollars for the fiscal year 1951 under that which was appropriated for fiscal year 1950 and that armies everywhere had to reduce military expenditures in order to prevent economic collapse.

26. General Collins then quickly reviewed the world strategic position as might be estimated by the Soviets. He pointed out that in the event of another major world war, the Soviet major effort would most likely be launched against the countries of Western Europe and England and that a subsidiary attack would probably be made via Iran or Turkey to seize the Cairo–Suez area. This latter attack might well by-pass Saudi Arabia entirely; however, any attack on Cairo would have to proceed through the Moslem countries, and if successful, would be a blow to the Moslem world.

27. General Collins went on to say quite frankly that, in his judgment neither the United States, nor its Navy, would be dependent upon Arabian oil in the event of war. He pointed out that it was likely that neither Russia nor the Western Powers would be able to obtain oil in any quantity from the Middle East. Russia would not be able to do so because of the lack of transportation and both the Western Powers and Russia would probably take steps to deny Middle East oil to the other by destroying through bombardment all the great refineries of the Middle East.

28. General Collins went on to say that, although the United States did not regard Saudi Arabia as being in the “front line”, nevertheless, its independence was of great concern to the United States. The United States would, from a strategic point of view, have to deliver its major military aid under the MDAP programs to the Western Powers and to the countries in the Middle East which were in immediate contact with Russia. He stated that, in his judgment, based on experience with the appropriations committees of the Congress, it would not be possible to obtain a grant-in-aid to Saudi Arabia for military supplies but that if Congress would approve a program it would be on a reimbursable basis.

29. After some further discussion and at the request of the Crown Prince, General Collins agreed to furnish a transcript of the entire discussions, including an outline of his proposals for consideration for the officials of the Saudi Arabian Government. This transcript is intended to serve this purpose.

30. It is particularly interesting to note that not once in the discussions outlined above was the subject of the renewal of the lease to Dhahran Air Base raised by any Saudi Arabians. They gave the impression that they accepted as a foregone conclusion the extension of U.S. base rights at Dhahran. (This paragraph should be omitted from any copy of the report forwarded to the Saudi Arabian Government.⁷)

1. The source text was enclosed in a memorandum of April 19, by Lt. Col. Stanley It. Larsen, Aide to General Collins, to Francis E. Meloy, Jr., of NEA/ANE; not printed. Larsen asked that the Department of State forward it to the Ambassador in Saudi Arabia, and a copy was sent to Jidda on May 18. (786A.5/4–1950)

   On his March 20–April 8 Middle Eastern inspection trip, Collins went to Italy, Trieste, Greece, Turkey, Iran, Egypt, and Tripoli, as well as Saudi Arabia. This report and the attached Annex 6 were a portion of his overall report on the Middle East. For a memorandum of Collins’ conversation with President Inonu, dated March 26, see p. 1241. Annex 5 is printed on p. 507. A copy of Collins’ complete report, attached to a memorandum for McGhee, is in Department of State file 780.5/4–1750.

2. Not found in Department of State files.
3. Handwritten notes on the source text, “deleted from enclosure,” indicate that paragraphs e and f were deleted from the copy forwarded to Jidda.
4. Paragraphs 4, 10, and 30 were deleted from the copy of the source text that was sent to Ambassador Childs for transmittal to King Saud, and the following paragraphs were renumbered.
5. Paragraphs 4, 10, and 30 were deleted from the copy of the source text that was sent to Ambassador Childs for transmittal to King Saud, and the following paragraphs were renumbered.
6. In the copy sent to Saudi Arabia, the latter part of this sentence read: “General Collins pointed out that he could not agree with some of the units recommended in the O’Keefe report.”
7. Paragraphs 4, 10, and 30 were deleted from the copy of the source text that was sent to Ambassador Childs for transmittal to King Saud, and the following paragraphs were renumbered.