357.AC/11–2550
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)1
Subject: Visit of Israel Ambassador
| Participants: | H. E. Abba Eban, Israel Ambassador, Washington |
| Moshe Keren, Counselor of the Embassy of Israel | |
| Mr. McGhee—NEA | |
| Mr. Waldo—NE |
Problem: To take action on certain points raised by Israel Ambassador.
Action Required: See below.
Action Assigned to: NE
[Page 1053]Ambassador Eban called on me this morning at 11 a. m., at his own request, to discuss a number of matters principally concerned with Palestine items on the UN agenda.
1. Israel Arms Plants: The Ambassador opened the discussion with an item which he said had nothing to do with the Palestine discussion at the UN. There are presently in Israel a number of small munitions plants which were set up hurriedly in 1948 to produce small arms and ammunition for use by Israel forces in their fight against the Arabs during the period of hostilities. He said the plants were still in operation but that there was now an adequate supply in Israel of the types of equipment manufactured by them. His Government wondered, therefore, whether the plants might not usefully manufacture equipment to assist in the rearmament of the Western World. The Ambassador said that Israel could easily sell the equipment on the open market but that his Government did not wish to act in any irresponsible fashion and would prefer to have the arms go where they would do the most good. Much of the equipment consisted of mortars and mortar ammunition of a standard US size. Colonel Herzog, Israel Military Attaché in Washington, had already discussed the matter informally with some of his friends in the Defense Department and they had said the matter should first be raised with the Department of State. The Ambassador said that none of the items manufactured in Israel were the type of equipment Israel was applying for in the US.
I thanked Mr. Eban for this interesting offer, and instructed Mr. Waldo to take the matter up with the appropriate persons in the Defense Department and in the Department in order that a more thorough discussion of the matter might be undertaken by the Israelis with the Defense Department.
2. Security Council Action:
Ambassador Eban indicated that he was not very happy over the form in which the Palestine resolution had been passed by the Security Council on November 17, 1950. He felt that the various delegations, including the US delegation, had slipped one over on him in this matter. Israel had agreed to evacuate Bir Qattar. The Ambassador admitted that this was the one point at which Israel might be considered at fault in connection with the overall armistice situation. The resolution as it had been originally drafted was satisfactory to Israel and referred in general terms to the complaints of the various parties. The section of the resolution which was concerned with the Egyptian complaint relating to the movement of Bedouins in the Negev was offensive to Israel in its present form. First, it referred to the fact that it was dealing with an Egyptian complaint, whereas none of the other complaints were specifically mentioned. Secondly, the resolution called upon both parties to give effect to any findings of the Mixed Armistice Commissions regarding the repatriation of any Arabs who in the Commission’s [Page 1054] opinion are entitled to return. Ambassador Eban felt that this was in effect a prejudgment of the entire issue and a suggestion as to what type of finding should be reached by the Mixed Armistice Commissions. He said the additional article which called upon the governments concerned to take no action involving the transfer of persons across frontiers without prior consultation with the Mixed Armistice Commissions raised a very difficult problem. It would not be practicable for Israel to consult with the UNSC in every case where Arabs infiltrated into Israel across the lines. Such consultation would obviously result in an impossible situation in view of the great number of cases which would occur. The Ambassador continued that it seemed to him that the US delegation and other delegations made every attempt to conciliate Fawzi Bey and draft a resolution acceptable to him, but that in the end the Egyptians had not voted for the resolution.
I said that I was not aware of the details of the discussions in the SC but that I was sure there was no intention on the part of the US delegation to slight the Israelis. We were anxious that the resolution should be acceptable to the Israelis, as well as to the Arabs. It did not seem to me, however, that the resolution in any way prejudged the situation in the Negev.
3. Arab Refugee Item and PCC Conclusions:
Ambassador Eban then brought up the question of the draft resolution on the Arab refugee item and the conclusions of the PCC, which is presently under informal discussion in the Ad Hoc Committee. The Ambassador thought that when this resolution was first drafted in the Committee it was fairly good. The modifications which had just been made at the suggestion of the Arab states appeared to him seriously to jeopardize any effectiveness the resolution might have. Specifically, the Ambassador deplored the removal of any reference to giving priority to a discussion of the refugee question in calling upon governments and authorities concerned promptly to enter direct negotiations. The Ambassador said that it was obvious that in any discussions looking toward a final settlement, the refugee question would have to be given prior consideration. This modification was merely another attempt to appease the Arabs and in the end would not result in obtaining their support. By separating a discussion of the refugee question from all other outstanding matters, the way would be opened to the same type of stalemate which existed after the passage of the December 11 resolution.
I said that it appeared to me that the resolution was a step forward in calling promptly for direct negotiations. In any such negotiations it would of course be impossible to side step the refugee question. If by the suggested modifications the acquiescence of the Arab states could be obtained, we would have achieved something that had never [Page 1055] been achieved before. It would almost amount to an informal commitment by the Arabs to enter the direct negotiations for which Israel had been clamoring for so long.
4. Jerusalem:
The Ambassador then briefly mentioned the Jerusalem question. He said that Israel intended to support the Swedish-Dutch draft resolution and he hoped that it would receive wide support among the other delegations. He said that Israel hoped it would be possible to refer the question to another committee which had a less crowded agenda.
I told the Ambassador that the resolution looked reasonable to us, but, unfortunately, it did not appear to have the support of the Vatican and we had recently been informed by the Jordanians that they had certain objections to it. I reiterated our position on this question—that we could not actively advocate any plan which had not received the support of Jordan, Israel and a majority of the international community. In view of the Jordanian position on this matter I thought we might, however, discuss the question informally with them.
5. Suez Canal:
The Ambassador complained that after a full discussion of the Egyptian item in the November 17 resolution, the SC had not seen fit to consider the Israel draft resolution concerning the Egyptian blockade of the Suez Canal. He said that a number of the other delegations had supported Israel in its position on this matter but that it had been decided not to take it up in the Council since the local remedies available in the Mixed Armistice Commission, i.e. the Special Committee, had not yet been exhausted. The Ambassador said he thought it was unfortunate the SC could not have considered the resolution since he was certain that, if a resolution along the lines of the Israel draft had been passed, the Egyptians would have removed their restriction against shipping through the Canal. He was not so optimistic that favorable action in the Special Committee would result in any change of the Egyptian position. If no solution to this matter was reached in the Special Committee, the Ambassador said Israel would raise the question again in the SC. He said that he hoped the Israel action at that time would receive the support of the other interested delegations.
I said that we, of course, felt that the Egyptian blockade was unreasonable, although they might have some justification for such action under the Suez Canal Convention of 1888. However, we believed that the Mixed Armistice Commission could appropriately handle the matter at the present time. I pointed out that we, the British, and other maritime powers had, of course, been vitally interested in this question and had been actively working to reach a solution with the Egyptians for some time.
[Page 1056]6. Arab League and Azzam Pasha:
The Ambassador said that he was unhappy to see that Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League, had been permitted, to attend the UN as observer and was being given red carpet treatment by all parties. He said that he had met Azzam Pasha in 1947 and found him completely rabid on the Palestine question. Azzam Pasha had said he would devote the rest of his life to the elimination of the Jews from Palestine. In addition, Mr. Eban said that the Arab League seemed to be a factor in preventing possible peace between the Arab states and Israel; that whenever an Arab state seemed prepared to discuss peace negotiations, the Arab League intervened to prevent that State from taking such action. He felt sure that by permitting Azzam Pasha to act as Arab League observer at the UN we had given the Arab League an exaggerated importance and one which would militate against the possibilities of peace in the Near East.
I told the Ambassador that I did not agree with him at all. Although the Arab League did at times appear to interfere with negotiations between the Arab states and Israel, I pointed out it was the political committee of the Arab League made up of representatives of the Arab states which took such action, and not the Secretary General. I said I thought that having an observer from the Arab League in the UN would serve a very useful purpose and we were in favor of it. The Arab League had a useful function to perform in many aspects of life in the Arab states.
With regard to peace negotiations, I said that Israel consistently maintained that the Arab states should make peace with Israel on Israel’s terms. To date Israel had offered no concessions to the Arab states in an effort to get them to make peace. In view of the Israel position it was not surprising that the Arabs took the position they had. If Israel showed a willingness to concede something, it was possible that the Arab states might adopt a more cooperative attitude.
- Drafted by Mr. Waldo.↩