320.2AB/10–2050
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State1
Subject: Situation of Israel.
| Participants: | S—The Secretary |
| Mr. Moshe Sharett, Foreign Minister of Israel | |
| Mr. Abba Eban, Israeli Ambassador to the US | |
| NE—Mr. Rockwell |
I received Messrs. Sharett and Eban at their request.2
[Page 1034]Mr. Sharett began the conversation by expressing Israel’s pleasure at having been elected to the Peace Observation Commission. He said that Israel was grateful for US support of its candidacy.
Mr. Sharett then began a lengthy discussion of the Israeli immigration situation. He described the numbers of Jewish immigrants arriving daily in this country, and said that Israel considered it to be its destiny to accept all Jews who wished to come. For the next few years it was hoped to receive 200,000 Jews annually, but thereafter the flow would most certainly begin to diminish.
Although the Government did not publicly say so, Mr. Sharett continued, it was making efforts to restrict the immigration according to the absorptive possibilities of the moment. Thus, a system of priorities had been set up. At present the highest priorities were accorded to Iraq and Rumania, while countries where the Jewish communities were not suffering undue hardships, such as Turkey, were accorded low priority.
Mr. Sharett said that the all-out immigration policy of the Israeli Government should be of interest to the US Government because through it manpower was siphoned from the Soviet reservoir into the Western reservoir. There was another advantage in that the Israel immigration policy was eliminating potential trouble spots. The Jewish community in Yemen, for example, had been transported to Israel practically in its entirety.
Mr. Sharett declared that the Israeli Government believed it was entitled to help in carrying out its destiny of receiving Jews from all over the world. Israel was prepared to face starvation and disaster in order to accomplish this end, but the Government naturally did not desire to do so if other means of accomplishing the purpose could be found. To date the American Jewish community had been unprecedentedly generous. Israel itself cheerfully was facing a harsh austerity regime, and in emptying the displaced persons camps in Germany had, Mr. Sharett felt, greatly assisted the US by lifting the burden of caring for the displaced persons.
[Page 1035]Mr. Sharret believed that the US should undertake a program of financial assistance to the Near East which would involve aiding Israel to absorb immigrants and aiding the Arab states to resettle the Palestine refugees.
One of the most immediate needs which Israel was facing was that of an adequate food supply. Although he was not making a request at this time, Mr. Sharett wondered whether it would not be possible for the US to arrange for the shipment of food supplies to Israel, either on a grant basis or on very long-term credit arrangements. There were precedents for this in the recent cases of India and Yugoslavia.
I said that frankly I did not consider India and Yugoslavia to be very good examples of precedents. There was real famine in these countries, and we had really had to torture procedures in order to help the Indians and the Yugoslavs.
The conversation then turned to the world situation. Mr. Sharett believed that with the action in Korea and the passage by the General Assembly of the Uniting For Peace resolution the possibility of a third world war had greatly receded. The Russians had learned a lesson. I said that I agreed that the Russians had been taught something, but that I did not believe their purpose had in any way been altered. No one should be fooled by the appearance of Russian geniality at Lake Success. There was always the possibility of trouble in some other part of the world.
I said that in this connection it seemed to us essential that the Near Eastern problem be solved as quickly as possible. The trouble was that when people in the Near East had the opportunity to do right things to help solve the problem, they seemed to do the wrong things. We were particularly concerned over the plight of the Arab refugees and believed that urgent steps should be taken to solve it.
Messrs. Sharett and Eban then took their departure.
- Drafted by Mr. Rockwell.↩
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In a memorandum of October 19, Mr. McGhee transmitted to Secretary Acheson a summary of points that Mr. Sharett might raise in their conversation the following day and recommendations as to the comments by the Secretary. Among the recommendations were: “We believe that a more conciliatory Israeli attitude toward the Arab States is necessary if progress is to be made toward a settlement. Israel should make a prior concession on one of the outstanding issues”; “The United States has consistently supported reasonable internationalization of the Jerusalem area. We do not wish to take the initiative at this time, but would support a solution providing for an international regime which was acceptable to Jordan, Israel and the international community”; “We are informed that the current Israeli request for a $35 million Ex-Im Bank loan for agricultural purposes is being studied by the Ex-Im Bank and the National Advisory Council, and that a decision should be reached in the near future … but some months ago [we] informed the Israeli representatives in Washington that there was no objection to the floating of an Israeli bond issue in the US”; “We recommend that you again inform the Foreign Minister of our position” with respect to military equipment for Israel, i.e., that “the US is unable to assist in the development of an Army. The shipment of heavy equipment is not possible because of prior commitments in other parts of the world. We have already approved export licenses totalling approximately $1,000,000 in light equipment for Israel”; and “Israel has a responsibility to assist in the solution of the refugee question through repatriation and compensation. We are encouraged by indications received through conversations with Israeli representatives in New York that Israel is prepared to consider making compensation outside the context of a general peace settlement. Such action might help persuade the Arabs to talk about other matters.” (611.84A/10–1950)
In the summary of daily meeting with the Secretary on October 12, the question of the Export-Import Bank loan to Israel was discussed. Adrian S. Fisher, the Legal Adviser, indicated that the “Department preferred to let this one drag out until after the General Assembly but in view of White House interest it seemed difficult to do. After some discussion, it was decided that he should take the position at the Export-Import Bank meeting this morning that the Department would interpose no political objection but that we preferred to handle the loan in the normal course of events rather than rush it through.” (Secretary’s memoranda, Lot 53 D 444)
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