868.03/10–3150: Telegram
The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Secretary of State
422. Deptel 282, October 19, 301, October 25, 303, October 25 and 307, October 27.1 I have just returned from fully satisfactory conversation with Tito concerning agreement for use of MDAP funds for food assistance.
Emphasizing that conversation was exploratory on part of both governments, I said that in order to obtain funds for assistance prior to Congressional action, it might be necessary to use money already appropriated for overseas military aid. In order to utilize these funds, American Government required certain undertakings on the part of Yugoslavia. I then read to the Marshal the verbatim text of the proposed agreement as quoted in Deptel 282.
I pointed out that only a part of total funds would come from MDAP, that contemplated agreement would be bilateral, and that it included no political conditions. At same time, I said that food from MDAP funds would have to be designated for troops and the source of the funds could not be disguised.
Advantages to Yugoslavia from suggested arrangement, I thought, were: (1) It would make possible prompt action prior to opening of Congress, (2) it would enable the President and Congress to demonstrate to the American people that we were getting something in return for our money, and (3) the agreement might lay the groundwork for prompt and effective assistance to Yugoslavia, through UN action, in case Yugoslavia should find it necessary in the future to request other type of assistance. I emphasized that the third consideration was entirely my own suggestion, but that if, God forbid, a second Korea should happen here, it might be found that an important preliminary step toward assistance had already been taken if the proposed agreement were in effect.
Tito said that while an agreement of this type would naturally require study, he did not hesitate to say that his preliminary reaction was entirely favorable. He volunteered the thought that the agreement would be advantageous to Yugoslavia inasmuch as it would enable the Yugoslavs to show that they were reciprocating, within their possibilities, for any aid received and were therefore not merely accepting hand-outs.
I said the Marshal’s reaction was what I expected. I expressed confidence that he would also be prepared for the inevitable propaganda blasts from Radio Moscow, based on the fact that funds in question had been appropriated by Congress in the same legislation as that which provided funds to implement North Atlantic Pact.
[Page 1489]Tito said Radio Moscow would “make a lot of noise anyway” and that Moscow could say nothing more than it had already said against Yugoslavia or which could further increase the absolute distrust which Yugoslavia already felt for the USSR and her satellites.
Tito asked how soon he could have a text of the suggested agreement to study. I said I hoped within a day or two. I repeated that our own thinking in the matter was tentative but that I knew that Washington was anxious to clear up this point as soon as possible.
As the conversation developed, I did not feel that I was having to sell Tito anything. His only adverse remarks was a jocular interjection when I read the sentence in the preamble to the agreement regarding individual and collective self-defense. He asked, with a smile, whether the sentence indicated any question in the minds of Washington that Yugoslavia might not defend itself. I said that proof to the contrary was found in the agreement itself, in which we also asked Yugoslavia to assist in our defense.
While Tito will possibly have to answer question in the Politburo, I feel confident that agreement can be reached and believe we should propose it immediately.
If specific reference to PL 329 is included in text, Yugoslavs will undoubtedly find it necessary to translate and study entire legislation, as amended, to be certain of their commitments. Inevitable delays will result. I made it plain what the legislation was, and could refer to it in transmittal note if desired, but I believe we would save time and trouble by omitting reference from formal agreement.