033.1100/10–2350: Telegram
The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Secretary of State
396. Congressmen Fisher,1 Battle,2 and Chatham3 had very satisfactory conference with Tito October 21.
By way of introduction I pointed out that if Yugoslavia’s request for aid is presented to Congress, these three members would probably be only ones who would have seen drought conditions in Yugoslavia and that their report to Congress would therefore be of great importance.
Tito reviewed Yugoslavia’s needs for food, and said request for our aid was based on military and political as well as humanitarian grounds. Strong Yugoslavia would deter attack and therefore contribute to peace. Failure of Yugoslavia to obtain assistance from US would be political victory for Moscow.
While Chatham was most outspoken, each Congressman in turn indicated to Tito that he would support request if presented to Congress.
Battle then said that on his return to US he would be asked frequently whether Yugoslav Government was likely to “go back to Russia”. Tito, who understood importance of question before Deputy Foreign Minister Mates began translation, broke into hearty laugh which Congressmen regarded as genuine and convincing. Tito said Yugoslavia would never surrender its independence again. Reconciliation [Page 1479] depended entirely on Soviet Union. If USSR turned about face and began to cooperate with UN, Yugoslavia stood as ready as US, UK or any other member of UN to welcome such a change, but no more so.
Fisher then asked why Tito thought USSR had not attacked Yugoslavia. Tito gave three reasons: First, because USSR could find no excuse which would carry conviction among that section of world opinion on which USSR depended for support; second, because Yugoslavia had strong Army and could continue fighting “for some months, while world opinion is being mobilized and aid received”, and third, because Soviet attack would undoubtedly bring on world war, which Soviets did not want. Tito said that UN had fortunately demonstrated in Korea that united action could be mobilized promptly. He added that in next major war, every country would become involved.
Referring to that last statement, Fisher asked what action Yugoslavia would take in case of Soviet aggression in Europe but which did not involve Yugoslavia directly. Tito said Yugoslavia would carry out its UN responsibilities loyally and fully.
I remarked at this point that Marshal’s statement was highly significant and that I wished to be certain that I had understood him correctly. Did he mean to say that there would be no neutrals during next war? After slight reflection, Tito said that action of UN in Korea had shown that whole world was now concerned by aggression anywhere. In response to question, he said that in case of attack against Yugoslavia, he would appeal to UN immediately, “without moments hesitation”.
Chatham then remarked that US was anxious to build up forces in Europe, including stores of military equipment, to resist any Soviet attack. He said that as far as he personally was concerned, Yugoslavia was best strategic location in Europe to be strengthened militarily. He said he thought Yugoslavia in order to make any effective resistance to Soviet attack, must have tactical air force, which today meant jet planes. He said US was training jet pilots from various European countries and wondered why Tito did not send some fliers to US to be trained, perhaps under guise of commercial jet pilots.
Before Mates translated this question I hastened to point out that the Congressman’s reference to military aid was solely on his own responsibility. Tito remarked with a laugh that Congressman was probably embarrassing me. I said I was glad for Congressmen to ask any questions they wished but that there should be no misunderstanding regarding capacity in which they spoke.
Tito then gave standard reply, saying that his first consideration must always be the security of Yugoslavia and that he would not wish to give USSR any plausible grounds for attacking Yugoslavia on [Page 1480] claim that Yugoslavia had become spearhead for US aggression against USSR. He added, incidentally, that Yugoslav Government had been attempting to purchase few jets in Europe for some time, and implied some surprise at Congressman’s reference to American jets when he could not even buy few old ones in Europe.
This was first time question of US military aid has been raised with Tito. While he rejected the suggestion, his reply was mild and I suspect that he was not displeased that conversation was turned in this direction by American side.4
Most significant statement during interview was Tito’s remark that next world war would involve everyone. Following interview, I commented to Mates that Tito’s statement ran counter to impression of most observers that Yugoslavia would remain neutral unless attacked. Mates, who himself was probably surprised at off-hand manner in which Tito had made statement of this importance, I referred again to Tito’s statement about Yugoslavia’s loyalty to UN.
Department pass Moscow; sent Department 396, repeated info Paris 50, London 31, Moscow 31.
- O. Clark Fisher, Democratic Congressman from Texas; member of the House Armed Services Committee.↩
- Laurie C. Battle, Democratic Congressman from Alabama; member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.↩
- Thurmond Chatham, Democratic Congressman from North CaroUna; member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.↩
- According to a memorandum of conversation by L. Randolph Higgs, Acting Deputy Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs, October 11, not printed, Marshal Tito had already discussed the matter of military aid in September. In a brief corridor conversation with officers of the Department of State following a meeting with Assistant Secretary of State Perkins, IBRD President Black mentioned that during his visit to Belgrade in September, Marshal Tito had spoken of the conditions under which Yugoslavia would accept military supplies from the West. Tito told Black that Yugoslavia did not want to accept military supplies directly from the West currently but did want to stockpile such materiel in countries close by Yugoslavia to be made available to Yugoslavia immediately when the need arose (768.56/10–1150).↩