868.03/10–550: Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Secretary of State 1

secret   priority

324. Boris Kidric,2 director of planning commission, asked me to his office last night for what he termed preliminary and informal discussion re Yugoslav need for grant from US for food relief. Also present were Milentije Popovic, MinFon Trade, and Velebit, who translated.

Kidric said Yugoslavia had decided to request grant but naturally would be embarrassed if it made such request and was refused or if it asked for much more than feasible to obtain. He said he would therefore welcome personal and friendly exchange of views re manner and method of presentation and chances of success.

Kidric said Yugoslavia calculated its loss from drought at approximately $100,000,000 of which $60,000,000 were loss of food and fodder for internal use and $40,000,000 for export. Minimum Yugoslav needs before next harvest total about 460,000 tons food and feed from abroad, or about fifty shiploads during next six to eight months. Needs include, as I recall, 100,000 tons maize, 40,000 edible fats, 50,000 each of wheat, oats, barley, 35,000 tons sugar, 30,000 tons beans $7,000,000 worth vegetables and rice. Full details will be furnished in few days.

I pointed out that no one, not even the President, could give assurance regarding matter requiring Congressional action, and that outcome would depend largely on justification and information presented by Yugoslavia. I said I thought it only honest to say that obtaining Congressional approval would present great difficulties. To speak frankly, I believed that if request had been made month ago, when situation was going badly in Korea, proposal for grant to Yugoslavia would have got very few votes in Congress. Fortunately, things were now going better in Korea and public opinion might not be so unfavorable to Yugoslavia today but that nevertheless American public felt our soldiers were dying in Korea for UN and not for any selfish national motive and that Yugoslav attitude on Korea had simply not been convincing to man on street whose views were reflected in Congress. I emphasized that US had no desire to buy anyone’s vote through grants or economic assistance but that facts had to be faced.

I said I thought Yugoslavia should also be prepared for a possibility that some unpleasant things might be said about present Yugoslav regime during debates in Congress. I pointed out, for example, that Senate had recently passed unanimous resolution calling on all countries [Page 1460] to return Greek children and that someone might well question grant to Yugoslavia on this score. I added that at least 400 American citizens were being held in Yugoslavia against their will and said several of their Congressmen might have something unpleasant to say in this regard. I said it was not necessary to recall some other criticisms of Tito regime which might be brought out in debate.

Kidric said he hoped it could be brought forcefully to attention of Congress and American public that a grant to Yugoslavia would be an important aid to peace since a weakened Yugoslavia would be a tempting target for Cominform attack whereas a strong Yugoslavia, like a strong western Europe, would deter aggression.

I concurred that case could be made for grant and said my remarks should not be construed as advising against Yugoslavs making request.

Kidric said he would appreciate further talk with me before formal request is made. He indicated he would call me again in few days.

It is evident that decision to request grant was difficult one for Yugoslavia to make and was reached only yesterday, after several weeks of discussion. My guess is that Kidric himself, who is hard-core Communist usually ranked fifth in Politburo hierarchy (after Tito, Kardelj, Rankovic3 and Djilas), regards decision as unpleasant necessity.

Allen
  1. This telegram was repeated to London and Paris.
  2. Chairman of the Yugoslav Central Economic Council and Chairman of the Yugoslav Central Commission for Planning; Secretary of the Politburo of the Yugoslav Communist Party.
  3. Aleksandar Ranković, Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior; Secretary of the Politburo of the Yugoslav Communist Party.