Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

768.5/7–2850

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)¹

top secret

[Washington,] September 25, 1950.

Reference is made to your memorandum of July 28² requesting an estimate of (1) Yugoslavia’s ability to defend itself against an attack by one or more of the Soviet satellites, and (2) what assistance should be given Yugoslavia in case of such an attack. The first point was covered in EUR’s memorandum to you of September 12, 1950.³ The second point, in so far as it can be answered now, is dealt with below.

Problem

To determine what assistance should be given to Yugoslavia in case of an attack by one or more of the Soviet satellites.

Discussion

The possibility of an attack on Yugoslavia was considered in connection with the preparation of NSC 18/4, which was approved on November 18, 1949. This document recommends that, in the event of an attack on Yugoslavia by the satellites, the US should support consideration of the matter by the Security Council, should participate in devising a resolution condemning the aggression, and should cooperate in carrying out any resolution adopted by the Security Council. In the event of delay in UN action, the document proposes that the US consult with the UK, France and other interested countries on possible interim security measures, and also that, if the USSR blocks action in the Security Council by its veto, the US should consult with other interested states in regard to making supplies available to Yugoslavia and imposing economic sanctions on the aggressors.

Document NSC 18/4 also recommends that, in the event of a satellite attack on Yugoslavia and if aid is requested by that country, the US should supply military aid “to the degree practicable under the conditions then prevailing and in any event within the limit of maintaining US ability to implement emergency war plans”. … The Joint Chiefs of Staff have emphasized that it would be militarily unsound for any political action to be taken in the UN which would irrevocably commit the employment of US troops in Yugoslavia, without preserving the right of decision on this matter in the light of the situation existing at the time. It is unlikely that the Security Council would include in a resolution an appeal for troops, particularly if the US opposed it. A general resolution calling upon members to provide aid to the victims of aggression, along the lines of the Korean resolution of June 27, 1950,⁴ would be more likely.

On the basis of recommendations contained in NSC 18/4 a study has been made by the Departments of State and Defense estimating Yugoslavia’s requirements for military supplies in case of attack and the extent and manner by which supplies can best be made available. This study reveals that Yugoslavia would probably need equipment in the following broad categories: ammunition, motor transport and spare parts, armored vehicles, demolitions, grenades, mines, anti-tank weapons, bridging, signal equipment, medical supplies, petroleum, anti-aircraft weapons, equipment for airdrops, reconnaissance aircraft, small arms and mortars, small naval craft. Also on the basis of NSC 18/4 the Department has been in communication with the UK and French Governments on the subject of providing military supplies to Yugoslavia in case of attack. The three Governments have agreed in principle that supplies should be made available in such an event and will explore the subject in technical talks scheduled to begin in Washington in the first week of October.

The problem of determining the capabilities of the US and other Western Powers to furnish materiel and supplies to Yugoslavia in the event of a satellite attack at some unspecified moment in the future is essentially a question of priorities. In present circumstances all materiel presently available to the US is already committed to one program or another, and to divert any of it for use in Yugoslavia would require the establishment of a top priority for that program. While the forthcoming technical discussions with the British and French may clarify the picture, in the last analysis it is probable that any real military assistance to Yugoslavia will have to come from the US; consequently the decisions on what supplies may be devoted to this program, where they may be stockpiled, and how they may be delivered to Yugoslavia in case of attack will have to be worked out within the US Government. Reserve stocks in the US and US Army stocks overseas are completely committed to our emergency war plans. The MDAP is fully scheduled, and what might be diverted for use in Yugoslavia would have to be taken from stocks scheduled for participating countries.

To date no direct, concrete high-level approach has been made to the US by the Yugoslav Government to request arms aid. Publicly Yugoslav leaders are saying that they do not intend to request it. There are indications, however, that they will make such a request and will raise the question of financing as well as the question of supply.

Conclusions

1. In the event of an attack on Yugoslavia by one or more of the Soviet satellites, the US should act through the UN along the lines laid in NSC 18/4 and should carry out any UN resolution on the subject.

2. In the event of such an attack the US should be prepared to provide military supplies to Yugoslavia along the lines laid down in NSC 18/4. In this matter the US should cooperate with the UK, France and other interested nations, although it is probable that they will not be able to contribute very much in material support.

3. …

4. Further study is being undertaken concerning the availability of military supplies for Yugoslavia in case of attack, the possible use of MDAP funds and supplies, possible stockpiling of supplies for Yugoslavia, priority of the Yugoslav program, and related subjects. So far as these matters concern the UK and France as well as the US and are technical rather than policy questions, they will be considered in the forthcoming tripartite technical talks.

5. NSC 18/4 is now before the National Security Council for review and revision, in accordance with a decision taken by the Senior Staff. Reconsideration of our policy in this connection will take into account the changes in the international picture following upon the aggression in Korea, the changing military situation in the Balkans, and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff set forth in their memorandum of August 23, 1950.⁵

[John C. Campbell]

1. This memorandum was drafted by John C. Campbell, the Officer in Charge of Balkan Affairs.
2. Not printed.

3. The memorandum under reference here, not printed, was based in large part upon an earlier study prepared by the Intelligence Division of the Army General Staff. The memorandum presented the following conclusions:

   “1. Yugoslavia could defend herself against an attack by any one and probably by any two of the four satellites (Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania), but would eventually need logistical support from the West.

   “2. Yugoslavia could defend herself against a sustained attack by Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania or by all four satellites only if she received logistical support from the West. The amount of such support required would vary according to the nature of the attack.

   “3. If the four satellites should attack between now and the end of 1950 with the probable strength they will possess during that period, the Yugoslavs could be expected to withdraw only under heavy pressure to successive delaying and defensive positions and might well contain and reduce the initial enemy penetrations except in the flat country north of Belgrade. However, it would be necessary for the West promptly to supply sufficient quantities of materiel in order for the Yugoslav army to defeat the invaders.

   “4. On the other hand, if the four satellites should attack between now and the end of 1950 with the maximum feasible strength they could possess during that period, the Yugoslavs probably would have to give up Belgrade and to withdraw to a defensive line in the mountainous areas of western Yugoslavia. An adequate and prompt flow of supplies from the West would be necessary, otherwise Tito’s army ultimately would be defeated.”

4. For the text of the U.N. Security Council resolution under reference here, see vol. vii, p. 211.
5. Ante, p. 1441.