768.5/6–1250: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia
516. Embtel 738, June 12.1 Dept approves idea Defense Dept and Service Atts Belgrade that it wld be desirable increase latters’ contacts with appropriate Yugo mil auths to extent that such can be accomplished without direct approach to Tito. However, such contacts at this stage shld not extend to advance planning for material assistance to Yugo. Although State and Defense Depts have been engaged, on basis para 27a NSC 18/4,2 in study Yugo mil requirements and possibility US and other western assistance in mil supplies in event Sov aggression against Yugo, there has been no intention inform Yugos of this planning or of approaching them at this stage to obtain info on status their armament.
In view absence indication Sovs prepared attack Yugos in near future, Dept has not considered it necessary give Yugos any assurances on provision of mil supplies. Yugos have not asked for such supplies, and we believe best course for time being is not to take initiative to raise subj with them either on dipl or technical mil level.
US Govt is, however, discussing question possible mil aid to Tito with Brit and Fr, fol their agreement with gen policy line of NSC 18/4. Three govts will work out, on basis info available to them, estimates of what materiel might be supplied Yugo in case emergency. Emb will be kept informed progress these talks.
In event threat of aggression shld become more imminent and Yugos shld specifically request mil supplies, new situation wld arise which might call for exchange of info on subj between Yugo and US mil reps, but existing situation does not warrant this step.
For urinfo Cong opinion at this time, judging from statements made in closed hearings on MDAP Bill,3 seems opposed to any decision by US Govt in advance of emergency to extend mil assistance Yugo. While NSC 18/4 represents decision by Exec Branch to furnish arms [Page 1432] to Tito if requested “to the degree practicable under the conditions then prevailing and in any event within the limit of maintaining US ability to implement emergency war plans”, temper of Cong wld of course be important and perhaps crucial factor in equation.
Defense Dept concurs in this tel.
- Not printed. In it Ambassador Allen reported having been informed by the service attachés in Belgrade that Department of Defense planning for military material assistance to Yugoslavia in the event of a Cominform attack was being hampered by the lack of positive knowledge regarding Yugoslavia’s current armed status. American service authorities suggested that the appropriate Yugoslav authorities be approached in an effort to establish such increased contacts. Ambassador Allen felt that the only effective approach would be to Marshal Tito directly, and such an approach would doubtless lead to a discussion of military assistance. Allen did not believe that there should be any American initiative in the matter of military assistance to Yugoslavia unless a firm decision had been made to render such assistance. Even were such a decision made, it would be preferable to wait for the Yugoslavs to make the first approach (768.5/6–1250).↩
- For the text of NSC 18/4, see p. 1341.↩
- For documentation on the military assistance legislation under reference here, see vol. i, pp. 126 ff.↩