768.00/6–2250: Telegram
The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Secretary of State
789. My conversation with Tito today was longest and on whole most satisfactory I have had. Various subjects discussed will be reported in separate telegrams.1
I began by saying I had read again with considerable interest Tito’s opening speech in Parliament (Embassy’s 560, April 272), in which he expressed desire to improve relations with Greece, Italy and Austria. I said that I hoped I was correct in believing he thought Yugoslavia, situated geographically in center of these countries, should take lead in bringing about this improvement. Tito said I had interpreted his position correctly.
I then asked whether he had in mind, following settlement of Trieste question, that Four Powers concerned might let it be known that they regarded their mutual boundaries as fixed for indefinite future.
Tito said that while he would not wish to participate in anything smacking of a bloc, Trieste presented only unsettled boundary question for Yugoslavia and that when mutually satisfactory agreement with Italy had been reached on this subject, there was no reason why Irredentism might not be banished by all concerned.
I welcomed his point of view and said it encouraged me to broach delicate but equally important question of minorities. It seemed to me that pressure by one country on behalf of its minorities in another often defeated its own purpose since result was that minorities were rendered suspect as agents of political instruments and treated more harshly than they might otherwise have been.
Although I carefully avoided indicating any particular area, Tito promptly declared that his recent statements regarding “Aegean Macedonia” had been limited to expression of interest that Macedonians be permitted to retain their schools, language and customs. He said that if he did not concern himself with all Macedonians, [Page 1428] Soviet Russia, acting through Bulgarian spokesmen, would be prompt to do so. He could not allow Cominform to appear as only friend of Macedonians and thereby make much mischief for him in Yugoslavia [Yugoslav?] Macedonia. He believed Greeks should appreciate his position since their interests were same as his in this respect.
I referred to American parallel and said that while we permitted greatest cultural freedom in US, we insisted on political loyalty to US by every one living in our boundaries and felt that people living permanent[ly] elsewhere should be loyal to country in which they lived. I expressed confidence that if Tito followed policy of encouraging any Macedonians living in Greece to be loyal to Greece, he would go long way towards removing Athens’ concern over his recent statements.
Tito denied any desire to use Macedonians as political instruments and offered his internal policy as evidence. He said that whereas Yugoslav Monarchy had tried to force all Yugoslavs to be Serbs, he was encouraging them to be Montenegrins, Serbs, Croats, etc., as well as Yugoslavs. He used illustration of US and said we were strong nation for very reason we permitted state, regional and cultural loyalties as basis for larger loyalty to nation as whole. He was convinced people would understand his position regarding Yugoslav minorities abroad when they had had more opportunity to observe his internal policy.
While conversation was inconclusive, it was friendly throughout and I believe useful. At least it was frank discussion, without heat, on subjects on which Tito can be most explosive. Deputy Foreign Minister Prica, who served as interpreter, was enthusiastic during brief talk I had with him after leaving Tito’s office.
Department pass Moscow. Sent Department 789, repeated info Athens 64, Rome 104, Vienna 88, Trieste 53, London 96, Paris 157, Moscow 110.
- In his telegram 790, June 22, from Belgrade, not printed, Ambassador Allen reported that during his conversation with Tito he referred to the question of the return of the Greek children to Greece. Allen explained that the concern of the American public on the subject had in no way diminished and that Tito could settle the matter without causing embarrassment by accepting the Greek suggestion that a mixed commission of International, Yugoslav, and Greek Red Cross representatives be established to identify those Greek children remaining in Yugoslavia. Tito showed some irritation at again being pressed on the matter. He reaffirmed his determination to return all Greek children to their parents as soon as requests and identification were completed (881.411/6–2250). Telegram 795, June 23, from Belgrade, not printed, reported that it was evident during the conversation that the chief question Tito had in mind to discuss with Allen was the representation of Communist China in the United Nations (310.2/6–2350). Documentation on the question of the admission of Communist China into the United Nations is presented in vol. ii, pp. 186 ff.↩
- Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1416.↩