Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

881.411/5–550: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia

confidential

Washington, May 5, 1950—6 p. m.

356. Athens tel 16, May 4.¹ Subj repatriation Grk children from Yugo raised by Grk Amb² with Dept May 5.

Dept entirely sympathetic Grk objective but leaves ur judgment whether US démarche, along lines fol para, at this moment likely accelerate progress or, by irritating Yugos, constitute spoke in wheel. You of course have text Dept note Yugo Emb Wash Feb 24, 1950³ and Dept memo conversation with Kosanovic same date⁴ which gives US viewpoint subj Grk children and which may provide point of departure raising matter with Yugos.

At ur discretion, therefore, in welcoming contemplated exchange Mins between Yugo and Greece,⁵ you may also express to Yugos in strong terms our hope that improved Grk relations will involve immed carrying out of Tito’s categoric promise to you that Grk children wld be repatriated (Embtel 98 Jan 26⁶). US public opinion thoroughly aroused over procrastination this matter which, if prolonged, wld prove highly embarrassing US-Yugo relations. In Greece position of progressive Plastiras Govt, which already under attack by reactionary elements, likely be threatened if exchange Mins not followed or preferably accompanied by repatriation children. More fundamental considerations, however, are humanitarian and not polit. Children of Slavic race in Yugo with parents or relatives are not involved. Concern is for children of Hellenic race separated from parents and families in Greece. (Difficult believe, incidentally, that such children number only 123 as recently reported from Yugo.) Demand of families in Greece for children’s return is insistent, genuine and pathetic. It cannot be ignored.⁷

Acheson

1. Telegram 1012, May 4, from Athens, repeated as 16 to Belgrade, not printed, reported that Theodoros Grivas-Gardikiotis, Director of the Third Political Department of the Greek Foreign Ministry, had informed an officer of the Embassy in Athens that the Greek Government had instructed its Ambassadors in Washington, Paris, and London to make formal démarches to the end that the governments to which they were accredited would bring pressure to bear on Yugoslavia to repatriate Greek children abducted during the Greek civil war as soon as possible and without demanding a quid pro quo from Greece (881411/5–550).
2. Vassili G. Dendramis.
3. Not printed, but see telegram 59, January 30, to Belgrade, p. 1359.
4. Not printed, but see footnote 2, ibid .
5. On April 15, 1950, Gen. Nicholas Plastiras, leader of the Greek National Progressive Union of the Center, took office as Greek Prime Minister in a coalition cabinet. Shortly afterwards, the Yugoslav and Greek Governments informally agreed to resume full diplomatic relations and exchange ministers. Prime Minister Plastiras formally announced agreement on the matter on May 10.
6. Not printed, but see the second footnote 1, p. 1357.
7. Telegram 595, May 6, from Belgrade, not printed, stated that the Embassy concurred fully with the view that the Yugoslav Government should return the abducted Greek children immediately without demanding any quid pro quo. The Embassy felt strongly, however, that a three-power démarche or any other form of pressure on Yugoslavia was not the effective way of obtaining return of the children. The Yugoslav Government almost invariably reacted negatively to pressure. Friendly persuasion was the best tactic to adopt (881.411/5–650).