611.68/3–1650: Telegram
The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Secretary of State
349. During hour-and-half conversation with Tito at his private villa this morning, we discussed variety of topics which I shall report in individual telegrams.1
I began by saying that if our relations were to be on sound basis, we would have to discuss frankly and forcefully many questions of mutual interest. I referred to extreme Yugoslav sensitiveness to anything which smacked of pressure and said that if I should become reluctant to refer to certain subjects for fear Yugoslavs would construe my remarks as pressure or internal interference, our relations would never be more than formal.
[Page 1389]Tito invited me to speak fully and in complete frankness on any subject and added, smiling, that he was experienced in detecting what was pressure and what was not.
As regards general political relations, I said purpose my request for interview had been mutual exchange of views in light his recent public speeches, which I believed indicated some misunderstanding American policy on his part. I expressed equal desire to understand Yugoslav policy more clearly.
In order to place conversation on realistic basis immediately, I referred to his speech at Uzice February 17, in which he advised his Yugoslav listeners not to be fooled by present attitude of west towards Yugoslavia. I mentioned specifically his flat statement “They do not love us. They hate us.”2
Tito hastened to interpose that he had not referred to western governments but merely to certain elements in west.
I continued that while I welcomed his directness, I wished to say with equal candor that certain parts of very speech under reference gave cause for American reserve toward existing Yugoslav system. I gave as example his statement that no opposition would be tolerated in forthcoming Yugoslav elections, and pointed out that this policy in itself was sufficient to cause great majority of Americans to regard his system not only with dislike but with loathing.
On other hand, I recognized certain aspects of American system which I realized he found difficulty in understanding. I referred to recent article by Drew Pearson3 alleging Tito was massing troops for attack on Albania. I was aware that Tito thought no country should permit this type of irresponsible journalism, which might result in creating misunderstanding and hatred with tragic results for millions of human beings. Moreover, I was aware that he attributed existence this type of journalism, at least in part, to what he regarded as sordid motive—that of private profit. While recognizing difficulties created by unbridled freedom of expression, I said masses of America, including myself, were irrevocably attached to Voltairian principle of freedom for Pearson.
I said these two illustrations merely emphasized basic and perhaps unbridgeable barriers to genuine friendly relations between our two countries. Furthermore, I thought we must look fact squarely in face that many Yugoslav officials felt present American policy towards Yugoslavia was temporary, based merely on our desire to use Yugoslavia for our own purposes in present world situation, and that we would turn against Yugoslavia or any other Marxist state as soon as convenient. I expressed confidence that despite great difficulties, basis [Page 1390] did in fact exist at least for good if not warm relations. As regards his statement that many Americans hated Yugoslavia, I said I thought he overlooked fact that Americans in general were overwhelmingly sympathetic to any nation’s striving to maintain its independence against big aggressor and ventured guess that if poll of American public were taken on question of who is leading patriot defending his country’s sovereignty against overwhelming odds today. Marshal Tito would top list. (Tito was visibly pleased at idea of topping popularity poll.)
I expressed personal view that American policy towards Yugoslavia today offered primary test of genuineness of our statement that we are peace-loving and not aggressive. I said Soviet propaganda depicts us as predatory imperialists determined to dominate world and cram our system down throats of everyone else. I said if we could demonstrate our willingness to support Yugoslav independence despite Yugoslav government’s Marxist character, we would give the lie to these false Soviet accusations in most dramatic and effective manner possible.
Tito expressed appreciation for my views and Said he had every confidence of my sincerity. He himself was also confident that a basis existed for friendly relations between Marxist and non-Marxist states and said he welcomed opportunity to prove his contention through friendly relations between Yugoslavia and US.
He said he would like tell me why Yugoslavia had recognized Ho Chi Minh. (Since I had made no reference to this subject, it was evident Tito felt we had misunderstood his actions and believed he should explain.) He said he would not discuss question why Ho had requested recognition, but that since Ho had done so, Yugoslav Government had had no alternative but accept if it hoped to maintain its position with the “progressive forces of world”. He expressed pleasure that there appeared to have been considerable understanding in west for his position.
Tito said the ExIm Bank loan4 was to him realistic proof that our policy towards Yugoslavia was basic and not merely words. He agreed that any opinions which he and I might express were merely words until implemented by acts and said he realized that Yugoslavia had to back up its own protestation with deeds as well.
Referring again to misunderstandings which had arisen during past few weeks as result of such matters as Uzice speech and recognition of Ho, Tito said he though dispute had cleared atmosphere and he was happy we had safely navigated this temporary storm.
I said I would not pretend that we might not face additional rough weather in future, but expressed confidence that with steady nerves [Page 1391] and clear eye on long-range horizon, we would navigate them as successfully.
Tito made no reference during conversation either directly or indirectly to military or economic assistance. He clearly considered discussion exploration and welcomed opportunity to talk over questions mutual interest.
Sent Department 349; repeated London 47, Paris 59; Department pass Moscow 37.
- Other portions of this conversation were reported upon in telegrams 350, 351, and 352, infra, pp. 1391 and 1393, respectively. In addition, Ambassador Allen reported in his telegram 353, March 16, not printed, that during their conversation Marshal Tito referred to German Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s refusal to approve a Yugoslav-Federal trade agreement because of Yugoslav treatment of German prisoners of war. Tito warned that if Adenauer persisted, the Yugoslav Government would he obliged to issue a White Paper detailing the crimes of those prisoners of war in Yugoslavia. Ambassador Allen expressed the hope that the difficulties would be overcome and that Yugoslavia would take no action for the moment (662, 6824/3–1650). Telegram 354, March 16, from Belgrade, not printed, reported that Tito could see no reason for keeping his meeting with Allen secret. Allen suggested that publicity might create difficulties for Tito, but Tito shrugged the matter off: “Why should I not receive you, as representative of [a] great world power, any time I wish? It is no one else’s business and they can say what they like.” (611.68/3–1650)↩
- Regarding the speech under reference here, see telegram 215, February 19), from Belgrade, p. 1370.↩
- A syndicated American news columnist.↩
- See telegram 142, March 1, to Belgrade, p. 1378.↩