Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

661.00/7–1350

Memorandum by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Minister to France, Temporarily in Washington¹

top secret

[Washington, July 13, 1950.]

Evaluation of the General Situation

Careful and intensive analysis of possibilities in the world situation in particular points and of the character of the new Soviet inspired aggression has revealed, of necessity, various interpretations as to Soviet intentions. However despite these differences in estimate, all studies on this subject which have been conducted in State and Defense agree on the following conclusions:

1. The Soviet Union has the military capability at the present time of taking, or inspiring through satellites, military action ranging from local aggression on one or more points along the periphery of the Soviet world to all-out general war.

2. While estimates of probabilities of Soviet action vary it is completely agreed that there is not sufficient evidence to justify a firm opinion that the Soviet Union will not take any one or all of the actions which lie within its military capabilities.

3. There is unanimous agreement, therefore, that the present world situation is one of extreme danger and tension which, either by Soviet desire or by the momentum of events arising from the Korean situation in which actual warfare is in progress, could present the United States with new outbreaks of aggression possibly up to and including general hostilities.

There are definite signs that the United States reverses in Korea have brought discouragement and dismay to our friends and it is to be expected that as long as these reverses continue this feeling will deepen, possibly even to the point where our friends and our allies will begin seriously to question the validity of their military and political association with the United States. For the same reason our reverses will tend to render more confident and arrogant our enemies and increase accordingly the possibility that they will be emboldened to take greater risk to achieve certain objectives than heretofore.

It is therefore obvious that it is urgently necessary for the United States to initiate measures necessary to bring about a rapid build-up of the United States military position both in manpower and in production in order to place us as speedily as possible in a military situation commensurate with the present state of international affairs. Among others the chief reasons for such action may be listed as follows:

1. Vital necessities of U.S. national defense.

2. The possible deterrent effect upon our enemies of evidence that the U.S. is seriously mobilizing its strength, as an offset to the encouragement they would receive from our reverses in Korea.

3. The heartening effect particularly in the field of military production that such action would have upon our allies.

[Enclosure]

U.S. Actions Required To Minimize the Likelihood of Soviet Aggression or of New Soviet-Inspired Aggression and To Deal With Such Aggression if it Occurs

1. From the political point of view, we can most reduce the likelihood of further Soviet and Soviet-inspired aggressive moves by a decision to achieve a rapid and substantial development of the strength of our armed forces and the armed forces of our NAT allies and by solid evidence of the economic and industrial measures to make this decision effective. Measures under this heading include:

a. Federalization of the National Guard and employment of the draft to accomplish a rapid increase in forces under arms; reactivation of available air and naval equipment.

b. Appropriation of funds and placement of orders to equip these forces as rapidly as possible, including adoption of necessary economic control measures (such as authority to allocate scarce materials and to impose limitation orders), and activation of idle capacity and development of new capacity for production of military end-items and related items.

c. Acceleration of rate of MDAP deliveries to Western Europe and appropriations of funds necessary for this and for expanding military production in Western Europe.

d. Initiation of an intensive program for development and perfection of new defensive weapons.

It is of the greatest importance to make a start without awaiting the perfection of detailed plans, if necessary by requesting round-number appropriations for these purposes as a first step toward building the strength which the Korean crisis has shown to be necessary.

2. It is also important to take measures which will increase the confidence and solidarity of the free world. It also includes increased economic assistance to potentially threatened areas, possibly $300 million.

1. The outbreak of hostilities in Korea had occurred on June 25, 1950. For documentation, see vol. vii, pp. 125 ff. Mr. Bohlen had returned from France and had participated in the considerations of the policy to be followed by the United States.