700.00 (S)/4–2650: Circular telegram
The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices 1
In discussions preparatory to forthcoming FonMins meetings2 Jessup3 has expressed our view that military preparedness of USSR for defense of all or most of areas under its control is becoming such that Kremlin will probably feel safe in pursuing more provocative foreign policy in near and perhaps immediate future; that development of west’s relations with USSR in next two or three years will probably hold more risks of war than previously; that while Kremlin now dominates many more people and much larger area than it did at end of war, development of Titoism and its ramifications probably largely offset for present Communist victory in China in Kremlin’s evaluation of its power position; that main arena in European phase of struggle with USSR is Germany and that western Germany’s orientation is of absolutely critical importance, although there are vulnerabilities in Asia and Near East which are greater than Germany’s; and that USSR has vulnerabilities which include relationship between Kremlin and peoples of USSR based on suspicion, fear and coercion, relations between USSR and its satellites, problem of accession to Stalin, and possibility that frustration of Kremlin’s dynamism might well lead to recession of its power. UK officials stated that Brit were broadly in agreement with these views but stated: 1) that Sovs appear to have made a slight gain in past year and Brit consider Communist successes in China more than offset Tito disaffection; 2) that although Sovs will undoubtedly be more provocative in next several years Brit do not feel that they will risk action which might result in hostilities and in view of Brit military critical period will be in 1955 or 1956; and 3) that Brit feel Southeast Asia is weakest of all our weak spots which must be remedied as matter of “first necessity”. Brit officials stated that US, UK, Commonwealth and western Europe were nucleus around which western world should form and that no partial agglomeration was adequate to stand alone. In discussing US–UK relations Brit official observed that joint action can only be achieved if UK is and is to remain world power, urging that we should help to make sterling area strong and should not force Brit to give independence to peoples who are not yet ready for it.
- The code room was instructed to repeat this telegram to Frankfort and Moscow.↩
- The British, French, and United States Foreign Ministers met in London on May 11–13, 1950. Their final communiqué was released to the press on May 18; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, May 29, 1950, p. 827, or vol. iii, p. 1106.↩
- Philip C. Jessup was Ambassador at Large.↩