Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 149¹

Policy Paper Prepared in the Department of State²

secret

[Washington, April 18, 1950.]

[FM D B–23a]

Soviet Intentions and Capabilities

1. Basic Objectives

a. The primary objective of the Soviet leaders must be to preserve their own absolute power in the USSR and, secondarily, in the satellites.

b. Subject to the limitations imposed by this primary necessity, the long-range objective of the Soviet leaders, as has been made clear by their words and actions, is to achieve a communist world under Soviet domination.

c. Communist ideology teaches that the collapse of capitalism is not automatic but must be brought about through active struggle. This belief, supplemented by the fact that the power position of the USSR rests in part on its international Communist network, compels the leaders of the USSR to preserve the militancy of their followers by deliberately generating hostility. The Soviet leaders consider themselves engaged in an irreconcilable and unceasing struggle against all non-communist countries, particularly the US. This struggle is considered to be essentially the same as war, with the ultimate objective of destruction of non-communist society. Uninhibited by any code of ethics or morals, the Soviet leaders consider all tactics or weapons which will contribute to the success of their aggressive plans admissible, bearing always in mind the first necessity of maintenance of the Soviet regime in power in the USSR.

2. Basic Strategy

a. Moscow’s basic strategy is to exert constant pressure wherever non-communist capacity or will to resist is limited. This strategy of whittling away at the extremities of the Western power position while simultaneously seeking to undermine the actual centers of power has a double value: It serves to strengthen the Soviet position for any eventual all-out war with the Western powers, and it continuously exploits all possibilities of achieving the Kremlin’s long-range objective without resort to direct military conflict with the Western powers.

b. This strategy thus far has succeeded. The USSR since 1939 has incorporated 280,000 square miles of territory, its political predominance now ranges from the Elbe to the South China Sea and, although it has suffered Setbacks none of these save Tito constituted a loss of territory Moscow already possessed.

It is also clear that in the immediate future dangerous pressure will be exerted, primarily through the Chinese Communists, against Southeast Asia, particularly Indochina and perhaps Burma. In the Middle East Iran represents a point of weakness where signs of increasing Soviet aggressiveness are now appearing. While there is no concrete evidence that armed action against Yugoslavia is contemplated, it cannot be excluded in view of the disintegrating effect of the Titoist heresy on World Communism.

c. Although Moscow habitually employs force in a limited sense in the operation of foreign communists, sabotage, strikes, et cetera, there has been no indication that Moscow intends at this time to alter its basic strategy and deliberately employ overt military force in conflict with the Western Powers. Yet Berlin and Vienna continue to rankle the Russians as intolerable, hostile penetrations within the Soviet power sphere. The growing threats of a Soviet-induced showdown in Berlin this spring and their downright sabotage of the Austrian treaty bear eloquent testimony of Soviet determination to continue and presumably augment pressure at these strategic points. Other areas subject to direct Soviet pressure, such as Yugoslavia and Iran, are only slightly less dangerous. It is always possible that the increasing confidence and inflexibility which the Soviet leaders have seemed to reflect in recent months may cause them to mis-calculate Western determination and capacity to resist aggression at such points. In these circumstances, therefore, there always exists the possibility of the outbreak of open armed conflict.

A new and disquieting element is recent evidence of Moscow’s intention for the first time to employ in Western Europe more or less overtly the secret activist formations of local communist parties in fomenting disorders and supporting political strikes. Such a tactic, if in fact carried out, would cause serious injury to the parties themselves and could only be explained as an operation in support of some wider and immediately pressing Soviet objective.

d. Available evidence would not seem to indicate any Soviet intention to withdraw from the UN at this time or to prolong its “walkout” from UN organs after the admission of the Chinese Communists. Willingness to indulge in a prolonged “walkout” suggests, however, a Soviet judgment that the UN is of decreasing value to the USSR and a readiness to risk a permanent break in order to attain important political objectives.

In spite of continuation of the “peace offensive” and of recently renewed emphasis on the possibility of “peaceful coexistence”, there has been no evidence whatsoever of a Soviet desire or willingness to negotiate on reasonable terms a settlement of basic issues with the West Soviet dogma in fact would seem to rule out any such settlement unless and until the Soviets are convinced that the strength and stability of the non-communist world has rendered the achievement of their basic objectives impossible in the foreseeable future.

3. Soviet Capabilities

a. The Soviet Government since the end of the war has maintained a military force in a state of readiness for action which gives it a general preponderance in military power on the Eurasian land mass. The population of the Soviet Union is younger than that of the Western powers with the result that a considerably greater proportion of the total population is of an age suitable for military service.

b. The total economic strength which the USSR has available for use in the struggle which it has undertaken compares with that of the US as roughly one to four. In 1949 Soviet national income was $65 billion, US national income $250 billion. In 1949 comparative production of key commodities emphasized the 4-to-1 ratio: steel, USSR, 21 million metric tons, US, 78 million; oil, USSR, 33 million tons, US, 276; electric power, USSR, 72 billion KWH, US, 410; aluminum, USSR, 135 thousand tons, US, 617.

c. This comparative economic weakness of the USSR is offset, however, by the fact that Moscow possesses a number of special advantages, particularly useful in the pursuit of its present strategy. These special advantages include:

(1) The ability to concentrate on any selected effort a large share of its total economic strength, without regard for consumer demand or public opinion.

(2) The capacity to mobilize and direct human resources through an elaborate system of rigid controls.

(3) The virtual monopoly on shaping the thinking of its people to believe in a world, not as it is, but as Soviet leaders desire it to appear.

5. [sic] Soviet Vulnerabilities

a. The Soviet power system by its very nature is subject to various vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities by themselves will not seriously weaken the USSR. If systematically exploited through external pressures, however, they could produce repercussions which would weaken the Soviet power position and possibly bring about a change in Soviet policy.

b. These vulnerabilities include:

(1) Moscow’s insistence on rigid control of the Soviet empire makes the development of an organized opposition difficult, but serves to lay the foundation of opposition, if favorable opportunity should develop, in that it is conducive of certain conflicts: (a) between the satellite state, as a state, and the USSR, as demonstrated by Tito; (b) between satellite governments and their people; and (c) between factions and individuals in satellite Communist Parties.

(2) Moscow’s insistence on open subservience by Communist Parties in still independent countries creates a potential for deviationism in these Parties from Soviet leadership.

(3) The Soviet dictatorial system, with power centered in the hands of a small clique, makes for constant jockeying for position among the Soviet leaders and, regardless of the preparations made, raises the possibility that after Stalin’s death, the transfer of power will precipitate various weakening disruptions.

(4) The Soviet system of internal controls contains seeds, which, given an opportunity, could produce real difficulty. Popular morale is generally low as a result of a continuing poor standard of living. Workers are still under rigid war-time labor controls, peasants have lost their previous gains, intellectuals are subject to continuing repression, and national minorities (40 percent of the Soviet population) are still unreconciled to Great Russian rule.

(5) Economic shortcomings within both the USSR and its satellites provide a pressure point. The Soviet Union has taken on economic obligations in Eastern Europe and China which it is incapable of fulfilling. In addition, it faces shortages in raw material (tin, natural rubber, certin non-ferrous metals) and industrial items (spare parts for machinery purchased in the West, precision instruments, complex machine tools, special purpose bearings, electrical equipment, railroad equipment).

(6) The effectiveness of Communist, propaganda in the non-Communist world is threatened by the gap between the Soviet myth of a Communist Utopia and the reality of life under Communist rule.

1. The CFM Files are a consolidated master collection of the records of conferences of Heads of State, Council of Foreign Ministers and ancillary bodies, North Atlantic Council, other meetings of the Secretary of State with the Foreign Ministers of European powers, and materials on the Austrian and German peace settlements for the years 1943–1955 prepared by the Department of State Records Service Center.
2. This paper was one of a series of policy and background papers prepared in the Department of State for the United States Delegation to the meetings of the American, British, and French Foreign Ministers in London on May 11–13, and the tripartite meetings of experts which preceded the ministerial meetings. Regarding these meetings, see the editorial note, p. 1192. A cover sheet attached to this text indicates that the paper, which was prepared in the Office of the Special Assistant for Intelligence, was fully approved within the Department of State. FM D B–23 dated April 13, a copy of which is included in the Department of State Central Files under 396.1–LO/4–1350, is identical with the text printed here, although it has a slightly different cover sheet.