S/S–NSC
Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 69
Series
Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State
for European Affairs (Thompson) to the Secretary of State
1
top secret
[Washington,] May 2, 1950.
Subject: NSC review of
export controls and security policy
The Secretary of Commerce has submitted to the NSC a memorandum which proposes the possible use of strong
pressure, including the withholding of ERP and MDAP assistance,
in order to force the Western European countries to adopt security
export controls as restrictive as those of the U.S. Commerce is under
some pressure from American business to modify export control practices
because U.S. controls, particularly on 1–B items are more restrictive
than those currently applied in Europe. The Commerce Department’s
suggestion represents only the most recent of a series of efforts to lay
down a negotiating line which, in the view of State and ECA, would be self-defeating. Aside from
the use of sanctions, the Commerce memorandum proposes no new policy
except for the abandonment of the principle laid down in Ambassador
Harriman’s original instructions that U.S. controls might have to be
more restrictive than European since trade with Eastern Europe was more
important to them than to us. Secretary Sawyer’s covering letter
indicates that he is somewhat confused as to the status of present
negotiating instructions to our representatives in Paris.
Attached are the following papers:
- 1.
- The Commerce memorandum (Tab A). (NSC 69)2
- 2.
- A suggested statement for your use at the NSC meeting on Thursday (Tab B).
- 3.
- A paper which you could propose as an NSC action on this subject (Tab C).
- 4.
- A more detailed comment on the Commerce memorandum (Tab D).3
- 5.
- Telegram No. 2363 from London giving the views of Ambassadors
Douglas and Jessup and Minister Bohlen and Colonel Bonesteel on the
Commerce memorandum (Tab E).4
The general position here outlined has been coordinated with ECA and Mr. Hoffman5 is being briefed accordingly.
Tab B
top secret
[Washington,] May 2,
1950.
Position Paper Prepared in the Department of
State
Subject: Recommended Position for NSC
Discussion of Export Controls and Security Policy
In the discussion by the NSC of
export controls and security policy, it is recommended that you
express the following position:
- 1.
-
ECA and State, as the
negotiating agencies, have to date succeeded in obtaining a very
substantial measure of agreement on a joint program of security
controls with our Western European allies. An embargo list has
been agreed and put into effect which includes most of the items
on the U.S. 1–A list as well as items defined as arms; there is
agreement on arrangements to take care of the special cases of
Yugoslavia and Finland; we are making progress on the difficult
problem of transshipment to Eastern Europe; and effective
machinery to handle these and other problems has been
established on a multilateral basis with the setting up of the
“Paris Consultative Group”. These are significant
accomplishments.
- 2.
- It has been possible to persuade the Western European
countries to go this far down the painful road of controlling
their exports primarily because they recognize a common interest
in the security of the North Atlantic area and as our partners
in the NAT. Threats of denial
of essential military or economic assistance would not serve the
purpose of advancing our mutual security. In recognition of this
basic negotiating situation, Ambassador Harriman recommended
that East-West trade discussions be taken out of the ERP context in which they were
originally placed and that the security aspect be emphasized by
having State take over responsibility. This has been done. We
will
[Page 102]
press these
negotiations vigorously, as ECA
has done in the past, but we must use our judgment as to the
best bargaining tactics to pursue. We believe that solidarity
with our Western European allies is a fundamental principle and
that we must convince them of the soundness of our security
export control policy on its merits. If their cooperation is
given unwillingly as a result of threats of withholding aid,
enforcement of their controls will be negligent and ineffective,
thus undermining the practical value of the very substantial
area of real agreement already achieved or in the process of
being achieved.
- 3.
- The most important unresolved question concerns the 1–B items
on which we propose that the quantities shipped to
Soviet-dominated areas should be limited. Our representatives in
Paris and London are now engaged under the direction of Mr.
Charles Bohlen in an intensive effort to persuade the other
members of the Consultative Group to bring their controls up to
the U.S. level. Our basic instructions to the U.S.
representatives on this matter take account of the views of the
Commerce Department and other interested agencies. We think it
would be useful to discuss the essentiality of joint security
restrictions in connection with the contemplated review of all
aspects of the Cold War at the Foreign Ministers’ meetings and
with the NAT Council. We must
make our basic and continuing effort however in the agencies
established to deal with these problems. This means that
complete support for the staff under Bohlen in Paris which
represents the U.S. in the Consultative Group is
essential.
- 4.
- We believe a new appraisal by the NSC of the problem of East-West trade should be
undertaken after we know the results of the Foreign Ministers’
meetings and of the forthcoming Paris negotiations on 1–B
controls. We will then be in a position to appraise the extent
to which the Western Europeans are willing to go along with our
present security control policy. This review should, of course,
take account of changes in the Cold War and in the world
economic situation since the NSC
last reviewed the matter. The NSC should direct its staff to initiate the
necessary factual studies. It is essential for the time being to
maintain the long-established principle that U.S. controls may
have to be more restrictive than Western European in view of the
much greater importance economically to the latter of East-West
trade.
Tab C
Paper Prepared in the Department of State
top secret
[Washington, undated.]
Subject: Export Controls and Security Policy
- 1.
- Developments in the “cold war” and in the world economic
situation since the National Security Council last reviewed the
problems of
[Page 103]
East-West
Trade, justify a new appraisal of United States policy.
Accordingly, the NSC staff is
directed to undertake the factual studies which will be required
to make this appraisal. The data required will include a basis
for a current appraisal of the importance of East-West trade to
European recovery, impact of present controls on Eastern Europe,
Soviet intentions with respect to trade, the reaction of other
governments to U.S. 1–B proposals after full discussion, the
points raised by the Secretary of Commerce in NSC 69, etc.
- 2.
- The Department of State in its negotiations should meanwhile
continue to make a vigorous effort to secure from the Western
countries the greatest area of agreement possible in the
adoption of controls over the items on the U.S. 1–A and 1–B
lists.
- 3.
- For the time being, controls in the United States which are
more restrictive than those of the Western European countries
should be maintained.
- 4.
- The following steps will be taken as immediate measures to
further United States objectives in this field:
- (a)
- The Secretary of State will take the opportunity to
emphasize the importance which the United States
attaches to common action in the field of security
export controls at forthcoming meetings with the Foreign
Ministers of Great Britain and France and with the
NAT Council.
- (b)
- In all negotiations with our Western European allies
on this subject, United States representatives will
stress the importance of the common security interests
of the nations of the North Atlantic area as the most
effective means of obtaining action in this
field.
