962A.50/1–2750: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfort1
668. We have seen Berlin’s tels 104 Jan. 26, rptd Fkft 119; and 108 Jan 27 rptd Fkft 123.2 We realize that nothing like complete blockade of Berlin exists but we are deeply concerned at new series harassing acts and feel these are calculated produce new creeping econ paralysis of Berlin with resulting serious polit effects. We note Berlin shippers are already hanging back to large extent out of sheer uncertainty as to Sov intentions. It is likewise apparent that recent developments stemming from seizure and return of Reichsbahn bldg3 have considerably damaged Western and especially Amer prestige in both Sov and Ger eyes and if Sov actions continue unchallenged except for protests Dept feels we are in for trouble.
Dept must view Berlin events in light of devs elsewhere. There appears to be general increase in Sov and satellite pressures. Examples are actions re Finland, treatment of our reps and citizens in China. Bulgaria, Hungary, dragging of feet in Aust Treaty talks and UN walkout.4 Sovs may feel that successes in China with resulting domestic storm here, plus our embarrassment in Ger with Saar affair,5 plus UK elections, plus our local actions in Berlin, mean we are off balance. Problem as we see it is to display resolution and strength wherever possible while not allowing our strength and attention to be too completely concentrated on what may be feint at Berlin.
We are impressed by fact that Sovs have deliberately sought to create confusion and doubt as to their intentions in both Allied and Ger minds. This is in line with their usual tactic of confusing an issue sufficiently to arouse doubt on our side as to whether action shld be taken. Past and present experience seems to demonstrate that Sovs are not impressed by mere protests or appeals to internatl agreements. [Page 820] Dept is of opinion restrictions are such as to constitute violation of Paris agreement6 and that measures shld be taken if restrictions not lifted promptly.
As we see it, reinstitution of airlift is not the answer now. Fact that some trains are running, that Army convoys go through and that large reserves have been built up in Berlin wld make new airlift difficult to defend on practical grounds. It wld be expensive prestige measure of doubtful usefulness. Our search therefore is for other measures designed to express our will to defend ourselves as well as calculated to bring real pressure on Sovs. Dept therefore desires your reaction toward full blockade on truck and barge transport from Western Zones to Sov Zone. This wld accord with NSC recommendation 24/3 of June 1949 as approved by President.7
If we shld determine, in concert with Fr. and Brit, to resort to some such measure we wld want to give prior notification to Sovs that if transport restrictions were not lifted within say 24 or 48 hours appropriate measures wld be taken immed (without disclosing precise nature of countermeasures). We wld consider it of highest importance that no info concerning these proposed measures shld be permitted to leak out. If any leak were to take place it wld be much more difficult for Sovs to comply with our demands and our hope of course is that result of foregoing action wld be lifting of Sov restrictions and that imposition of blockade on our side wld not be necessary. It wld be our thought to have any such communication handed over by Allied HICOM then in chair as separate communications by three HICOMS wld attract too much attention.
We desire to give fullest support to you and Taylor on this problem. Dept wld accordingly appreciate on urgent basis your views and reactions to foregoing and your recommendations of any other course of action based on direct knowledge of conditions. We also need your estimate of probable temper your Brit and Fr colleagues toward prompt action as well as estimated attitude of Germans and their probable reaction to suggested measure.8
- Repeated to Berlin as 29, London as 454, Paris as 423, and Moscow as 86.↩
- Neither printed; the former reported that the Allied Kommandatura had decided to protest to General Kotikov over Soviet restrictions on transit to Berlin; the latter transmitted the text of the letter of protest. (357AE/1–2650 and 862A.50/1–2750).↩
- On January 17 the Reichsbahndirektion building in the U.S. sector had been seized by the Property Control Branch of the U.S. Element. Following the rejection of a Soviet protest over the seizure, elevated train service, controlled by the Soviet-directed Railway Administration, was curtailed to half normal, and further restrictions were threatened. Under this threat the United States relinquished custody of the building. (Byroade memorandum to Acheson, January 23, not printed, 962A.50/1–2350).↩
- For documentation on the Austrian Treaty negotiations, see pp. 430 ff.; for documentation on Soviet pressure on Finland and the treatment of United States representatives in Bulgaria and Hungary, see pp. 574 ff., 503 ff., and 980 ff., respectively; regarding the Soviet walkout from the United Nations, see vol. ii, pp. 303 ff.; for documentation on the situation in China, see vol. vi, pp. 256 ff.↩
- For documentation on the Saar question, see pp. 927 ff.↩
- For the text of the communiqué of the Paris Council of Foreign Ministers, June 20, 1949, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. iii, p. 1062.↩
- NSC 24/3 is not printed; for NSC 24/4, see ibid, p. 839.↩
- The source text was initialed by Secretary Acheson.↩