Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

740.5/12–1450: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom ¹

top secret
priority

Washington, December 14, 1950—8 p. m.

3054. Eyes only for Holmes and Bruce for action, pass to Spofford and McCloy for info.

1. Foll summarizes position Sec proposes take at Brussels on Ger problem. He desires these views made known to Bevin and Schuman as his present thinking. He has not as yet, of course, had benefit HICOM views which wld be particularly important in these matters.

2. Ger opinion, judging by all available evidence, has so deteriorated that any proposal along lines of interim plan agreed by Deps,² wld meet rejection and counter-demands. Consequently, no proposal as such shld be made until three Powers are in position to negotiate satisfactory political as well as military agreement with Gers.

3. The task ahead will therefore be to work out a plan which will give Ger substantial polit freedom and equality at such time as she wld enter defense arrangements. This, in our concept, means acceptance of idea of putting our relations with Ger largely on “contractual basis”. (Our idea of “contractual basis” is sketched roughly in Deptel 4222 to Frankfort, Dec 12).

4. Two things have a most important bearing on how problem is to be worked out. They are: (a) success of Schuman Plan and (b) success of efforts to be made at Paris mtgs to form Eur army³ with necessary polit unifying machinery. If these two moves make progress, way toward ending occupation controls will be much easier all round.

5. Agreement shld be reached therefore that HICOM will meet with Adenauer on informal confidential basis and give him for his info only, but not as proposal, results of Deps work including info on Atlantic force. He shld be told that info is not put forward for Ger acceptance or rejection at this time, that formal or official response was not desired and that impression must not be given that Allies have made formal request of Gers. We desire avoid any basis for growth of idea that proposals had been made by us, and rejected with counter-demands by Chancellor. Adenauer shld be told further that we consider Germany’s participation in defense arrangements shld logically be accompanied by further modification of our position as occupying powers and that three powers were undertaking further work in this regard. He shld be told that these plans, when more fully developed, will be put on table for fullest discussion with his govt and that meanwhile, ideas expressed in his aide-mémoire presented to HICOM on Nov 16⁴ will be considered. Finally, and we regard this as most important, HICOM shld clearly indicate to Adenauer that development of our proposals will be greatly influenced by success or failure of Schuman Plan and coming Paris talks and that anything he can do that will contribute to agreement will be helpful.

6. Agreement shld also be reached in Brussels that immediate start shld be made by Three Powers on developing possible proposal for contractual arrangements. This task shld in first stage be undertaken by ISG on Jan 15, who wld immediately recommend reference to HICOM of those matters which can appropriately be worked out jointly with Gers prior to tentative agreement among Allies. ISG shld consider as its terms of reference ideas and plans of procedure set forth in paras 3, 4 and 5 above. It shld not strive for perfection of detail, but shld seek recommendations on broad outlines of a plan or alternative plans which cld be submitted to Govts for HICOM by Feb 28 at outside. This wld allow time for initial planning on broad lines and wld also give time for development of Paris mtg. After Govts have passed ISG’s plans to HICOM with comments, latter cld develop final plan, with continued assistance of ISG as appropriate, in consultation with Gers always bearing in mind final negots wld be reserved until total three-power plan substantially completed.⁵

7. Foregoing proposals make imperative to de-emphasize Ger aspect of defense planning as much as possible for present. We believe Brussels communiqué shld heavily accent agreement on all other phases of integrated defense plan and confine itself on Germany to something on lines of text in para 9 of Deptel 4222, Dec 12, to Frankfort, (rptd London as 2994 Paris as 3272).

8. In referring to “contractual agreement” you can speak from above referenced telegram, omitting reference to any proposal to relinquish Supreme Authority or MSB arrangement as our thinking on these subjs still tentative. We will expect to give ideas on “contractual agreement” in better form to Brit and Fr at Brussels, but for info only as we consider impractical to try to reach any agreement on such matters there. In short, we will confine our attempts to reach formal agreement to points covered in paras 5 and 6, on basis of assumptions contained in paras 3 and 4.

It is not intended at this stage that you discuss text of portion of communiqué on German aspect with Brit and Fr.⁶

Acheson

1. Repeated to Paris as 3281 and to Frankfort as 4315.
2. For documentation on the NATO Deputies interim defense plan, see vol. iii, pp. 1 ff.
3. For documentation on the Paris discussions of representatives from the NATO countries concerning the formation of a European army in the fall of 1950, see ibid .; further documentation on these talks in 1951 is presented in Foreign Relations, 1951, volume iii .
4. Transmitted in telegram 319, November 17, p. 780.
5. In telegram 4316, December 14, 11 p. m., to Frankfort, not printed, Byroade elaborated on the division of responsibility between the ISG and the High Commission with regard to the negotiation of the contractual agreements. He felt that the most satisfactory procedure would be one in which McCloy would remain free to give his individual recommendations from time to time after he had discussed the various questions with the Germans. (396.1–ISG/12–1450)
6. On December 15 Holmes discussed the substance of this telegram with Bevin who expressed similar views. Bevin agreed that the Western powers would “ultimately reach a position of ‘contractual relations’ with Western Germany but felt that we should reach that position by negotiating step by step,” and Holmes believed that he could probably be persuaded to agree to tell the Germans “that our objective is to reach that point provided they, the Germans, do what is necessary to permit us to change our relationship.” (Telegram 3482, December 15, from London, not printed, 740.5/12–1550).