I am convinced that a real danger exists that we shall be faced, possibly
in a few months’ time, with a crisis in Germany similar to but more
dangerous than that in Korea, arising from an attempt by the Russians,
acting through the East Zone police, to drive us out of Berlin or to
secure the unity of Germany within the Communist orbit.
I feel it is essential that we should examine this question at our
meeting and I therefore ask you to consider the attached paper, the
substance of which I am also communicating to M. Pleven. Our Chiefs of
Staff point out that there is no visible way of providing the forces
needed to defend the territories of the North Atlantic Treaty Powers
without German assistance. His Majesty’s Government are not however
prepared at present to agree to the re-creation of a German Army. We do
not wish to exclude eventual discussion of the incorporation of a German
contingent in the Western defence forces if the United
[Page 718]
States or French Governments should wish
to discuss it but in our view there are certain minimum measures which
should be taken without delay. These are summarised in paragraph 3 of
the paper. The most important is the creation of a Federal Police Force
for which Adenauer asked on 17th August. The size and armaments of such
a Force are for discussion but it is important that it should be
organised on a sufficiently centralised basis to enable swift and
effective action to be taken in an emergency.
I have given much thought to the question whether the establishment of
such a Force would provoke the very action we want to prevent. Unless we
are prepared to ignore military opinion and to risk Berlin and even
Western Germany being overrun, this danger must be faced some time. It
is better to face it now when the Bereitschaften
are less ready for action than they will be next year and in such a form
as is least likely to provoke Soviet reaction. Moreover, the creation of
a gendarmerie will take time. Until it exists and
until we have reorganised the German auxiliary services, our forces
would find themselves liable to be hamstrung in an emergency by loss of
their essential services, and by having to devote themselves to
suppression of Communist-inspired disturbances or cope with mass
movements of refugees. Furthermore, unless we show now that we are
prepared to face up to danger that stares West Germans in the face, we
shall lose the confidence of the Germans and their morale may crack in
an emergency.
The problem of the defence of Berlin may prove to be more urgent and to
need separate action in advance of the other measures I propose.
[Enclosure]
Paper Prepared in the British Foreign Office
top secret
[London,] August, 1950.
German Association With the Defence of the
West
the problem
In Europe the declared policy of the Western Powers has been
- (1)
- to build up a position of strength in the West;
- (2)
- to incorporate Germany into the Western system, eventually as
an equal partner.
It was recognised that this policy could only be
executed in the teeth of Russian opposition, but the risk was taken
in the expectation that it would be possible in time to build up the
necessary position of strength in the West. It was hoped to achieve
this by the Brussels
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Treaty and subsequently by the North Atlantic Treaty. Had this hope
been realised, Western policy would be coherent and the prospects
fair. But in the light of recent events the Chiefs of Staff have
come to the firm conclusion (C.O.S. (50)305 of August 18th) that in
fact we cannot build up the necessary strength to assure the defence
of the territories of the N.A.T. Powers without the participation of
Germany. The need to provide for adequate defence has been rendered
more urgent by the circumstance that the rearmament of Germany has
already begun in the Eastern Zone. There is evidence that the
Russians are in process of converting the People’s Police the Bereitschaften (Alert Units) into a
highly-trained regular German Army of 150,000 men which is to
include a number of armoured divisions. It is accordingly clear that
provision will soon have to be made against an attack on Berlin or
on the Western Zone by this new Germany Army. To meet the threat the
Federal Chancellor in a conversation, on August 17th, 1950, asked
the High Commissioners for authority to raise a special Federal
force of 150,000 volunteers trained and equipped on the model of the
Bereitschaften. In the paper of 18th
August the Chiefs of Staff went further and recommended that the
German contribution to Western defence should consist of local naval
forces, a balanced Army of 20 divisions with a reserve of 10
divisions, a tactical air component of 1,100 aircraft, an air
defence force of 1,000 fighters and a substantial anti-aircraft
force equipped with guided weapons.
2. If the premise is accepted that the threat from the East is real
and urgent and without Germany it cannot be met, the problem is to
find the best method of associating Germany so far as this is
politically and economically practicable with the defence of the
West.
3. recommendations
- 1.
- It should be recognised that it is not practicable at the
moment to rearm Germany on the scale recommended by the
Chiefs of Staff.
- 2.
- Nevertheless, the United States and French Governments
should be urged to agree that the Federal Chancellor should
be told in reply to his request that in view of the threat
of an invasion by the Eastern German Army he may as a first
step raise a federal force of 100,000 volunteers trained and
equipped on the model of the Bereitschaften, the arms to be supplied by the
Western Allies.
- 3.
- A similar force of 3,000 men should be raised in
Berlin.
- 4.
- The proposal to create a gendarmerie on a Land Basis
should be abandoned.
- 5.
- The auxiliary forces serving with the British and United
States armies should be improved and reorganised in
Units.
- 6.
- The German Frontier Customs Police Force should be
improved and slightly expanded.
- 7.
- Germany should make an industrial contribution to Western
strength.
- 8.
- The High Commissioners should be empowered to discuss the
implementation of these steps with the Chancellor and with
German representatives nominated by him.
4. argument
[Here follow sections on the strength of the German forces in the
Soviet zone, Soviet intentions in Germany, and the attitude of the
Federal Republic on rearmament.]
11. But this does not mean that nothing can be done to strengthen
Western defence from German resources. On the contrary, Germany
could make a substantial contribution now. The Federal Chancellor
has made a strong case for the establishment of a force of 150,000
volunteers to match the Bereitschaften. He
professes to be confident that he can secure the assent of the
Opposition and he also believes; that he can raise 150,000 reliable
volunteers. He may be unduly optimistic but he is a man of
determination and of a certain political adroitness. In any event
the initiative has come from the German side, and in their present
situation the Western Allies would be taking upon themselves a
serious responsibility if they rejected out of hand a proposal which
would not only bring a considerable access of strength to the West
but would tend to consolidate opinion both in Western Germany and in
other countries in Western Europe in resistance to the East.
Nevertheless, it is for consideration whether in view of French
susceptibilities and of the difficulty of raising and arming a new
force quickly it would not be better to fix the initial strength of
the force at 100,000 men., It could subsequently be expanded if
required.
12. The three Western Commandants in Berlin have recommended that in
view of the threat of an attack by the Eastern German Army they
should be authorised forthwith to raise three battalions of German
gendarmerie in Berlin. They consider that
such a force would constitute a valuable reinforcement of the
Western Garrisons. It is recommended that they should be given the
authority they require.
13. If the above steps are taken it would clearly be unnecessary and
indeed wasteful to proceed any further with the makeshift proposal
to create a force of 10,000 mobile police on a Land basis with a central inspectorate.
14. The improvement and reorganisation of the ancillary forces
attached to the British forces has now become a matter of
considerable urgency. This force was originally raised in order to
economise British manpower and was organised on a military basis. In
consequence of Russian representations the units were dissolved and
the force placed on a purely civilian basis. As a result conditions
of service have become so unattractive and discipline has so
deteriorated that the force
[Page 721]
cannot be relied upon in an emergency. If, as is feared,
defections on a large scale took place on the outbreak of
hostilities, the British Army would not be able to move. It is
accordingly recommended that the proposals for the reorganisation
and improvement of this force which are now before the Chiefs of
Staff should be approved and executed without delay. Such measures
would have the full support of the Chancellor and the Federal
Government.
15. There is at present in the British Zone a force of some 4,000
German Frontier Customs Police, which is armed with rifles and
patrols the frontier. This special police, if increased in strength
and suitably trained, could perform a useful function as a covering
force in an emergency. The Federal Chancellor has also indicated
that he favours strengthening this force.
16. The supply of weapons to any German formations will have to be
the responsibility of the Western Allies both on security grounds
and because the Germans are not in a position to manufacture weapons
in any measurable distance of time. But there is every reason to
insist that, in addition to continuing to pay occupation costs,
Germany should supply transport, uniforms, and equipment not of a
purely military character. It is also for consideration whether the
German Government should not be required to make a contribution of
nonmilitary equipment to the Western forces.
17. If these recommendations are approved, their execution will
require the cooperation of the Federal Government, and it is
accordingly essential that the High Commissioners should be
empowered to discuss these matters with the Federal Chancellor and
with German representatives nominated by him.
18. To sum up. The Western Allies are at the moment in a vicious
circle. The French Government will not agree to any form of German
rearmament until France is strong. But France will not make the
effort to be strong unless there is a real prospect of assuring
Western defence, which in turn cannot be done without a measure of
German rearmament. It is clear that the vicious circle must at all
costs be broken. Since there is no prospect of inducing the German
at the moment to accept remilitarisation on the scale recommended by
the Chiefs of Staff, a beginning should be made without any delay
with the creation of the force demanded by the Chancellor and with
the improvement of the British and United States ancillary forces.
But there is little time to lose. The Eastern German Army has been
in being for some time. If it would take 15 months to bring this
Army to a sufficient pitch of efficiency to enable it to attack the
Western Zones, it will require at least that time to train a new
Western German force to play its part in repelling the attack.
