Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

763.00/2–2850: Telegram

The Minister in Austria (Erhardt) to the Secretary of State

secret

Vienna, February 28, 1950—6 p. m.

334. Deptel 287, February 17. We are, of course, entirely in agreement with General Keyes that steps taken to strengthen Austrian sovereignty should not be at expense US interests nor endanger continued functioning of quadripartite control agreement. In event no treaty, however, we feel we must re-assess our policy towards Austria, and determine whether or not further progress is possible and desirable along course which we have, in fact, consistently followed up to present, i.e., gradual strengthening of Austrian sovereignty and eventual establishment of stable, independent state integrated with Western Europe. We must also decide whether this policy effectively serves our aim of preventing further Soviet expansion in this direction.

In connection this assessment, we submit that US policy towards Austria, as contrasted with policy towards Germany, has shown static quality during past two years. This adherence to status quo has, of course, been due to expectation that treaty negotiations would have been successfully concluded by now. With further protracted delay in view, it would be sheerest temporizing not to take cognizance of fact that insofar as West is concerned, occupation aims and functions of AC have long since been achieved to extent possible in face of Soviet obstruction. We have, for example, already admitted in our actions that Austrian Parliament, rather than High Commissioners, is supreme authority in Austria. We have likewise admitted tacitly that fundamental purpose of military occupation is no longer to control country but to provide element of security until such time as we can bring about withdrawal of Soviet forces and Austrians themselves can assume this responsibility. Moreover, we have for some time past used AC almost solely to protect Austrian sovereignty and curb Soviet actions, rather than for its original control functions.

Over period of years, therefore, emphasis in our policy towards Austria has been shifting from military to political basis. But framework of this policy has not been altered proportionately, nor was there perhaps any reason for it to have been changed so long as treaty remained in view. We believe time has now come, however, when in general re-assessment of our Austrian policy, functions and responsibilities of US representatives in Austria must be redefined in light of existing situation. 1950 is not 1945, and neither solutions nor organizations can be same today as they were five years ago.

We see no reason why changes cannot be made without damage to continued functioning of quadripartite control agreement. They would naturally entail relaxation of some controls in our zone, and would even mean that we would cease to exercise others, but this process of relaxation and relinquishment of controls has been going on for some time without in any way jeopardizing functions of AC. Nor do we feel that changes can be interpreted as weakening our position in Austria. Rather, they would be regarded, we believe, as adapting ourselves to the changed situation, and their connotation would be our determination to maintain our position regardless of length of time it may require to obtain treaty and bring about withdrawal of Soviet forces.

As we see it, our immediate objective must be to reinforce our efforts to obtain treaty, and at same time to put Austrian relations with Western powers on basis more nearly corresponding to realities of situation. We have every confidence that this objective coincides with aspirations of vast majority of Austrian people, and would best contribute to our fundamental aim of ensuring stable, independent Austria. We have no desire to underestimate vital importance either of economic assistance to Austria or requirement in our own interest of sound US military position here. We regard both as essential elements, without which we would assuredly fail in achievement of this fundamental aim. But we feel element of US moral support must likewise be given weight, and we do wish to make clear our view that we can also further our aim by responding, at least in part, to aspirations of Austrian people without impairing effectiveness of either economic aid or military support.

As to specific points raised by General Keyes, we have following comment:

1. Our suggestion re proposal to Soviets for immediate withdrawal of all occupation forces was admittedly put forward as propaganda move, without any expectation of Soviet acceptance. In unlikely event of Soviet acceptance, however, it was our idea that period required for implementing withdrawal would be utilized for strengthening Austrian security forces. While such forces would require subsequent augmentation before security risk eliminated, we would regard withdrawal of some 45,000 Soviet troops as itself no small contribution to Austrian security.

As to US interests, we are of opinion that withdrawal of Soviet forces in Austria might, over period of time, have considerable bearing on developments in Central Europe, and, in any event, must be regarded as sine qua non to any possible reduction in Soviet power in Balkans. Finally, we are persuaded by Soviets’ own reluctance to terminate occupation that their withdrawal would be in US interest.

2. Our suggestions for proposals to Soviets for reduction of forces and formal elimination of certain controls were likewise made primarily as propaganda moves, and we agree that Soviets will probably accept no changes which are not to their advantage. But we feel it will be of increasing advantage tons if we can demonstrate from time to time that continued occupation and controls are due solely to Soviet intransigence.

3. Figures furnished by French and British Governments re dependents of their occupation forces in Austria demonstrate that reduction of number such dependents, if not of troops, would have beneficial effect on Austrian economy.

4. Our suggestion on reduction of US occupation forces was put forward tentatively, with acknowledgment security considerations was deciding factor. We made no attempt to answer question whether US forces could be reduced, but intended only that this problem be given full consideration. As to argument, however, that sending troops back into Austria from Germany would be overt aggressive act by US, it seems to us this would be valid only if all forces had been finally withdrawn from Austria, and that so long as occupation continued, US commander would be free to increase or decrease number of troops in US zone in accordance with government policy and his estimate of requirements. Moreover, we do not believe any such increase would arouse Austrian hostility if future events should require strengthening of forces.

5. Re abolition of military courts, our suggestion was intended to meet Austrian protests re jurisdiction such courts over Austrian citizens, to which both major political parties vigorously object. We believe solution, at least to extent civil cases, might be found along lines of formula covering allied troops in other friendly countries, i.e., British troops in Greece.

6. Re housing, our use of term, “requisitioning” created false impression. Although no new buildings have been requisitioned for years, occupation forces continue to occupy offices and residential properties through rental arrangements concluded with Austrian Government These arrangements do not, however, have consent of owners, most of whom ardently desire return of their properties, and their resentment is directed primarily against occupation forces and only secondarily against Austrian Government. We regard it as important to endeavor eliminate this complaint, especially if treaty is not soon obtained and occupation must continue more or less indefinitely.

7. We regard question of whether high commissioner is to be civilian or military to be of less importance than redefinition of functions and responsibilities of US representatives as suggested above.

Finally, it should perhaps be stated that we are not primarily advocating any specific suggestion, nor do we presume to have surveyed all possible steps which US might take at this time. Rather, it has been our desire to convey impression that we can not, by merely adhering to status quo, expect to continue to combat Soviet policies in this area, nor to make our just contributions to establishment of Austrian political life on an enduring constitutional basis. Sent Department 334; repeated London 46, Paris 39.

Erhardt