Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

661.00/7–2750

Information Policy Guidance Paper¹

confidential

[Washington,] July 27, 1950.

Special Guidance No. 50

The Betrayal of Peace

(The Soviet-sponsored “peace” signatures campaign²)

i. problem

To determine the psychological significance of the current Soviet-sponsored “peace signatures” campaign and to set forth propaganda policy effectively to counter and combat it.

ii. background

A. The Appeal

(The text of the Appeal is in Annex 1³)

B. Analysis

(Analysis of the Appeal is in Annex 2)

C. Methods

(Methods used to collect signatures is found in Annex 3)

iii. soviet objectives

The more obvious Soviet objectives served by the “signatures for peace” campaign, are:

To promote acceptance through popular support of the assertions of the major Soviet propaganda theme to the effect that the US wants war while the USSR wants peace;

To use it as a cover for communist activities aimed at extension of Soviet power;

To divert attention from the direct and indirect aggression continuously practiced by the USSR;

To identify aggression solely with use of the atom bomb and minimize public condemnation of aggression by other means;

To nullify the defensive value to the US and its allies of US superiority in atomic weapons by making any use of atomic weapons seem morally indefensible;

To weaken the support of people in non-Communist countries for their governments by creating doubts concerning the wisdom of the current foreign policy of the United States and its allies;

To lure non-Communist peoples into seeming support of Soviet policy, by making them appear to back the USSR in its self-appointed role of the real champion of world peace;

To raise doubts among the American people of the reliability of the populations of its allies in the event of war;

To propagate ideas and concepts which sustain the overall Soviet myth;

To heighten tensions resulting in psychological barriers to enjoyment of normal comforts and pleasures and indirectly to place the onus on the US for unsettled conditions.

To condition psychologically the people of the USSR and to encourage Soviet-dominated populations to endure privations and to make further sacrifices necessary to “safeguard the peace,”

In addition to the objectives listed above there is a strong possibility that the USSR may be planning special exploitation of the “peace” signatures in the UN. The Soviet Union may use the signatures to document the contention that whereas the Vishinsky resolution, condemning the US for “preparing a new war of aggression” and calling for the prohibition of atomic weapons, was rejected in the GA, the signatures demonstrate that the Soviet resolution (and inferentially overall Soviet policy) has worldwide popular support.⁴ The signatures would thus be utilized as a sort of world referendum to compel the UN to modify its position with respect to the control of atomic energy and to accept the Soviet proposal supported by the signatures.

If, in the event described, Soviet demands were rejected by the General Assembly, the USSR might withdraw from the UN and use the signatures to document the line that the opposing governments in the UN are unrepresentative, illegitimate and unresponsive to the will of the people. An indication of this approach was supplied recently in connection with the warning of the British Labor Party to its members not to sign Partisans of Peace petitions or join Partisans of Peace committees. The communists reacted quickly, declaring that it is the British National Partisans of Peace Committee which represents the overwhelming majority of the British Labor Party, even though the latter controls the government.

This line of argumentation could be adapted effectively to serve Soviet purposes at the Second World Congress in Warsaw, in the event that the USSR elected not to attend the forthcoming meetings of the GA.

iv. discussion

In countering the objectives of the USSR we must continue increasingly to undermine the whole Soviet “peace” offensive, of which the signatures campaign is only a part, if currently the most significant, as set forth in Special Guidance No. 36 of January 31, 1950.⁵ This entails exposure of the Soviet myth, projection of a fair picture of US democracy in action, emphasis on US support of the UN and above all exposition on every suitable occasion of the desire of the US and its intentions to promote peace in the world based on freedom, justice and law. The record of the US in this respect is impressive. We can legitimately take vigorous pride in citing what the US has done, is doing and will continue to do to preserve and to enforce peace. The significance of our actions in support of the UN in Korea can scarcely be overemphasized. These points have constituted important components of our total propaganda effort. They should be continued and intensified.

However, the United States should take the offensive and should, in combatting the Soviet-sponsored signatures compaign, devote considerable propaganda energy positively to demonstrate that far from seeking peace, international communism harbors militantly aggressive designs against the Free World and against the US as the most prominent nation of the Free World. It should label the actions and the intentions of international communism as a betrayal of peace, as a betrayal of the signers of the “peace” petition and indeed of the hopes of all men who yearn for peace and the opportunity to devote their energies to constructive purposes. It should do this not only to meet the exigencies of the current situation but in order to set and to keep the historical record straight.

The betrayal of peace should become the inclusive phrase describing the actions of international communism in pursuit of its fundamental purpose to dominate the world. Though posing as the champions of peace, international communism does not seek peace. It has repeatedly, during the past five years, betrayed peace.

International communism betrayed peace when in 1946, Stalin, in his election speech, announced the end of constructive collaboration with the United States and the other nations of the free world.

It betrayed peace when police regimes were imposed on the Eastern European satellites in violation of the Yalta Agreement.

It betrayed peace when it supported civil war in Greece.

It betrayed peace when Germany was broken into two separate units.

It betrayed peace when it refused to consent to effective international control of atomic energy according to a plan endorsed by an overwhelming majority of the nations of the world.

It betrayed the peace when a police regime was imposed in North Korea.

It betrayed the peace when a blockade was established in Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav people incited to insurrection.

It betrayed the peace when the remilitarization of Eastern Germany was begun.

It betrays peace when it refuses to permit the free exchange of persons and ideas across international boundaries.

It betrays peace by blocking peaceful contacts of the West with her satellites.

It has betrayed peace by its obstructionist tactics in the UN Commission for Conventional Armaments and its persistent opposition in that Commission, in the Security Council, and in the General Assembly to every single majority-supported effort or proposal to regulate and reduce conventional armaments and armed forces.

It betrays the peace when it uses propaganda to war-monger, whip up tension, civil war-monger and to deceive people concerning the intentions of the West.

It betrays the peace when it uses Communist fifth-columns, wherever they exist, to create distrust, disorder, and, when possible, civil war.

Within the framework of such a propaganda offensive (pressed with vigor between the present time and October 1, the eve of the General Assembly of the UN, and meeting of the Second World Congress in Warsaw of the Partisans of Peace, scheduled for October 16–21⁶) care must be taken not to offend the sensibilities of countless individuals who signed the petition in good faith and who sincerely desire peace.

v. u.s. objectives

The objectives should be:

A. To discourage further signatures, especially on the part of well-known public figures, and activity for their collection.

B. To raise doubts in the minds of those who have already signed or may be pressed into signing and of those who are engaged in the collection of signatures.

C. To provide leadership for and thus indirectly to encourage high-ranking government officials, trades union, religious and other public opinion leaders in friendly foreign countries to take a firm stand on the signatures campaign and to expose the fraudulent purposes which it serves.

D. To anticipate and minimize the impact at the presentation of the signatures to the United Nations or to another forum.

1. by raising doubts concerning the validity of the statistical claims made on behalf of the signatures campaign.

2. by intimating, to the extent that it is feasible, that the signatures constitute endorsement solely of the need for effective international control of atomic energy—a position which the US took 5 years ago, implementation of which, however, has been blocked by the USSR.

E. To win new support for the United Nations plan for the international control of atomic energy and to strengthen the belief that the United Nations constitutes the best hope of maintaining lasting peace in the world.

vi. treatment

The objectives set forth above may be sought in the following ways:

A. A frontal attack on the Stockholm Appeal as

(1) A deceit, because it seeks to mask behind fair words the militantly aggressive acts and intentions of the Soviet Union.

(2) A fraud, because it ignores, or glosses over, the one plan for the international control of atomic energy which contains solid guarantees for the security of all people against the misuse of atomic energy. The failure to mention the United Nations plan is the “missing component” in the petition.

(3) A hypocrisy, because it exploits heartlessly the deep aspirations of people everywhere on behalf of an aggressive, belligerent power, which maintains and is expanding the largest armed force in the world.

(4) A betrayal, because its intention is not to cultivate the conditions of international agreement that alone can lead to an easing of existing international tensions but rather to create new divisions and exacerbate old ones.

(5) Chicanery, because it cunningly associates crimes against humanity with a single weapon rather than with aggression itself. As the Secretary has pointed out^* the real crime against humanity is aggression; particularly deliberate armed aggression in defiance of the UN. Among the instruments of aggression currently used by the communists to impose their will on unwilling peoples are propaganda of incitation, subversion, infiltration, intimidation, threats of force, puppet armies and civil war. It will be recalled that several hundred thousand North Koreans had signed the petition before the aggression against the Republic of Korea.

B. A labelling of the Communist sponsors of the petition as betrayers of the signers of the peace petition. Signers of the petition should not be charged as betrayers, but the implication should be made that they have, if innocently, been duped and exploited by forces that are bent on their destruction as social forces and as individuals.

C. A persistent counterpoint of exposition to the effect that the USSR could make a genuine contribution to peace by using as requested by Britain and the US, its acknowledged influence with North Korean authorities to withdraw their troops to the 38th parallel. In this connection the retraction of signatures movement, initiated in Copenhagen as a reaction to communist refusal to fix responsibility for the Korean war, offers opportunity for useful publicity.

Open letters by men of prominence addressed to newspaper editors and to the Partisans of Peace organization, raising embarrassing questions concerning unprovoked aggression regardless of weapons used and including the question of condemnation as aggression the attack of North Korean forces on the Republic of Korea, would also prove effective. (See Annex 5.⁷)

Since the Partisans of Peace endeavor to gloss over or avoid the question of responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, Korea must be used as the basic test of sincerity. This point must be hammered home mercilessly.

D. A persistent counterpoint of exposition to the effect that tabulation of Partisans of Peace signature statistics is uncontrolled and that since the substance is spurious the figures are also phony. Testimony by refugees from Iron Curtain countries concerning communist falsification of election results, multiple-voting, coercion, etc., can be used effectively to discredit reliability of communist claims.

E. A persistent counterpoint of exposition to the effect that essentially the bonafide signatures constitute an endorsement of the position which the US took 5 years ago: namely, that there is need for effective international control of atomic energy. This can be furthered by publicizing

(1) Statements by individuals who have signed to the effect that they affixed their signatures with the expectation that the USSR would draw the necessary conclusions and submit to effective international control of atomic energy by accepting the plan approved by the overwhelming majority of the UN members.

(2) Statements by individuals who have signed to the effect that their signatures affirm their desire for peace and the elimination of aggression but do not constitute endorsement of Soviet policies.

F. A persistent counterpoint of exposition to the effect that

(1) The United Nations plan for the international control of atomic energy is the only plan thus far devised that offers effective guarantees against the misuse of atomic energy.

(2) The United Nations plan has the support of most of the governments and people of the world.

(3) The United Nations plan would have been in effect two years or more ago but for the opposition of the USSR, which obviously opposed it in order to be free to continue its aggressive plans.

G. An additional persistent counterpoint to the effect that the United States and the Free World are dedicated to the preservation of peace with freedom and that they are determined to achieve their objective.

H. An additional persistent counterpoint to the effect that aggression is the crime, not the weapons that may be used to effect or to deter it. The attempt to foster a special stigma on the atomic weapon should be countered in this fashion.

I. Seek out in the book which is basic to each major religion, such as the Bible, the Torah, the Koran, etc., quotations to the effect that one should beware of those dressed in sheep’s clothing, or beware of those who come offering gifts while practicing dangerous deception.

vii. execution

The execution of the policy outlined above will require:

A. Cooperation with information agencies of other governments and the NATO to encourage similar action among other peoples. Abroad, the United States should appear not as the leader in the movement but only as one of many nations and peoples interested in exposing the Communist maneuver. In other countries, the campaign of exposure should be of an indigenous character.

B. Speeches and statements by US public and private spokesmen along the lines indicated, action by public and private groups and decisions along these lines regarding actions to be taken by the US delegation to the United Nations.

C. Exploitation of these statements, actions and decisions by US officials and unofficial information media.

Annex 2

Background Paper Prepared by the Public Affairs Policy Advisory Staff
confidential

[Washington, undated.]

Analysis of the Appeal

The Appeal appears to be neutral. It mentions by name neither the US nor the Soviet Union. At first blush it seems to reflect sentiments and objectives to which “honest men of good will” may subscribe in good conscience.

Originally, the world goal of the signatures petition was set at three to four hundred million signatures, to be solicited in both communist and non-communist countries. If communist reports concerning accomplishments of the signatures drive can be taken at face value, results achieved thus far are impressive. According to the latest statistics some 214 million signatures have been collected to date. Since the signatures campaign has some 3 months more to run—apparently working up to a climax for the Second World Congress of the Partisans of Peace, scheduled to be held in Warsaw, October 16–21—there is a likelihood that the Soviet Union may claim half a billion signatures—350 to 450 million from the Soviet orbit alone—by the time the campaign is concluded.

With the outbreak of hostilities in Korea the possibility arose that communist propagandists would find their “peace” movement embarrassing and accordingly would shift their emphasis from the “peace” theme. After a short hiatus, however, they blamed the present situation on the US and intensified their “peace” propaganda. Present communist strategy appears to gloss over the question of who committed the crime of aggression in Korea, to attribute international tensions and the danger of widespread international conflict to US foreign policy, and to demand an end to “US intervention in Korea.”

The Communists have sought to capitalize on neutrality sentiment, especially in Western Europe, by declaring that partisans of neutrality are partisans of peace who “do not know themselves.” This is an obvious effort to reconcile neutralism and Communist doctrine.

The new strategy appears not to have produced successes. Reports from US missions the world around indicate that, since the aggression in Korea, popular interest in the Stockholm Appeal has sharply fallen off and popular skepticism concerning its motives has sharply risen. Attendance at meetings has declined, while open attack on the Appeal, from both official and unofficial sources, has increased. Moreover, counterpetitions and campaigns to withdraw signatures have gained considerable success.

Annex 3

Background Paper Prepared by the Public Affairs Policy Advisory Staff
confidential

[Washington, undated.]

Methods Used To Collect Signatures

Exploiting the universal desire for peace, the Partisans of Peace appear to be working on two levels. They appeal, first of all, in a general way to all peace-loving, “honest” people and attempt to secure their support on a non-partisan basis. Secondly, special campaigns have been launched to reach such important segments of the population as industrial workers, farmers, the youth and women through local committees, shop workers, and, above all, door-to-door canvassing.

Coercion, particularly in the Soviet orbit (where particularly heavy pressures have been exerted on religious groups), as well as persuasion is being used. Moscow has called on Partisan of Peace officials to demand from persons who refuse to sign the petition a public explanation of why they oppose prohibition of atomic weapons. This demand in Western countries is directed chiefly at leading personalities in an attempt to maneuver them into the position of appearing to favor weapons of mass destrucution. According to Moscow’s warning, anyone who refuses to sign exposes himself as an enemy of peace.

1. This is one of a series of Special Information Policy Guidance papers on major developments which were prepared by the Public Affairs Policy Advisory Staff (in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs), coordinated with appropriate bureaus and offices of the Department of State, and sent to public affairs officers in the United States and abroad as well as to other agencies with public affairs responsibilities. Beginning in 1950 the Public Affairs Policy Advisory Staff also began preparing regular Weekly Information Policy Guidance papers which received interdepartmental coordination and were sent to all public affairs officers of all agencies in the United States and abroad.
2. Regarding the origin of the “peace signature” campaign under reference here, see the editorial note, p. 276.
3. Annex 1 is not printed here; for the text of the “Stockholm Peace Appeal,” see ibid .
4. During the Fourth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, September 20–December 10, 1949, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, the head of the Soviet Delegation to the General Assembly, introduced a resolution which would have condemned the alleged preparations for a new war conducted by a number of countries, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom. The First Committee of the General Assembly decisively rejected the Soviet resolution and instead adopted a United States-United Kingdom resolution entitled “Essentials of Peace” which was subsequently approved by the General Assembly on December 1, 1949. Documentation on the “Essentials of Peace” Resolution is presented in Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. ii, pp. 72 ff.
5. Not printed.
6. Regarding the Second World Congress of the Partisans of Peace, held In Warsaw, November 16–22, see footnote 2, p. 332.
7. The text of the Secretary’s remarks at his press conference on July 12, 1950, is in Annex 4. [Footnote in the source text. Annex 4 under reference here is not printed. Regarding the Secretary’s press conference remarks of July 12, see the second editorial note, p. 315.]
7. Annex 5, not printed, was the draft text of a letter suggested as a pattern that might be used in other countries by prominent writers, artists, clergymen, and other public leaders as part of a campaign of exposure of the Stockholm peace signature campaign.