The American Embassy refers to recent discussions with the Foreign Office
concerning the joint course of action with respect to civil aviation
policy toward the USSR and its satellites.2 There is
attached
[Page 26]
in this connection the
text of a document which the Department of States proposes to use as a
basis for instructions to certain United States Missions. The United
States Government hopes that His Majesty’s Government will find itself
in agreement with the policy set forth in this statement.
If such agreement is reached, it is proposed that the substance of this
statement be transmitted by the two Governments to the United Kingdom
and United States Missions concerned. In this way, it should prove
possible to avoid differences in understanding and interpretation by
such Missions in explaining the joint course of action to third
governments.
[Enclosure]
Paper Prepared by the Embassy in the United
Kingdom3
secret
[London, undated.]
Civil Aviation Policy Toward the USSR and its Satellites
recommendations
[Here follow the texts of paragraphs 12 through 16 of document NSC 15/3, January 5, pages 5–6,
renumbered 1 through 5.]
background
Our previous policy, NSC 15/1,4 called
for (1) the blocking of civil air operations of the USSR and its
satellites outside the area of Soviet control, and (2) the
prohibition of the sale or export of civil aircraft and associated
aviation equipment to Soviet or satellite agencies, as well as the
denial of the use of facilities for overhaul, refitting and
maintenance to USSR and satellite aircraft. These restrictive
measures were to be carried out on a “common front” basis through
the cooperation of other like-minded countries of Europe and the
Near East. As an initial step toward the implementation of this
policy, the Department of State sought the concurrence of the
British Government. His Majesty’s Government agreed with respect to
the export aspects of the policy (2 above) and concurred that USSR
and satellite civil air operations to the Near Eastern, South Asian
and African area should be prevented. They did not, however, agree
with us completely concerning “containment” of USSR and satellite
air operations to Western Europe.
[Page 27]
After some discussions our two governments reached agreement upon a
joint policy which called for full implementation of the export
aspects of the policy (NSC 15/1) and
a less restrictive implementation with respect to satellite air
operations (i.e. instead of attempting to “contain” satellite air
operations completely, we would grant permission for satellite
services outside the area of Soviet control if such concessions were
necessary as a quid pro quo to obtain such
services as we required, and were actually ready to operate, in
satellite territory). We also agreed that, while facilities for
overhaul, refitting or major maintenance should be denied to Soviet
and satellite aircraft, the use of such minimum facilities as were
necessary for the operation of such satellite air services as might
be permitted and for securing adequate facilities for our own
services in satellite territory would be authorized. Also, as
provided for in the proposed policy, we agreed to make parallel
approaches to other countries to persuade them to cooperate with us
in putting the joint policy into effect.
The joint efforts of our two governments met with some success. With
the cooperation of other friendly countries, a blockade against the
export or sale of aviation equipment to the USSR or satellite
agencies was successfully established and satellite air operations
to the Near and Middle East were blocked. Some difficulties,
however, were encountered in carrying out the air transport aspect
of the policy insofar as satellite air operations to Western Europe
were concerned. It developed that there was not a clearcut
understanding between His Majesty’s Government and ourselves with
respect to the severity of the restrictive measures intended in this
respect. This problem soon became reflected in the attitudes of
several Western European countries who began to show uncertainty as
to how tightly they should control satellite air operations to their
territories.
Under these circumstances, the Department of State considered it
advisable to review the United States policy (NSC 15/1), from which our joint policy
stemmed, and concluded that it would be desirable in this connection
to secure the current views of our military authorities concerning
the military security factors involved. We were subsequently
informed by the Department of Defense that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
believed there were military advantages to be gained by such civil
air penetration of satellite territory as might be arranged through
bilateral agreements between satellite states and non-curtain
countries on a reciprocal basis, that is, the granting of landing
rights in non-curtain states, including the United States, to
satellite states in exchange for similar landing rights in satellite
territory. Our military authorities, however, did not believe a
balance of advantages were obtainable through an exchange of rights
between Near Eastern, South Asian, and African countries and any
satellite state and that
[Page 28]
continued “containment” of satellite civil air operations in that
area was required in our national interest. It was concluded that
our policy (NSC 15/1) should be
modified to bring it into consonance with such revised views of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and with current political, economic and civil
aviation considerations.
comparison between new and old policy
It is believed that it will be of assistance to the addressee
missions charged with the responsibility of implementing this new
policy, as well as to those to which this instruction is being
transmitted for information, if the similarities and differences
between the new policy and its predecessor are highlighted.
An important, if not the most important, common denominator between
the new and the old policy is the fact that the United States
believes that civil air operations of USSR and satellite air
carriers outside the area of Soviet control are motivated primarily
by military considerations and are opposed to our national interest.
This conclusion was contained in NSC
15/1 and has been reaffirmed in NSC
15/3.5 There has been no essential change,
therefore, in our estimation of the nature of the problem with which
we remain convinced the United States and other non-curtain
countries must effectively cope. Secondly, we continue to believe it
imperative that our multilateral effort to prevent the sale and
export of aircraft and associated aviation equipment to Soviet and
satellite agencies be continued. Furthermore, we continue to believe
that Soviet and satellite air operations to the Near Eastern, South
Asian and African area should be blocked. Finally, we still consider
that the predominant consideration underlying the problem is that of
military security. This concept found expression in our previous
policy and is reemphasized and confirmed in our new policy.
The principal difference between the old and new policy is in the
extension of the tactics which we believe can be effectively
employed in combating the threat to our national interests contained
in USSR and satellite air operations outside the Soviet area of
control. Our previous policy called for only one counter measure:
the complete blocking of such operations through the erection of a
counter iron curtain of the air along the periphery of the Soviet
controlled area by the United States and other countries in Western
Europe and in the Near and Middle East. Our new policy, however,
envisages the possibility that the United States and certain
non-curtain states, particularly certain Western European states,
might be able to beat the USSR and its satellites at their own game,
i.e. efforts to effect a reciprocal exchange of air services with a
satellite state should be made by the
[Page 29]
United States or other non-curtain states if it can be clearly determined that a net
balance of advantages would result, particularly from a military
security point of view. This course of action, to be undertaken only
after certain definite criteria are met, is an active tactic as
compared with the passive and relatively defensive measure to which
we previously limited ourselves. The adoption of this additional
tactic should not be construed to mean that we have “relaxed” or
“softened” our previous severely restrictive policy. Such a
conception would be without sound foundation, not only because it
would be illogical for us to embrace an “easier” policy in the face
of a reaffirmation of the seriousness of the security threat with
which we are still confronted, but furthermore because any egress by
a Soviet or satellite air carrier into non-curtain state territory
would be permitted under our new policy only if the recognized
disadvantages of such egress were more than offset by advantages to
be gained from penetration of satellite territory.
A second point of difference is that the new policy is global and is
intended to be applicable to all areas of the world where USSR or
satellite air carriers may attempt to operate; its predecessor,
while intended to be applicable to USSR and satellite air operations
wherever they might be found, did not specifically include the Far
Eastern area.
A third point of difference lies in the responsibility given the
Department of State for establishing the identity from a political
relations standpoint of those states which should be deemed
satellites, whereas the previous policy listed certain satellites by
name. Additionally, provision is made in the new policy for
permitting minimum facilities necessary for the operation of such
satellite air services outside satellite territory as may be agreed
to and for securing adequate facilities for United States and other
non-curtain air carriers in satellite territory. This modification
is intended to reflect only realistic recognition of the fact that
if the United States or another non-curtain state should determine
that reciprocal air services should be exchanged it would, of
course, be necessary to grant the satellite air carrier concerned
the minimum “turn around” facilities and servicing necessary to
insure reciprocal requirements in satellite territory.
Lastly, the new policy provides for a re-oriented approach to the
problem of satellite air operations over the occupied zones of
Germany. We recognize the fact that we will probably be unable to
continue in all cases to use our position in Western Germany as a
barrier to Soviet and satellite air operations. For example, if a
reciprocal air service between a non-curtain state and a satellite
state transitting Western Germany were established, as permitted
under our new policy, we would almost certainly be obliged to grant
overflight authorizations to that satellite state even though the
United States itself
[Page 30]
were
unable to secure reciprocal benefits in the territory of the
satellite requesting such authorizations. This would be particularly
true if, following the cooperation between the United States and the
non-curtain state concerned which is called for in the new policy,
the United States had previously indicated it perceived no objection
to such a reciprocal air service. However, if the United States
found itself in such a position, i.e. of approving overflights of a
satellite air carrier, it would unquestionably endeavor to use such
concessions as a bargaining lever to secure air rights in the
territory of that satellite in behalf of United States carriers.
