This study was received with much interest by the French Minister of
Foreign Affairs.2 He,
for his part, is having the question studied by his legal adviser.
The Embassy has the honor to transmit herewith to the Department of State
a note summarizing briefly the conclusions of the study which has been
made at Paris.
It would be happy to learn the observations to which this document may
give rise on the part of the American authorities.
[Annex]
The French Embassy to
the Department of State
secret
Subject: Possible Italo-Yugoslav Agreement on
Trieste
As the study made by the Department of State points out, the possible
conclusion of an Italo-Yugoslav agreement on Trieste would pose a
very delicate legal problem. Such an agreement would constitute in
effect a novation with respect to the treaty of peace with Italy. If
this novation were accepted by all the signatories of the treaty of
peace, no difficulties would arise. But it is almost certain that
the U.S.S.R. would object thereto. Hence, one must ask oneself by
what means this opposition could be neutralized.
In this connection two entirely different attitudes on the part of
the three Western Powers may be envisaged:
Either they strive to secure a legal and moral basis for the
agreement reached, which, at the beginning, would be lacking;
Or else, on the contrary, they will refrain from any mention of the
legal aspect of the question, leaving to the new state of affairs
created by the accord its character as a de
facto situation.
[Page 1336]
In the first alternative, it appears that an appeal to the General
Assembly of the United Nations is in fact the only possible
procedure. The U.S.S.R. which, it is assumed, would be hostile to
the agreement contemplated, would not fail to veto the proposal in
the Security Council. Aside from the fact that the appointment of a
governor of the Free Territory of Trieste figures on the agenda of
the Council, the appeal to the Assembly would present serious
disadvantages. The moral authority of a decision taken by the
majority of the Assembly would no doubt carry great weight. Its
legal value would nevertheless be questionable. Indeed, if one were
to invoke Article 12 of the Charter it would not be a question,
under the circumstances, of the Assembly’s making recommendations,
but of confirming purely and simply an important modification of the
peace treaty. Would the appeal to the aforementioned Article 12 be
justified under such conditions? It seems that on this point the
U.S.S.R. could raise serious objections. On the other hand, no
matter how large a majority might declare itself in favor of the
Italo-Yugoslav agreement, it would nevertheless be true that the
treaty of peace would be modified without the consent of all the
signatories.
It is therefore to be feared that the intervention of the General
Assembly would furnish the U.S.S.R. with valid pretexts for
denouncing the illegal character of our action.
From another point of view, it is to be feared that the U.S.S.R.,
arguing from this “violation” of the peace treaty, would profit
therefrom to free itself, if the occasion should arise, from certain
obligations which hamper it. To be sure, it has not failed to
interpret to its liking the peace treaties with the satellite
countries. Would it not be inopportune, in this respect, to furnish
ammunition for its propaganda? These considerations are all the more
worthy of study because it would be a question, this time, of
modifying territorial clauses of the peace
treaty with Italy.
Besides these general objections, the suggestion of the Department of
State calls forth two specific observations.
First of all, we do not see how the United States, Great Britain, and
France could intervene as signatory powers of the declaration of
March 20, when, in all probability, an Italo-Yugoslav agreement
would deviate considerably from the terms of that declaration. If,
then, the matter were to be laid before the United Nations, it would
be preferable to leave it to Yugoslavia to make an appeal to the
Secretary General of that organization.
Moreover, it appears difficult to have recourse to a plebiscite of
the local populations. With respect to the zone which would be
assigned to Yugoslavia, it would be strange, to say the least, to
invoke, as
[Page 1337]
ratification
of the agreement, a popular vote organized by a totalitarian
country. If there were to be a plebiscite, it would be necessary
that it be supervised by an international commission under the
auspices of the United Nations. Would the Belgrade Government accept
such supervision? It is improbable.
The other possible attitude, on the part of the Western Powers, would
be to refrain from any mention of the legal aspect of the question,
and even to reserve it formally. The end which we seek is, in fact,
the settlement of an irritating quarrel which is poisoning
Italo-Yugoslav relations. This objective would be attained by the
agreement itself. Consequently, what is the good of furnishing an
opportunity for a Soviet maneuver by trying to give that agreement
an insecure legal basis? Would it not be infinitely preferable,
while welcoming the new arrangement, and while acclaiming the
intentions of which it is the realization, to declare at the same
time that we could not acknowledge that it has a definitive legal
value until all the signatories of the peace treaty had given their
consent and an amendment to the treaty had been effected. This
rather Platonic declaration of principle would have the advantage of
cutting short any controversy with the U.S.S.R., without however
preventing the agreement from going into effect. Furthermore, if so
desired, it would permit the maintenance, if only as a token force,
of British and American troops in the present zone A which they are
occupying by virtue of the peace treaty. Subsequently, if
circumstances were propitious, we could request the U.S.S.R. to join
us in recognizing the agreement entered into between Rome and
Belgrade. A refusal on the part of Moscow would then no longer have
any practical bearing.
