Office of the Historian

320/10–1350: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

secret
Washington, October 16, 1950—7 p. m.

403. Ref Delga 119.1 Dept suggests fol gen course of action re Iraq-Syria res regarding United Action for Peace.

1.
Preferred course of action is that US Del shld, after consultation with UK and France, seek urgently to persuade Iraq and Syria to withdraw res.
2.
Dept agrees with gen point of view expressed by Younger2 Oct 15 that opposition to consultation with USSR wld place US and other democratic states in bad position vis-à-vis world public opinion. Opposition might likewise have unfortunate domestic political repercussions. Furthermore, entirely possible that res might carry with Sov support, despite US opposition.
3.
Dept agrees fully with view expressed by Dulles that 4 power discussions at this time wld be futile and might divert US and world public opinion from task of going forward with program of strengthening the free world position both within and outside UN with particular reference to rearmament effort.
4.
Therefore, Dept suggests that if course of action suggested in para 1 is unsuccessful, Syria-Iraq res shld be amended along gen lines of Mex Res in GA of Nov 3, 1948 (A/PV 154).3
5.
Specifically Dept suggests three possible amendments:
a)
The last para of the preamble placing blame for present situation equally on Western democracies and USSR shld be omitted.
b)
The Dept is inclined to believe that the time limit for termination of discussions shld be eliminated or extended beyond the present session of the GA. Dept influenced in this conclusion by belief that in absence of such amendment, present session GA will be unable to take action on any matters where disagreement between West and USSR until Great Powers have reported results of discussions and GA has debated reports. This wld completely frustrate present session of GA. Amendment of this nature wld be consistent with US position that always willing to consult with Soviets on critical problems. At same time such amendment wld recognize factual situation that discussions without advance preparation wld certainly be futile. Dept’s views on this matter differ from positions tentatively taken by UK, France, etc. during discussions Oct. 15. Dept believes important res also not specify any set time for commencement talks. This will preserve flexibility and open possibility avoiding talks unless some useful purpose develops.
c)
The res shld make it clear that 4 powers shld not discuss problems in the solution of which other states have strong interests and shld not make agreements at expense of other states. Dept believes that it wld probably not be advisable to list in res possible subjects of discussion.
6.
You shld consider advisability of attempting to secure Iraq-Syrian sponsorship of or at least consent to proposed amendments.
7.
Prior any discussions with Iraq or Syria reps, you shld have further discussions with France, UK and such other friendly delegations as you deem advisable, especially, since Dept’s views as to time limits of consultations differ from those expressed in discussions at Mr. Dulles’ home on Oct 15.
8.
Since the initiative for any consultations wld come from UN, Dept’s position is that 4 powers shld not be represented by foreign secretaries.
9.
If it is not possible to secure amendments along lines suggested herein, Dept’s view is that US shld abstain on res.
10.
If proposal made to include Chinese in discussions US shld not oppose.
Acheson
  1. Not printed.↩
  2. Kenneth G. Younger, British Minister of State (Foreign Office), Member of the British Delegation to the General Assembly.↩
  3. For documentation on this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. i, Part 1, pp. 89 ff.↩