IO Files: US/A/C.1/1929
Mr. John Foster Dulles of the United States Delegation to the Permanent Representative of France at the United Nations (Chauvel)
Dear M. Chauvel: In our talk today you raised the question as to whether the General Assembly could constitutionally recommend to the Members of the United Nations the designation of armed forces available for collective use, and could thereafter recommend collective use if the Security Council failed to act to meet aggression.
Your doubt, as I understand it, rests upon the fact that Article 11(2) provides, as an exception, that “Any such [peace and security]1 question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion.”
In our opinion this provision of Article 11(2) does not in any way impair the broad authority of the General Assembly to discuss and [Page 347] make recommendations. The only limitation is, we think, contained in Article 12(1), which says that “While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.”
Obviously this provision of Article 12 should be respected and by our resolution it would be respected.
The matter of Members maintaining within their national forces elements available for service as United Nations units is clearly not a “question on which action [by the Security Council] is necessary” within the meaning of the last sentence of Article 11 (2).
As regards the proposal that the General Assembly might hereafter recommend the collective use of such units, this you will recall would only happen if the Security Council fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security with respect to a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or act of aggression.
I have no doubt that the General Assembly has the power to recommend such use under those circumstances. The limitation of Article 12(1) is fully respected. The General Assembly would not, under the conditions indicated, be in any sense encroaching upon the authority of the Security Council, or duplicating its activity, for the Security Council would have had its opportunity and would have failed to act. Surely under these circumstances the recommendatory authority of the General Assembly is made explicit by the provisions of Article 10 and the first part of Article 11 (2).
There is no conflict between these provisions and the exceptions concerning “action” in Article 11(2). The “action” referred to in Article 11(2) consists of binding decisions—orders—of the Security Council under such Charter articles as 40, 41 and 42.
It is, of course, recognized that the General Assembly does not have any such power to take action; if action—binding decisions and orders—as distinct from recommendation, is necessary, the matter should be referred to the Security Council, which alone has that power of action. The General Assembly does, however, under Article 10, have the general power to make recommendations with respect to “any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter”, subject only to Article 12(1) preventing duplication. Surely the phrase “the scope of the present Charter” is broad enough to include the matter dealt with in Chapter VII and this was designed at San Francisco. One of the most bitterly fought and last agreed to Articles, was this Article 10. It was a final concession made by the so-called “Big Five” to the so-called “Little 45”. The Russians fought it to the [Page 348] last, and only gave in under the strongest sort of persuasion, including a statement by our Secretary of State conveyed to Moscow that we would go ahead without them unless they accepted this broad power of recommendation in the General Assembly. The Soviet Union gave in at the last moment and very reluctantly. Their reluctance stemmed from the fact that they recognized that this power of recommendation would, subject to Article 12, be as broad as the whole Charter and include matters within the scope of Security Council jurisdiction.
The issue of whether or not the General Assembly should have that broad power of recommendation was fought out at San Francisco and was resolved there and seems to be perfectly expressed by unambiguous language.
It would, I suppose, hardly be contended that the provisions of the Charter prevent the Members from acting collectively against aggression except with the approval of the Security Council, where the veto exists. If that were so, the Charter would not be a bulwark, but a trap tying the hands of the law-abiding nations which would serve the purpose of any Great Power aggressor. Surely if the Members want to, they can create military units available for collective defense and if they want to, they can put those units into action. Article 51 makes this entirely clear. We feel that the Charter enables them to use the General Assembly as the place for working out this voluntary system to carry forward the fundamental objectives of the Charter. This would be based on recommendation only. To get this result, the Members do not have to go outside the framework of the United Nations. The Charter is, happily, a flexible instrument and responsive to growing needs.
Sincerely yours,
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