661.9331/8–1349: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
[Received 1:37 p. m.]
2025. As first formal and public move in otherwise undisclosed pattern of Soviet intentions toward Communist China recent unheralded [Page 962] announcement of trade agreement between USSR and “Manchurian People’s Democratic Authorities” gives us tangible clue to nature of understandings which may have been reached between Mao and Kremlin (Embtel 189620 and Nanking’s 1727 to Department, August 6).
First reaction some foreign observers here was that trade agreement represented Soviet move to detach Manchuria from rest China and that storms brewing between Moscow and CCP. While Manchuria may become eventual bone of contention between Communist China and USSR, information Nanking’s 5521 re Kao Kang’s status and favorable reaction CCP-controlled press effectively dispel any illusions or [of] rift at this time and in fact points toward agreement as being initial step carefully worked out plan for “economic cooperation” between Communist China and USSR with special reference Manchuria.
Existence such understanding was foreshadowed Nanking’s 37, June 922 which impresses this Embassy as sound analysis Soviet economic intentions Manchuria, Interesting to note, however, that press announcement here referred to trade delegation as representing “Manchurian People’s Democratic Authorities” whereas Nanking’s 1727 indicates Chinese Communist press uses phrase “Northeast People’s Democratic Government of China”.
Natural query is why even if authorities concerned felt agreement to regularize trade necessary public announcement had to be made at all—and at this time. Embassy suspects that publicity stemmed more from Mao’s need to prove to followers that he is on right track in eschewing economic aid from capitalistic West and pinning his hopes for industrialization China on Soviet aid than any other factor (his July 1 speech23). Note that “industrial equipment” first item on list Soviet products to be sent Manchuria.
Desire meet Mao’s needs this regard must have outweighed in Soviet thinking considerations re de facto recognition, etc., mentioned Nanking’s 1727, which in present context China situation could appear to Soviet mind as mere “formalities”. Soviets may feel they could if necessary defend “correctness” their course by citing principles and precedents international law under which trade agreements as such do not constitute recognition. Also possible that Soviets and Chinese Communists may have decided better arrange agreement be concluded on Chinese side by local Manchurian authorities in order minimize any outcry re recognition.
[Page 963]Fact that agreement was made name [with?] Manchurian group does, however, stimulate speculation re separatist form Manchuria (and other border areas such as Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia) may assume in eventual political constitution Communist China. Possible Soviets envisage establishment Federation Chinese Socialist Republics as pattern best suiting Kremlin purposes.
Whatever may be form of autonomy enjoyed by Manchurian Chinese Communist Republic, it now seems clear that Manchuria will become scene of marked Sino-Russian “cooperative” effort out of which both parties anticipate political and economic benefits. Soviets will thereby achieve strong leverage on China as a whole for internal recovery latter dependent Manchurian capacity for heavy capital growth. Soviets may also see in Manchuria their industrial base FE to counter balance US-dominated Japan.
Blinded by ideological glare, Mao and Co. may see in industrialization Manchuria under Soviet direction only basic cure for many economic ills China. It will be worth our while to follow closely and to exploit whenever possible inherent contradictions in this Kremlin “point four” program for Manchuria, for Soviet inability to deliver on economic aid will bring Chinese Communist disillusionment while on other hand even if aid forthcoming and economic development considerable Soviets would exploit fruits thereof for their own purposes and thus reveal to Chinese Communists and “progressives” true nature Soviet imperialism.
Sent Department; repeated Nanking 88, Dairen 29, Canton 46.
Department pass Peiping 3.
- July 31, p. 955.↩
- Same as No. 1727, August 6, from the Counselor of Embassy in China, p. 956.↩
- Same as No. 1246, June 9, noon, from the Ambassador in China, vol. viii, “Political and military situation in China”, chapter V.↩
- See also telegram No. 1443, July 6, 1 p. m., from the Ambassador in China, vol. viii, ibid .↩