611.9331/4–2949: Telegram
The Minister-Counselor of Embassy in China (Clark) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 1—12:11 a. m.]
Cantel 296. For US approach Communists with statement no intention intervene civil war and expressing willingness enter trade relations with Communists, as suggested Shanghai’s 1389, April 27,53 repeated Nanking 798, Canton 346, would seem mistaken tactics. In present situation any conciliatory move on our part would be regarded by Communists as either trap or as indication grave weakness. If former, it would subject us to embarrassment having overture rejected. If latter, we should have to deal with them on terms they impose, which can scarcely be less than humiliating.
[Page 935]Fact of matter is that Communists need American commodities and this need is our principal political weapon in eastern Asia. We should, then, employ it only under conditions our own choosing and for attainment ends of paramount importance. Thus, we feel that request, or even indication desire, for trade should come from Communists so that we will be in position to extract minimum quid pro quo.
I am equally of belief that statement to effect we have no intention intervention in civil war would serve no useful purpose at this time. Our position on intervention has been made abundantly clear in past, and Department’s most recent statements on China further clarify issue. Repetition at present juncture would attract little or no attention if made in general way, and, if addressed specifically to Communists, might well be seized on by them as pretext exorbitant demands on military aid, position of ECA54 and similiar subjects, to which we could deliver no answer satisfactory to them.
Granted treatment our consular officers Communist areas leaves much to be desired and that situation Mukden should be protested fullest and remedied earliest, I think we have much to gain and little to lose by sitting it out little longer. I envisage Embassy Nanking will be ignored as such even more than has been case consular offices and that we will inevitably be led withdraw all personnel except those in consular or administrative capacities. Granting that Mukden is exception because of physical hardships of prolonged incarceration of personnel, I feel that threat of withdrawal other consular personnel would meet with ready acquiescence from Communists who seem to have established one way street for foreigners out of their areas with no way back. Fact that Peiping is still on air and that communications have been reestablished Tientsin seem encouraging. It may be that Communists are learning, as their contacts with foreigners increase, and that they may come of themselves to realization [of] need for more recognition international comity and useful functions performed by consular offices. At present time, there does not exist, in reality, any Communist government of China. It may well be that when such government is constituted, following convening of PCC,55 that there will come about change for better in attitude toward foreign diplomatic and consular establishments.
In conclusion, I believe course suggested in Shanghai’s 1389 offers little or no guarantee ameliorating present disabilities our consulates and Embassy. Also, such course would prejudice our future bargaining position at time when much larger issues may well be at stake. [Page 936] For this reason, and because of fact Communists have yet [to] form government capable development policy [respecting] treatment foreign Embassies and Consulates, I believe that for time being other means should be devised and used to attain ends we desire in this field.
Sent Department, repeated Nanking 233, Shanghai 186.