Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East: China, Volume IX

893.20/8–2849: Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Jones) to the Secretary of State

Nanking, August 28, 1949—7 p. m.
[Received August 29—9:42 a. m.]

1922. ReDeptel 620, August 25 to Canton, repeated Nanking 1012. Li Tsung-jen [and] Pai Chung-hsi military capabilities to organize and continue resistance in SW against Commie domination of all China must be considered limited, in light of past performance.

Favorable factors: (1) both are well-known among Chinese civilian and military personnel; (2) Pai as field commander demonstrated ability to defend line of Yangtze River until Nationalist troops on his east flank withdrew permitting Commies cross river and outflank his forces; (3) Pai when outflanked and threatened by forces of second and fourth Red field armies executed orderly successful withdrawal from Wuhan area to Hengyang areas; (4) Pai’s troops have recently demonstrated limited offensive capabilities; (5) Pai has under his command 300,000 to 350,000 troops. Of these minimum of three Kwangsi armies, according to Pai’s own statement, are absolutely loyal; (6) terrain in SW China is favorable for fighting guerrilla action.

Unfavorable factors: (1) neither Pai nor Li have demonstrated aggressive leadership either militarily or politically necessary for successful revolution or counter-revolution. They have failed to eliminate Generalissimo from politico-military scene and seize available Nationalist wealth and military supplies necessary successfully to combat Commies; (2) Pai’s troops to date have fought mostly defensive action against Commies and their ability to launch real offensive still remains to be demonstrated; (3) in event of actual split with Generalissimo it is possible that only Pai’s three Kwangsi armies or force of 120,000 troops would remain to fight underpaid Shanghai [sic] leadership; (4) the area to which Pai would be forced to withdraw is already invested [infested?] with Commie bandit groups who operate in (a) Yunnan-Kwangsi, (b) Kwangtung-Kwangsi and (c) Kwangtung peninsula areas, (5) area to which Pai would be forced to withdraw is capable of being cut off from SE, thus presenting problem for expensive and perhaps prohibitive air supply to maintain his forces. Conclusion: If well-supplied, Nationalists estimated that Pai’s forces could maintain themselves against superior Commie strength for maximum period of one year.

So long as proposed stronghold remains area of more or less static defense, effect on overall Commie military effort will be unimportant. Military consolidation of other Commie areas will not be affected since very little redisposition will be required. It is estimated that during time required to set up Pai’s stronghold and obtain sufficient supplies to constitute threat to Commies, latter will have completed their present offensive and be in position to regroup their southern forces both for purpose of containing or attacking Pai and for sweep down coast in order to deny him use of suitable supply harbor. In latter connection, Commies will probably make use of valuable amphibious operational experience gained during successful assault on Miao Tao group and current attack on Chou Shan group.

In attempting to determine advantages and disadvantages of further military assistance to Nationalist forces on mainland, following political considerations suggest themselves.

On attractive side:

(1). Effective military resistance in southwest China, even for relatively short period of one year, would obstruct southward sweep of Communism and give countries of SE Asia that much more time to strengthen their common defenses.

(2). Area of free China able successfully to resist for next year would have encouraging effect on potential resistance groups within Commie China; would supply through clandestine means guerrilla leaders and arms to active resistance pockets within Commie China: would deal blow to prestige of PLA¹⁰ and generally weaken Commie authority in newly won areas which they are attempting to consolidate.

(3). If spirit of resistance and forces of liberalism are to be kept alive in Commie China, help and inspiration must come during first year and before CCP¹¹ has had two or three years in which to consolidate its power and eliminate all political-military resistance.

Contrary considerations are:

(1). Static defense of two or three southern provinces for temporary period does not lead to any positive goal. It is at best holding operation providing time. Unless there is unforeseen and rapid deterioration in present Commie position, there is little likelihood that offensive action against Commies could be seriously contemplated except for isolated guerrilla activities.

(2). Open hostile attitude toward CCP would unquestionably eliminate now and for some years to come any question of establishment relation with new government in Peiping.

(3). Renewed military aid to Nationalist leaders would mean rapid extinction of all American interests in Commie China. Before instituting such policy all Americans should be evacuated from Commie areas.

(4). Policy of overt assistance to anti-Commie military forces would probably strengthen rather than weaken CCP’s ties with Moscow.

(5). Overt interference in China’s civil war at this late stage would add renewed fuel to Chinese chauvinism and renewed support to CCP propaganda.

(6). Any group which must depend for its continued existence upon foreign aid is unlikely to prove savior of China. When indigenous resistance group can find means for its support among masses, has proved its ability to exist independently and expand its influence, only then can foreign assistance be effective.

(7). Renewed military assistance to Nationalists would probably be greeted with disapproval by influential political groups in SE Asian countries who are already influenced by Commie propaganda and suspicious of our motives.

(8). Our western allies would undoubtedly disapprove and attempt to disassociate themselves further from us in any Communist front Far Eastern policy.

(9). Military assistance to China would siphon aid away from Western European countries where exist effective instruments for resistance to Communism.

On balance it would appear that, even if Pai were successful in holding out in Kwangsi with American military aid and advice for next year, the most optimistic estimate of benefit deriving from such resistance would be outweighed by resultant adverse effect on overall US foreign policy.

Sent Department 1922, repeated Embassy Canton 806.

Jones

10. People’s Liberation Army (Communist).
11. Chinese Communist Party.