Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East: China, Volume IX

893.00/8–2449

Memorandum by Mr. John P. Davies, Jr., of the Policy Planning Staff⁷

[Washington,] August 24, 1949.

The Problem

To devise a decisive form of pressure which can be exerted on the Chinese Communists to compel them to respect the United States and moderate their behavior.

Analysis

1. Never in the history of U.S. relations with China has the predominant regime of that country viewed us with such uncompromising enmity. Never has the prestige of the United States in China been so low. And never have we been so apparently at a loss to make our influence felt in China.

2. Chinese Communist malevolence toward the U.S. and our loss of prestige are the product of a number of readily recognizable factors:

a. Communist ideology, by the terms of which we are branded as a hostile force;

b. The fact that we allied ourselves with the Nationalists and are therefore open enemies of the Communists in the Chinese civil war; and

c. Soviet intrigue and incitement of the Communists against the U.S.

3. But there is another factor which has thus far not been adequately examined in this Government. That is the mistaken evaluation by the dominant faction in Chinese Communist leadership of international realities and power relationships in the world. The Communists’ victory over the Nationalists armed with American weapons, their humiliation of the British Navy in the lower Yangtze and their ignorance of the real significance of air power have resulted in the thesis that the U.S. is a “paper tiger”. The U.S.S.R. certainly has no interest in disabusing the Communists of this mischievous fancy.

4. For our part, it must be admitted, we have done little to belie the role of “paper tiger” attributed to us. Such economic controls as we have instituted have been overshadowed by the Nationalist blockade of Communist China. And in any event, economic measures lack the quality of sharp and concentrated impact; their effect is felt gradually and in a diffused form.

5. As for military measures, we have quite rightly rejected resort to the traditional forms of armed intervention. The mishap of HMS Amethyst marked the end of the era of gunboat diplomacy. The day of Boxer expeditions is also past; the landing of troops these days represents a commitment of prestige and strength which, in the case of Communist China, would be most unlikely to serve any practical purpose and which once committed would constitute a continuing drain of dangerously indefinite proportions and duration.

6. All in all, this is a risky and explosive combination. It is one in which initiative lies in the reckless hands of the Chinese Communists. Unaware of power realities in the world and uncurbed by any manifestation of effective counter-force, fanaticism can feel free to engage in the dangerous game of mounting provocation.

7. The remedy to this intolerable state of affairs lies in our finding, if they exist, hitherto undiscovered means whereby we can bring overwhelming pressure to bear on the Chinese Communists, in finding these means to resolve upon their use where necessary, and finally making it known to the Communists that we have both the ability and the will to do compelling damage to their vital interests.

8. In seeking these means of military pressure, it is well to have clearly in mind what our objectives would be in so employing our armed strength. Obviously, it would be utterly quixotic for us to embrace as an objective the unconditional surrender of the Chinese Communists. It would be only somewhat less unprofitable to create a formal state of war with the Chinese Communists. The only feasible aim is a limited and flexible one—coercion by punitive action or the threat thereof. It is evident that such coercion should be effective and enhance rather than detract from our prestige. The punitive action should be more costly and painful to the Communists than to ourselves. For political reasons it should do the minimum possible personal damage to the Chinese people. Finally, it would appear to be the part of good sense in applying such coercion to avoid, so far as feasible, contributing to a further consolidation of Soviet influence and control of China.

9. Given these objectives, let us explore what forms of punitive action we might take. We have written off as impracticable the traditional measures of military coercion; gunboats and small-scale expeditionary forces. We have not, however, examined the possibilities of utilizing air power, including naval air, as a potential punitive instrument. The advantages of employing air power against the Chinese Communists are several.

a. It can be brought to bear with comparatively great force and flexibility against not only coastal areas but the interior of China.

b. The Chinese Communists cannot, so far as we now know, seriously counter air attack.

c. The use of air power involves the minimum tying down of our prestige; air power does not commit us to holding fixed positions.

10. Air power is, of course, a weapon of broad utility, broader than the selective aims of coercion require. As our aim would be the coercion of Communist leadership, not the mass destruction of civilian morale and lives, air operations employed in total warfare, such as saturation bombing of cities, are excluded at the outset.

11. The concept of the air arm as an implement of coercion narrows down therefore to highly selective bombing of such installations as arsenals, railroad roundhouses and factories. To minimize further the unavoidable damage which would be done to the civilian population, warning would have to be given of impending attacks and rationalization of our military action provided the Chinese people through propaganda media.

12. If the total effect of this punitive potential is calculated to exceed by an overwhelming margin the profit which the Communists could gain through continued provocation in the face of such retaliation, then it is possible that we have at hand the instrument which we seek. This basic question must, of course, be subjected to rigid scrutiny and evaluation by the Military Establishment and, in the light of the NME’s findings, reviewed by the Department of State.

13. Meanwhile, it may be helpful, proceeding on the assumption that the sum total of our punitive capability is a compelling force in our relations with the Chinese Communists, to examine some of the implications of this concept of coercion through a selective use of air power. In these circumstances it would become possible for us to establish a graduated scale of punitive action. We could tailor our reprisal to the provocation, knowing that in a contest of mounting provocation and retribution we could in the end win out. This means a maximum economy of force.

14. But what is more important, we could by apprising the Communists of our capabilities and resolve create the possibility of preventing rather than attempting to cure crises in our relations with them. This would involve a secret approach to the Communist leaders (so as not to stiffen their resistance) along the following general lines:

a. We consider that we have put up with enough misbehavior on their part;

b. We do not feel that their interests or ours will be served by their laboring under any misapprehensions regarding means at our disposal for bringing our displeasure home to them;

c. They are, therefore, advised of a graduated scale of punitive air action which we can take against their military and industrial bases in China;

d. We will not hesitate to take these punitive actions in accordance with the degree of provocation given us; and

e. We will feel free to resort to these measures so long as their regime is not recognized by us, which will be so long as their international behavior is that of bandits and blackmailers.

15. It might be desirable in this connection to consider the possibility of concentrating punitive operations, at least initially, on installations in Manchuria rather than in China Proper. This suggestion is based on the theory that, if we are to embark on attritive action, we can most profitably direct our attention to those arsenals and factories which are of the greatest importance to Soviet as well as Chinese military and economic power. Such action or the threat thereof would perhaps also serve to bring into play Soviet admonitions to the Chinese Communists to cease or refrain from provocation.

16. The foregoing suggestion raises one of the principal objections which can be advanced to the concept of coercion through air power. Very legitimately it can be inquired where such punitive action would lead to. Would it involve us in incidents and possibly even conflict with the U.S.S.R.? The answer to this question is that such punitive operations might very well do just that. We might, particularly if we engaged in air attacks on Manchurian installations, find the U.S.S.R. giving vigorous but disguised air support to the Chinese Communists along the pattern of the Spanish Civil War. This would undoubtedly make our task more difficult and hazardous. But at the same time, it must be remembered that the proposed punitive operations are quite dissimilar in nature to the situations in which the Axis and the U.S.S.R. became involved in Spain. These would be hit-and-run, attritive raids and not attempts to capture and hold positions or impose a certain form of government on the country. Finally, the question must arise someplace in our relations with the U.S.S.R.—and it will probably be in Asia—whether we can afford to follow indefinitely a policy of avoiding risks of conflict with them at whatever the cost to us. If supreme caution is to be our guiding rule with the U.S.S.R., then we had best not embark upon a course of military coercion in China.

17. Another objection which may be raised relates to some 2,500 American citizens now residing in Communist China. It may be assumed that if we take military action of the nature described in the preceding paragraph, without reference to our hostages in Communist hands, these Americans will be made the butt of Communist vengeance. In such circumstances, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that many or all of them would either be executed by the authorities or massacred by mobs. This consideration is a major deterrent to our drifting into an exchange of reprisals for provocation. It is the strongest argument, however, for making our capabilities and resolve known to the Communist leadership as a protection to the Americans now at their mercy. Americans in Communist China are likely to be in less danger if the Communist leaders realize that harm done them will be prohibitively costly than if no sobering restraint is placed on Communist caprice.

18. Finally, there are considerations of our obligations under the U.N. Charter, our position in the international community and the attitude of the American public toward a policy of military coercion. These are practical questions regarding the circumstances under which we would be justified in resorting to a punitive course. Bombing does not have a good name in world public opinion. Even though it might be directed at acceptable installations, there would unavoidably be a certain amount of damage to civilian property and loss of civilian lives. This would not be condoned in the public mind unless the provocation were generally regarded in the category of an outrage. Direct Communist aggression against Hong Kong might provide international sanction for coercion through selective bombing. The murder or execution of Americans would probably provide a similar justification. These considerations then are a strictly limiting factor on what we could do by way of coercion. It would appear that we could not embark upon such a course, even on a limited scale, until the Communists have so acted as to justify our retribution along the lines of this paper.

Recommendations

19. The NME should be requested to examine the concept of coercion through selective use of air power in our relations with the Chinese Communists and having done so to make its conclusions known to the National Security Council for further consideration.

7. Notation by the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Sprouse): “Maybe I’m old-fashioned, but this has to be read to be believed.”