894A.00/12–2349

The Chinese Ambassador (Koo) to the Secretary of State

Dear Mr. Secretary: I am directed by my Government to present to you the following Memorandum.

My Government hopes that you will be good enough to give it early consideration and lay it before the President for decision.

[Page 458]

“On November 3, 1949, Mr. John J. Macdonald, United States Consul-General at Taipeh, Taiwan (Formosa), called on Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and, pursuant to instructions of the Secretary of State, presented to him a Memorandum expressing the concern of the United States Government over the situation in Taiwan. The Generalissimo duly communicated the contents of the Memorandum to the National Government and the Provincial Government of Taiwan. General Chen Cheng, Governor of Taiwan, in response to similar representations made to him on November 4, 1949, by Mr. Macdonald, sent him a written statement for the information of the Department of State regarding the military and political situation of Taiwan.

“After careful consideration of the United States Memorandum the National Government wishes to declare solemnly to the United States Government that it will spare no effort to preserve Taiwan as a central base of operations against Communist aggression and that it will urge the Provincial Government of Taiwan, following the principle of full cooperation between the provincial authorities and the people, to exert its utmost efforts for the political and economic progress of the Province in order that the people of the island may enjoy a democratic and stable life, thereby establishing a marked contrast to the enslavement and miserable conditions obtaining in the Communist-controlled areas on the mainland and thus serving to strengthen the will of the Chinese people in opposing Communism.

“To attain the above-mentioned objectives, the Chinese Government will make the utmost effort on its own part to overcome the great difficulties with which it is confronted in the present situation; but it earnestly hopes at the same time that the United States Government will have a sympathetic understanding of these difficulties and will help it to resolve them. For the defense of Taiwan from Communist domination will have a very important bearing upon the general defense strategy of the democratic and free nations in combating Communist aggression in the whole Pacific area.

“If the United States Government could see its way to approve China’s request for technical and material assistance as proposed below, the Chinese Government will not, on account of such aid, neglect its own responsibilities or relax in any degree its own efforts. The Chinese Government believes that the following requests for aid are well within the limits of the existing legislations of the United States providing aid to China.

“I. Technical assistance:

“A. The Chinese Government wishes to procure the services of 30–40 officers for each of the three branches (military, naval and air) of its defense establishment. The officers are expected to assist in the planning of the three defense services of China and in the work of supply, administration and training of the armed forces. The proposed number of officers should include five to seven marine officers who will assist in the training of Chinese forces for amphibious operations. These officers may be selected by the United States Government for appointment from among American officers in active service or in retirement. If the United States Government desires that these officers should not be asked to participate in first-line combat duties, the Chinese Government [Page 459] will respect this desire and will not ask them to undertake any such work.

“B. The Chinese Government also desires to engage 20–30 American political and economic experts to assist the authorities of the Taiwan Provincial Government in planning and carrying out projects in the fields of industry, finance, commerce and trade, agriculture and public administration, and in ensuring the effective use of any aid granted.

“The above-mentioned officers and specialists will be employed by the Chinese Government on a voluntary and contractual basis and their remunerations will be paid by the Chinese Government. It is hoped, however, that some arrangements may be made for defraying their remunerations out of the funds provided for under the existing legislations on United States aid to China.

“II. Material assistance:

  • “A. Of a military kind:
    • “(1) Military supplies and equipment for at least six “M” divisions.
    • “(2) About 16 naval craft of categories suitable for patrol duties, and fuel and oil for such craft and other vessels of the Chinese Navy.
    • “(3) Necessary spare parts, certain repair shop equipment, and aviation gasoline for the Air Force.
    • “(4) Equipment for Signal Corps, spare parts and repair shop supplies for Tank Corps, and a small number of field radar stations.
  • “B. Of cm economic kind:
    • “(1) The Chinese Government hopes that the United States Government will take steps to bring about an extension of Section 12 of Public Law 47 (81st Congress),80 so that the existing balance of the fund for aid to China under the Act may be fully utilized until the end of 1950, and that two-thirds of such balance, approximately $60,000,000, may be spent in Taiwan for the following purposes:
      • (a) Purchase of commodities;
      • (b) Industrial reconstruction;
      • (c) Agricultural rehabilitation; and
      • (d) Stabilization of currency.

“With reference to the foregoing proposals, the Chinese Government has consulted Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek for his views. The Generalissimo, in view of the urgency of the situation in Taiwan, also earnestly hopes that the President of the United States and the Secretary of State will see their way to give full consideration to the proposals as promptly as possible.

“The Chinese Government wishes to add that, although the foregoing proposals have been prepared on the basis of the particular needs of Taiwan alone and although the difficulties in the other combat areas are exceedingly great, it will continue to exert itself to maintain these areas. The security of Hainan Island, especially, is of strategic importance as an auxiliary base of operations to supply the Government forces in the south-western Provinces of China now still resisting the Communist advance. The Chinese Government therefore earnestly [Page 460] hopes that the United States Government will also give the necessary aid in order more effectively to defend the said Island.”

I remain [etc.]

V. K. Wellington Koo

[For a Department document entitled “Policy Information Paper—Formosa”, “Special guidance No. 28, December 23, 1949”, prepared by the Public Affairs Area, Policy Advisory Staff, and circulated to posts in the Far East, see Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 82d Congress, 1st session (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951), part 3, pages 1667–1669. For testimony by Secretary of State Dean Acheson in June 1951 in regard to this document, see ibid., pages 1663–1711.]

  1. Approved April 19, 1949; 63 Stat. 50, 55.