893.01/5–1449: Telegram

The Minister-Counselor of Embassy in China (Clark) to the Secretary of State

Cantel 379. Feel we must wait event before determining who should follow Nationalist Government in move from Canton (telCan 160, May 11 [10],13 repeated Nanking 570, Shanghai 895). As I see picture at moment, Generalissimo is not acting in good faith and resources Taiwan will not be subject authority Li Tsung-jen. Also, I do not believe Generalissimo plans resume authority this stage.

Canton appears at mercy Communists whenever they choose exercise capabilities occupying city. The protestations of all and sundry, including highest government leaders with whom I have talked of determination fight to finish do not carry conviction. Underlying everything they say is evidence fundamental belief eventual Communist occupation all China. Even Li Tsung-jen’s supporters are [Page 317] planning for a future envisaging Communist China. (Cantel 378, May 14, 11 a. m.)

When final break with Generalissimo comes, whether it is published or not, Li appears to have three alternatives: (1) remove capital elsewhere on mainland—Chungking is prominently mentioned—and continue battle; or (2) withdraw to Kwangsi with support by Pai Chung-hsi’s Army, hoping Communists will by-pass province and eventually permit conclusion “Peiping peace” on terms acceptable to Li; (3) go abroad and endeavor rally overseas Chinese and others to support by clandestine as well as by overt measures elements remaining in China in resistance to Communism.

There is much talk at moment that first course will be followed and that resistance forces will be organized in northwest and southwest China. I have been asked by three separate cabinet members as to advisability maintaining capital on mainland as opposed moving Taiwan. I have, of course, insisted decision must be Chinese.

My best guess at moment is that in the event Li may pursue each of the three alternatives in turn. In other words, he may seek move government in first instance Chungking. Retaining Kwangsi as his own personal bastion, Pai Chung-hsi’s headquarters are at Chuan-hsien, Kwangsi, obviously indicating likelihood falling back on Kwangsi province. Should his position Szechwan prove untenable and should he be unable negotiate satisfactory “Peiping peace”, Li could then go abroad. Since Li is aware insignificant role being played by Li Chi-shen and Fu Tso-yi,14 he will [not] attempt to place himself in similar position. Likelihood is, therefore, that he will wind up abroad.

It seems certain that Canton will fall in a matter of weeks. My present guess is mid-June. It seems to me that the talk of rallying northwest and southwest behind a government removed to Chungking is largely wishful thinking. As I have previously reported the prime motivation in actions of all leaders with whom I have come in contact is self-interest. There are unimportant exceptions to that statement. I cannot conceive that leaders in the northwest or southwest can be prevailed upon to give other than lip service in support of any Li Tsung-jen government that might move from Canton. Li will be able to count on armies Pai Chung-hsi only and his government would represent and be supported by only those who could expect short shrift under Communists. People almost without exception want peace and are unaware of and uninterested in implications Communist China. Even among literate there is belief in the inevitability of Communist domination and determination endeavor temper its harshness. Any such government would not, of course, exercise any control over Taiwan [Page 318] which Chen Cheng admits will be the haven for generalissimo should he choose go there.

On balance, therefore, at this stage, I feel we would run risk of making ourselves ridiculous if we were to follow any government which might be set up elsewhere than canton when canton falls. On other hand, desirability maintaining friendly vote in UN and other international organs might warrant running risk. It seems to me to follow French suggestion of sending “officers of lesser rank” to follow government would be inadvisable. Either we support the government and I go along, or there is no need of sending anyone.

Sent Department Cantel 379, repeating Nanking 283, Shanghai 236.

Clark
  1. Post, p. 687.
  2. Chinese commander in north China who remained in Peiping after Communist occupation.