893.00/4–2749: Telegram
The Minister-Counselor of Embassy in China (Clark) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 28—7:49 a. m.]
Cantel 287. Presence Canton Chu Chang-wei (Cantel 266, April 25 and 278, April 26) as well as information coming from other sources indicates strong probability that Li Tsung-jen has found his position untenable and is really determined upon showdown with Gimo.
Since taking office as Acting President, Li has had constant failure obtain respect his authority with resulting frustration largely through [Page 281] interference Gimo. Thru his control Kmt, armed forces, Nationalist treasury, secret police and persons remaining in office who are personal followers, Gimo has exerted his authority [garble] and can continue do so despite anything Li can do. Either, therefore, Gimo must be removed irrevocably from scene or Li must make other plans. He cannot be expected continue in present untenable position.
Gimo’s response to Li’s efforts at Hangchow was offer of compromise wherein both ostensibly shared power, altho in reality Li’s position remained unchanged. Li has rejected proposal and is currently attempting secure adherence Kwangtung generals and get promise support from US.
Li’s plans envisage rallying and organizing bloc, comprising northwest, southwest and south China, to continue civil war and seek material aid from US. On other hand, Gimo’s policy involves concentration all possible resources Taiwan for prolonged defense island in hope that he may hold it until war between Soviet Union and US saves him. Thus he is unwilling risk any considerable portion his resources for military adventures on mainland. Under these conditions it is virtually certain he will refuse accede Li’s demands, and open break between Li and Gimo may be confidently expected.
Without resources controlled by Gimo, Li lacks means for prolonged resistance. Altho he claims support various provincial leaders west and south China, it is highly doubtful that this would include any substantial military effort on part those concerned. They are largely-interested in maintaining their own position and even if Li could offer prospect large US aid it is unlikely they would come positively to his, assistance. When Li fully realizes that no US aid is forthcoming, that he cannot rely on positive assistance from his southwestern would-be allies, and that his sole remaining source of strength is armies Pai Chung-hsi, he will very likely remain Kwangsi and make whatever arrangement with Communists may be possible. Communists might conceivably by-pass Kwangsi and leave Li in peace for quite some time.
Factors outlined above give impetus to already strong trend toward regionalism, and so defeat attempt on part any Nationalist leaders [to] firm up organized resistance. Thus, further Communist ad vanee into South China likely follow pattern series local settlements, with little military activity involved. It may well be that, convinced effective resistance an impracticality, and seeking most favorable possible terms, Li and Pai will agree lend their forces to facilitate Communist take-over of South. There is certainly no friendship or trust at present between Li and the Canton generals. In any event, day is obviously not far off when anti-Communist China will be so fragmented [Page 282] politically that Nationalist Govt will cease to exist as Nationalist force and will become little more than another regional authority. At that time we will have to scrutinize situation carefully in effort to determine whether continued recognition will make us look ridiculous in eyes of the world.
Sent Department, repeated Shanghai 180, Nanking 228.