893.00/7–349: Telegram

The Consul General at Shanghai (Cabot) to the Secretary of State

2600. Chase81 and Thomas82 had interesting talk Thursday evening with Democratic League leader Han Ming; also participated in by Mr. Amos Wong who helped arrange meeting. Han (who recalls pleasant wartime acquaintance with Vincent,83 Sprouse,84 Freeman85 and other FSO’s) seems clearly belong to League’s pro-American moderate wing which includes Lo Lung-chi, Chang Tung-sun and Yih Tu-yi; is City Editor of newly reemerged Hsin Min Jih Pao; is close friend and frequent contact of FonOff Chief, Chang Han-fu, and Deputy Chief, Hsu Yung-yin. Both he and Amos Wong are much concerned over increasing seriousness Shanghai situation and need for foreign help in coping with it. Han feels that current Shanghai troubles involving foreigners are not due to Communist wishes but to temporarily unavoidable difficulties centering on:

1.
General intransigence of labor, whether under foreign or Chinese employment, in exploiting opportunity to extent which Communists disapprove but cannot presently afford suppress, irrespective rights [Page 1194] and wrongs, for fear seeming to champion capitalists, imperialists and so losing urgently needed mass support.
2.
Deeply ingrained suspicion and sensitivity which rank and file Communists have re all American, British actions and which Americans, British fail appreciate.
3.
(Especially stressed by Han) Unfortunate lack, pending recognition, of communication channel between Communists and foreign Consuls for proper understanding and discussion troubles, problems. Communist officials reluctant, deal with Consul publicly (in offices and office hours). They prefer out-office informal contact but also cautious re that. While genuinely desiring meet foreign representatives, they are accordingly unable find adequate means therefor. Result is misunderstandings and aggravation troubles.

Han indicated that in such circumstances, and especially in pre-recognition period, Democratic Leaguers who understand viewpoints both sides, could and should help as intermediary communication channel.

By, way illustrate Communist psychology, Han mentioned North China Daily News case. He said outburst against paper’s publication of items re Nationalists’ mining of Yangtze and foreign (British) aid in sweeping for mines came as result Communists’ exasperation over what they regarded as old-style imperialistic face-insulting tactics of British authorities in making patronizing offer to clear mines in return for Communist release of British warship Amethyst.

He said that as editor himself, he well realized difficulties operating newspaper to satisfaction of Communists. Even Ta Kung Pao is perplexed over problem. Communist authorities one day blame papers for not following CP line and next day criticize for slavish imitation.

Han regretted Gould’s decision close Evening Post and could not help feel Gould not acted wisely. He feels convinced Communists are perturbed over closure; have been anxious have one American and one British paper continue publication. He pointed to ability of NCDN to continue publication despite clamor for its closure as evidence to support his conviction.

Chase, Thomas expressed full concurrence re urgent need adequate means communications between Communists and Consuls to prevent misunderstandings and permit disposal potentially dangerous matters before reach serious stage. They mentioned as example ConGen’s predicament with respect extensive demands by former Navy employees, pointing out that development of trouble to violent stage could not fail react seriously on all local as well as general relations between new regime and Americans, and mentioning danger that underground anti-Communist agents might likely lose no chance to help stir employees to violence against ConGen for which Communist authorities would be blamed. Had also pointed out that, while it might be somewhat embarrassing for authorities to “champion imperialists” to extent intimating to ex-employees need for refraining from violence, it would [Page 1195] be infinitely more embarrassing if violence once started and authorities had to choose between leaving it unchecked or interfering forcibly against laborers. Han apparently impressed and, without any request from Consulate officers, thereupon said he would talk over ConGen’s problem with Chang Han-fu at first opportunity and requested background memo re matter (which ConGen has already supplied him).

Throughout talk Han mainly stressed need for communication channel. Believe that he presented views on own initiative rather than by request Communists but that he is nevertheless sufficiently close to local Communists to have good understanding their present line of thinking and desires. ConGen officers much impressed by his intelligent and earnest interest in problem and absence any desire push himself forward.

Sent Department; repeated Nanking 1435, Canton 850, Peiping 189.

Cabot
  1. Augustus Sabin Chase, Consul at Shanghai.
  2. Reuben R. Thomas, Administrative Attaché at Shanghai.
  3. John Carter Vincent, then Counselor of Embassy in China.
  4. Philip D. Sprouse, then Third and Second Secretary of Embassy in China.
  5. Fulton Freeman, then Third Secretary of Embassy in China.