856d.00/5–549: Telegram
The Chargé in Australia (Foster) to the Secretary of State
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88. Burton, who returned with Prime Minister Chifley from London this week, sent for me, today and expounded for an hour the present Australian position on Indonesia. He spoke with unusual earnestness and none of his customary sardonic flippancy. Said he was communicating to me formally for transmission to highest levels Washington the views of Prime Minister and Australian Government, but added Makin1 would supplement by call at Department.
Burton said as background that in London Chifley expressed in strong language to other Commonwealth Prime Ministers and senior British Cabinet Ministers following thesis: the Indonesian problem has been handled very badly from every point of view; on basis of Critchley’s reports from Batavia, repeatedly proved sound in past, Australia satisfied that Dutch are making no general effort reach settlement; there will be no such effort until UK and US compel Dutch make it; meanwhile situation Southeast Asia growing worse all the time.
Burton said he believed Chifley made deep impression on Commonwealth Prime Ministers and especially on Attlee,2 Bevin and Cripps.3 Added Chifley told British in effect it was time for UK give cooperation to Australia if it expected continuing cooperation, for example loans in return. Remarked incidentally that Chifley refused attend London meeting on aid Burma, riot for reason suggested by press, but only because he believed any country furnishing arms to Burma could expect same outcome as US had with Nationalists in China. Said graft and corruption in Burma far worse than ever in China.
Burton said Nehru and Chifley see eye to eye on Indonesia.
Burton showed me secret telegram being sent today to CRO London and Australian Mission New York, Batavia, Ottawa, Wellington and New Delhi substance as follows: Australia has full and incontrovertible “appreciation” from Critchley. Negotiations between Dutch and Republicans continue but are “informal and completely non-committal”. Dutch insist that before restoration at Jogjakarta there must be cessation guerilla warfare and agreement on Hague Convention; SC resolution does not admit such conditions. Meanwhile Dutch make no undertakings re prisoners, cessation hostilities or return Republican area to Republican administration as required by SC resolution. [Page 405] Cochran bringing strong pressure on Republicans to make concessions which they obviously cannot afford, thus permitting further Dutch stalling. Change in US policy probably because of change in China; US now evidently wants force Republicans to settle. But this is fatal mistake. Meanwhile Chinese in Indonesia have all joined Republicans. Dutch are playing for time so can argue in GA next week that negotiations are in progress and just not be embarrassed by GA discussion. Australia is “disturbed” by Atlantic Pact group all voting recently against GA discussion Indonesia. US and UK must once and for all “bring Dutch to adopt realistic attitude regardless of their alleged domestic difficulties”. Australia will now insist on GA discussion and hopes other Commonweath governments will adopt similar attitude for sake minimizing damage Dutch are doing to interests of western countries in Southeast Asia (end Burton’s telegram).
Burton said with apparently full conviction that UK has at last realized gravity Indonesian situation and will act restrain Dutch. He gave no intimation, however, what action he believes UK will take or what actions or sanctions Australia is prepared to adopt. He reiterated what he has told me in past that Australia does not want Dutch leave Indonesia (Embtels 277, 278, 280, December 20, 21 and 28 and January 54).
Please instruct my reply Burton concerning our present position re Indonesia.
Sent by Courier to Wellington, Kew Delhi and Rangoon.
Sent Department; repeated Batavia, USDel New York, London, Ottawa.
- Norman J. O. Makin, Australian Ambassador.↩
- Clement R. Attlee, British Prime Minister.↩
- Sir Stafford Cripps, British Chancellor of the Exchequer.↩
- None printed, but see memorandum of conversation on December 20, 1948, Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. vi, p. 589.↩