501.BC Indonesia/3–3049: Telegram
The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 1
312. Gocus 647. Believe Department should take advantage Stikker’s visit Washington to impress upon him Batavia meetings may be last opportunity make progress towards constructive solution Indonesian problem.
Continued unyielding position Netherlands together with defiance SC would give support to view of many observers that Beel plan and Hague Conference were improvised for purpose of drawing SC off Netherlands trail and delaying to allow attempt solidification Netherlands position here I suggested (Gocus 6352) Netherlands policy may be either transfer sovereignty under such conditions and to such weakened USI that latter could not succeed or premeditately permit situation to deteriorate to such level that Netherlands might appear warranted in holding transfer sovereignty impracticable. Latter alternative would follow decline moderate Republicans and asoendancy Tan Malakka, leftists and violent militarists. If latter alternative develops, then Netherlands would insist SC policy wrong all along and Netherlands should then be aided with materials and perhaps even with force to put down what they would term Communist war against them in Indonesia.
I have believed that SC Resolution January 28 represented, and in fact still represents, well-advised program but recognize that continued delay and Netherlands attitude toward moderate Republican leaders result hi steady deterioration their position together with probable increasing ineffectiveness their ability stop hostilities.
As Department is aware, I have taken lead in UNCFI for calling Batavia meetings and attempting obtain best possible atmosphere. Conditional acceptance, appointment Van Royen and resultant delay could indicate Netherlands may make vigorous prolonged effort through most experienced representative to defeat purpose directive. [Page 355] Van Royen’s nomination might possibly indicate recognition potential usefulness of Batavia meetings and necessity best possible Netherlands representation well aware broader implications and world opinion. I have as yet no evidence to indicate latter to be case.
As Department well knows, I have always given Stikker credit for highest motives. I realized difficulties with which he has to contend. Cables from Hague and Department reports on conversations with Netherlands Embassy Washington tend to cause doubt, however, as to whether there is genuine intention backed by adequate character and strength in Netherlands Government to carry through promised accelerated SC transfer sovereignty. Department should impress upon Stikker that UNCFI will make serious all-out effort assist parties implement SC Resolution and come to understanding on Hague Conference. It should emphasize seriousness of situation and likelihood UNCFI will give parties only limited period within which to demonstrate good intentions and reach agreement. It might refer Stikker to second paragraph UNCFI report first March in which Commission unanimously staged that “first Steps” up to Netherlands and that only after restoration Jogja and release political prisoners could Republican Government discharge its responsibilities. This forecasts UNCFI will insist on Netherlands responsibility first move and that only after clear indication Netherlands willingness to mate that move will there by [be] any hope success on (1) cease-fire and (2) time and conditions Hague Conference. In absence Netherlands initiative and full cooperation, vigorous and condemnatory report to SC by UNCFI appears inevitable. Signed Cochran.