501.BC Indonesia/3–1849
The Netherlands Ambassador (Van Kleffens) to the Secretary of State
My Dear Mr. Secretary, It was my hope that you would be able to see me to-day in view of the latest developments in Lake Success and, as a result, in Holland, with regard to the Indonesian question.
In reply to my inquiry I learned that your time will be taken up with Congressional hearings, and that you suggest a talk on Monday. This, I assume, means that on Saturday too there will be no chance of seeing you. I therefore shall be very glad to come on Monday, but I am anxious to write to you without delay since I do not feel justified in withholding until Monday from you my realization of the fact that a situation is developing in Holland which gives cause for alarm. The circumstances are these:
You know that in regard to Indonesia the question is not whether that archipelago is to be free and independent. That question is answered in the affirmative, most especially in Holland. Nor is the question when it is to be free and independent: the reply is, so far as we are concerned: if possible in a few months time, well before the end of the year, months before the date suggested by the Security Council of the United Nations. The only question is: how can this best be brought about?
The United Nations Security Council, in a resolution of January 28, called upon the Netherlands in order that the Government of the republic of Indonesia (one of several Indonesian States to be federated in the United States of Indonesia, and the only one with which there are difficulties) be returned to its capital city of Djokjakarta with full powers of administration. I may mention in passing that the republic has made this return a condition for fresh negotiations, thereby going farther than the Security Council’s resolution.
If the Republican Government is reinstated in its capital without qualification, it is certain that those elements, now in hiding, will return with the government of the republic to its capital who have previously prevented that government from coming to terms with my Government. They are: communist leaders who, though ardent communists, do not (or do not openly) admit allegiance to Moscow, and secondly heads of armed organizations whose power depends on the perpetuation of unsettled conditions.
It is for that reason that, as honest people, we felt, and feel, that we cannot take upon ouselves to carry out that part of the Security Council’s resolution without some reasonable qualification. If we took another attitude, we would be untrue to ourselves and to the Council, for [Page 326] against our better knowledge we would do something which we are convinced in our heart and conscience would be a sure way of preventing agreement from being reached. No republican government, if subjected again to the dual influence I have just mentioned, could afford for reasons of its own personal safety to come to an agreement with us on any terms.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs has done his best to find a compromise. He suggested to your Government and to the United Kingdom’s Government that, if they could support him he would sponsor the return of the republican government to Djokjakarta as a government, with full civil administrative authority, it being understood—in order to prevent the simultaneous return of the frustrating elements above referred to—that we would undertake to police that city and surrounding district. The United Nations Commission for Indonesia could be our witness that we would let the republican government administer Djokjakarta and environs, and deliberate, communicate and consult in full freedom, as called upon by the Security Council’s resolution.
You know what reply you and the British Government returned to this suggestion. I am anxious to bring this matter further, and therefore refrain from comment on that reply. But I am anxious to make a few observations on what happened after that reply was made on March 12.
On March 11 the Canadian Representative in the Security Council, stressing the desirability for the Council of doing everything possible to aid the parties to enter upon direct negotiations, stated that it would seem useful that the United Nations Commission for Indonesia would assist in reaching an agreement between the parties as to the time and conditions under which the proposed conference at The Hague would be held. He added that “it would be understood, of course, that these exploratory discussions under the ‘auspices of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia would be without prejudice to the resolutions of the Security Council and to the rights, claims or positions of the parties” (page 37–40, United Nations Document S/PV417).
This, although not ideal, seemed to us a reasonable idea and the Netherlands Representative in the Security Council, on behalf of the Netherlands Government, officially accepted the Canadian proposal in the terms and with the objective as formulated by the Canadian Representative. We fully understand that the authority of the Security Council has to be duly taken into account, and that therefore it is difficult to deviate from its resolutions very much, although in the Kashmir and Palestine cases such deviations from the Council’s resolutions were more than once accepted with a view of achieving agreement between [Page 327] the parties. But we also think that if, owing to an insufficient appreciation of the facts as they are on the spot, the literal text of the Council’s, resolution of January 28 went a little too far, this should be corrected in carrying out the resolution. This the Canadian draft takes into account, and in a spirit of compromise (we have made express reservations with regard to the original Council resolution of January 28) we were, and are, prepared to accept it. It semed to us better than the suggestions made by the Chinese Delegate in his speech in the Security Council on March 11, which in our view were more in the nature of admitting the return of the republican government to Djokjakarta without sufficient qualification.
The Canadian draft seemed to have very good chances of being accepted, and its acceptance seemed assured if the United States Delegation would accept it. To our great regret, and without understanding the necessity for it, we then heard in spite thereof that the United States Delegation had made a different tentative draft. This draft, as we have it, reads as follows:
“It is the sense of the Security Council that the United Nations Commission for Indonesia, without prejudicing the Council’s resolution of January 28 and the rights, claims and position of the parties, should assist the parties in reaching agreement as to the time and conditions for holding the proposed Conference at The Hague, including the manner in which the restoration of Djokjakarta to the administration of the Government of the Republic may be accomplished, to the end that the negotiations contemplated by the resolution of January 28 may be held as soon as possible. It is further the sense of the Council that, if such an agreement is reached, the holding of such a Conference and the participation by the United Nations Commission for Indonesia in accordance with its terms of reference would be consistent with the basic purposes and objectives of the Council’s resolution of January 28, 1949, which remains in full force and effect.”
We fail to see why it was necessary to draft this text, even in a tentative form, a draft which we are convinced would, if adopted, make agreement between the parties impossible, because it neither adds nor implies a qualification to the return of the republican government to its capital (see above), and, without any necessity, stresses the “full force” of the Council’s resolution of January 28. That is the essential difference with the Canadian proposal, which, whilst entirely compatible with the Security Council’s resolution of January 28, makes it possible to implement that resolution in such a way that ultimate agreement between the parties is not endangered.
This raises a crucial domestic issue in Holland, where the nation is getting restive because it is felt the Government’s attempts at reasonable compromise are not duly acknowledged abroad. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, who hopes to meet you here on April 4, has asked me [Page 328] to invite your serious attention to this situation, which may—there is no point in hiding it—lead to his early resignation, and perhaps to that of the whole cabinet. Dr. Baruch, who is on the spot, will be able to explain to you what that would mean.
I must admit in all candor that I do not see what can be gained by an attempt to exact from the Netherlands a too literal application of the resolution of January 28. The loss is certain: no agreement in Indonesia. On the most difficult point of that resolution (the return of the republican government to Djokjakarta), Mr. Stikker has explained in his personal letter to Mr. Bevin with which you are familiar, that this problem could find a practical solution, it being understood that the republican government would thereupon take part in the proposed Round Table Conference. This general idea you too seemed to favor in your letter of March 12. Your Government and the United Kingdom Government know that, if and when the parties shortly meet in conference, the Netherlands will not be found unreasonable. If the United States Government considers the Netherlands as a nation which abides by its promises, then it is very difficult to understand why the United States Delegation in Lake Success should believe that it is incumbent on it to present a text stipulating expressly that the unqualified re-instatement of the republican government in Djokjakarta is the aim and purpose of the contemplated conference, and reiterates, again expressly, that the Security Council’s resolution of January 28 remains in full force.
Quite apart from their importance and effect in Indonesia, such useless reiterations have an effect on the States-General and on public opinion in Holland which I feel I must call to your earnest attention. It is an effect of exasperation. At a moment when Argentina, France, and the United Kingdom would no doubt accept Canada’s text if only the United States would accept it—and China and Norway then would accept likewise—they see that the United States refuse, and, being unable to find any reasonable explanation for this refusal, they believe that it is in order to side with the Indonesian republic and against the other, non-republican Indonesians and the Netherlands themselves. It is felt that on our side so many concessions have already been made without there becoming apparent any appreciation by others for our accommodating attitude. In order to gain a generally workable solution, we have agreed to continue recognizing the republican government as a party to the dispute as before; notwithstanding the serious doubts as to the competence of the Council to deal with the Indonesian question and the refusal of the Council to submit this important point to the Court of International Justice for its advice, we have announced our willingness to carry out the resolution of [Page 329] January 28, to the extent to which it is compatible with the responsibility of the Netherlands Government; we have decided to transfer sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia a full year earlier than foreseen by the resolution; we have thereby reduced the interim period and the necessity for arrangements for an interim-government to a minimum; and so there are more concessions which I will not enumerate fully in this letter.
But this is not a process which can be continued indefinitely; the line obviously has to be drawn at the point where a further concession (such as the unqualified application of the Security Council’s resolution of January 28) would endanger if not nullify the chances of ultimate agreement between the parties. That point, it is felt in Holland, has now been reached, and the exasperation of which I spoke springs from lack of support abroad of this reality after we have shown our goodwill by a series of concessions on major points, our suggestion for a Round Table Conference and our desire to set up the United States of Indonesia a year earlier than the Security Council itself had envisaged. The Dutch people is naturally patient, but its patience has its limit somewhere, and that limit is now visible. It is not, as I said, drawn by either whim or caprice, but by cogent consideration of being unwilling to make concessions which endanger or nullify the chances of ultimate agreement.
There is a strong feeling amongst the people in Holland that at the moment there does not exist that real confidence between our nations which must be present if the Atlantic Pact is to be a success. Irrespective of what this or any Government in Holland would wish or prefer, this feeling is reaching a degree of intensity which is such that it may discharge itself, so The Hague assures me, in some irrational way. If next Monday, March 21, American influence in the Security Council results in the adoption of a decision which as honest people we cannot accept, knowing that subversive influences will make it impossible for the republic to come to terms, Mr. Stikker wishes you to know that this may well result in an open rupture between ourselves and the Security Council, and this when the margin is so small, and when it is difficult to see what general or Western interest should prevent adoption of the Canadian compromise. Mr. Stikker furthermore fears that public opinion would then strongly oppose Netherlands participation a few days later, in the conclusion of the Atlantic Pact, however much he and the other members of the Cabinet would desire this participation.
For these reasons, Mr. Stikker has directed me to submit these considerations to you long enough before Monday (when the Security Council’s decision is expected) so that you can decide what instructions [Page 330] to give to the United States Delegation in the Security Council, and to express to you his very earnest hope that by accepting the Canadian compromise the United States Government will not go farther against our reasonable attitude than other Governments who are to join us in the Atlantic Pact, Governments who have that confidence in our sincere intentions with regard to Indonesia which the Canadian proposal presupposes and to which my nation feels entitled.
I venture to express the hope that on Monday you will find it possible to authorize me to tell my Government that your Delegation in the Security Council will support the Canadian proposal.
Believe me to remain with high regard
Sincerely yours,