501.BC Indonesia/3–1249: Telegram
The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 1
niact
253. Gocus 628. Received from British Consulate General, March 12, 6 p. m., copies letters exchanged between Stikker and Bevin. At hour preparation this message, have received section one only of Usgoc 331.2 From my recent cables and Gocus 624 to 6273 inclusive, Department will have seen my opposition to any bargaining with Netherlands oil restoration Jogja. Since Stikker letter differs from five points covered Gocus 625,4 I submit following comments compliance Usgoc 329.5
First paragraph Stikker letter-gives well-known arguments in justification military action which SC has condemned.
Paragraph 2 argues against sound concept SC resolution namely that restoration Jogja necessary to enable Republicans issue most effective call to guerrillas. There is calculated risk of disorder which believe must be taken in view other important considerations. Seriously doubt Republicans, if permitted return to small area Jogja, would launch campaign victimization while surrounded on all sides by Netherlands military forces with planes, bombs, etc.
Paragraph 3, if Netherlands Government genuinely contemplates turnover sovereignty in few months, cannot believe such last ditch opposition should arise against real restoration, to say nothing of “token return”.
Paragraph 4, while naturally favor cooperation, think SC should resent Netherlands effort avoid any UNGA [debate?] or suspicion their compliance with SC resolution.
Point 1, Republican Government cannot exercise appropriate functions in full freedom including administration Jogja area, if Netherlands authorities remain responsible for law and order therein. Clashes would appear inevitable, even if Republicans agreed to such arrangement, which I consider unlikely.
Point 2, convinced cease-fire order issued by Republicans when not functioning freely and in position authority would have poor response.
Point 3, law and order not being well maintained in Jogja now with
Point 4, Netherlands would interfere with progressive withdrawal of Netherlands forces anticipated under SC resolution and delay any action thereon until agreement at round table.
Point 5, no comment. This already anticipated by paragraph 4(D) SC resolution.
Point 6, by military action Netherlands has already disrupted economic, financial, and social structure Indonesia. Restoration Jogja, accordance SC resolution, would be first orderly step toward reconstruction and under eyes UNCFI anxious see best results achieved.
Point 7, Republican leaders have already assured UNCFI representatives informally that when restored Jogja will call emergency government members Jogja and revoke all delegated authorities.
Point 8, UNCFI has military observer Jogja and would plan augment number considerably even to using entire force if necessary to observe turnover to an administration under Republicans. Civilian members could also be stationed there or visit frequently as circumstances warrant.
Point 9, Netherlands token restoration cannot be taken seriously if accompanied by demand that immediately after return of Republican Government to Jogja, delegation for round table will leave for Hague, such delegation to include Sukarno and Hatta. This would give no time for bringing in and consulting scattered leaders by Republican Government. Furthermore, would necessitate absence Sukarno at time when his efforts might best be devoted to pacification. I favor one of two top men being at Hague constantly, and Sukarno agreed thereto (Gocus 624) but I share his idea re advantage of his being principally Jogja. Bevin has expanded some above arguments.
As for remainder letter, “sweeping proposals” of Netherlands Government which to date have been so vague as to arouse little enthusiasm will cause Netherlands Government to be suspected launching colossal swindle if they insist stubbornly on holding out against SC resolution on point Jogja restoration, while giving no undertakings. I have gone along with round table idea, since I feel we could at Hague have best chance either force Netherlands give honorable deal or be shown up in true light, and dealt with accordingly. If Drees Government not strong enough weather Jogja, could surely never get transfer sovereignty agreement ratified. Arguments in regard to Netherlands effort create stability in Indonesia with 100,000 soldiers for over three years, patently [Page 322] fallacious. Unfair Netherlands approach US and UK Governments separately, seeking concessions under SC resolution in which both governments have participated. Inclined doubt moral value Netherlands in group of Atlantic friends, if inclined use friendships to escape compliance with judgment of majority Western powers and entire east.
In summary, I consider Stikker’s approach weak and unconvincing. While willing compromise on means when motives beyond question, in light foregoing, must recommend strictest insistence upon prompt Netherlands compliance with SC resolution provisions pertinent restoration Jogja and free functioning government there. I recommend against stronger SC, throwing problem back to UNCFI for negotiations in bitter atmosphere Batavia. Recommend SC show strength expected of it by Asiatic countries and by BFO delegates, remembering that latter have just broken from Netherlands dominance to stand beside Republicans in resolution March 3, but awaiting SC outcome before making announcement. Signed Cochran.
- Repeated in telegram 224, March 15, 4 p. m., to The Hague, to be forwarded to Brussels for Kirk. [Page 321] Netherlands nominally in full authority. Insufficient civil police likely to be found available. Mixture Republican civil with Republican military and Netherlands military would lead to troubles. Republicans would never trust Netherlands military to decide when an emergency exists.↩
- See telegram 237, March 10, p. 314, and footnote 1.↩
- Telegrams 246, March 10, p. 311, and 252, March 12, not printed.↩
- Telegram 250, March 11, p. 315.↩
- Telegram 155, March 10, p. 314.↩